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A laska’s election system is among the most secure in the coun-
try, and it has a number of safeguards other states are now adopting. But 
the technology Alaska uses to record and count votes could be improved—
and the state’s huge size, limited road system, and scattered communities 
also create special challenges for insuring the integrity of the vote.  
In this second phase of an ongoing study of Alaska’s election 
security, we recommend ways of strengthening the system—not only the 
technology but also the election procedures.  The lieutenant governor 
and the Division of Elections asked the University of Alaska Anchorage to 
do this evaluation, which began in September 2007.
The Division of Elections itself  
first identified a number of pos-
sible security improvements, and 
we evaluated their feasibility and 
potential benefits. We also identified 
additional improvements.
 The table shows our main rec-
ommendations, dividing them into 
changes the state could make be-
fore the 2008 primary and general 
elections and changes that would 
take longer to put into effect.
 The biggest recommendation is 
that the state upgrade all its tech-
nology to a new system recently 
developed by Premier Election Solu-
tions, which manufactures the voting 
machines and related technology 
Alaska and other states use. 
That new system is important. It 
corrects a number of vulnerabilities 
in the current system, identified in 
Phase 1 of this study. But as of April 
2008, it had not yet been certified 
to standards required by the fed-
eral Election Assistance Commission. 
Alaska can’t use the new system until 
it is certified—and when it is certi-
fied, it will take a lot of time, money, 
and people to do the upgrade. It will 
have to be installed on hundreds of  
optical-scanning machines, touch-
screen devices, election-manage-
ment servers, and other equipment 
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Recommendations for Improving Alaska’s Election Security
Change By 2008 Election Why? Change After Election Why?
 Verify  the accuracy of  
voting technology before 
and after the election, by 
comparing code in voting 
machines with correct, 
registered code
 Install new software that 
allows election officials to  
create a more-secure pass-
word authentication system 
for touch-screen machines 
 Change passwords on all 
voting technology through-
out the system
 Use tamper-evident 
seals on shipping cases and 
envelopes
 Add election-security 
material to poll workers’ 
training manual
 Increase vigilance about  
security procedures in 
absentee polling locations
 Purchase state-owned 
voting machines for use in 
North Slope Borough, rather 
than borrowing borough-
owned machines
This series of  changes 
in technology and 
election procedures will 
make the existing tech-
nology more secure; 
improve security proce-
dures among election 
officials and poll work-
ers; and help increase 
Alaskans’ confidence 
in the integrity of  state 
elections. 
These measures can all 
be taken in the short-
term, before the August 
primary and the Novem-
ber 2008 election.
Upgrade voting machines 
and other technology to new, 
improved platform
  Establish long-term 
security goals and a method 
for measuring progress  
 Improve testing processes 
to insure all voting technolo-
gy is functioning properly and 
recording votes accurately 
 Develop and implement 
a standard plan for tracking 
and changing passwords
 Improve system for track-
ing the number and location 
of  voting machines, through 
bar-codes or other inventory-
control measures
 Strengthen storage facili-
ties for voting machines and 
other system components 
with dead-bolt locks, alarms, 
ceiling grids, self-locking 
doors, and other features to 
prevent forced entry 
 Buy more-secure shipping 
containers for optical-scanners 
 Recruit and train more 
poll workers
 Consider partnerships 
with other institutions to 
do ongoing evaluation and 
implementation of  changes in 
election-security technology  
Installing the new plat-
form is the single-most 
important change the 
state can make, be-
cause it will reduce or 
eliminate risks of  vote-
tampering identified in 
the current system. But 
the platform must first 
be certified to the Elec-
tion Assistance Com-
mission’s 2002 Voting 
System Standards, and 
after that will require 
an estimated 1,000 
man-hours to install 
on election equipment 
statewide. Even if  it 
were certified soon, 
it is not practical now 
to install the upgrade 
before the 2008 elec-
tions, given the time, 
expenses, and logistics 
involved.
The other post-election 
recommendations are 
either longer-term 
enhancements of  
measures recom-
mended for 2008, 
or additional security 
measures that there 
isn’t time  enough to 
implement before the 
2008 elections.  
scattered throughout Alaska. Taking on such a big, expensive job would not 
be practical, even if the new system were certified in the next few months. 
At this point, the Division of Elections is already doing many tasks required 
before the primary election in August and the presidential election in No-
vember. Also, because the state shares voting equipment with local govern-
ments, the upgrade will have to be coordinated with them as well.
But between now and the election, the state can improve security, with 
the changes recommended below. After the election, it can upgrade to the 
new system and develop a method for continuously monitoring changes in 
technology.  We also recommend improving the way voting equipment is 
transported, tracked, and stored—as well as increasing the number of  
poll workers and providing them with more training in election security.
University of Alaska Anchorage  April 2008
2What is the Current system?
This is a particularly appropriate time for this study, not 
only because election-security has become a prominent issue 
nationwide, but also because this year marks the tenth anni-
versary of Alaska’s use of electronic voting technology. 
Unlike other election-security studies, our study is examin-
ing not only voting technology but also policies and proce-
dures that add to the security of the system. 
Much of our work in the first phase of the study was as-
sessing the existing election system.  To provide background 
for our recommended improvements, here we first briefly 
summarize the existing system. The figures on this page and 
the facing page show how the current system is organized 
and how it works.
The lieutenant governor heads the election system, and 
the Division of Elections manages federal and state elections 
statewide.  The state is divided into four election regions, which 
in turn have 439 precincts.  Election regulations, procedures, 
training, and technology are the same throughout the state.
There are multiple steps in the voting process, from the 
time Alaskans go to the polls until the director of elections 
certifies the results (as the figure on the facing page details). The pro-
cess includes a number of security features that make it among the 
safest in the country: 
• A centralized voting system, with standard procedures and identical 
hardware and software throughout Alaska. This centralization minimizes 
opportunities for tampering and allows flaws identified in any part of the 
system to be corrected statewide.
• Paper back-ups for all votes. Although optical scanners do scan and 
count ballots in 290 of Alaska’s 439 precincts, almost all Alaska voters 
mark paper ballots that serve as back-ups to electronic tallies. There 
are touch-screen machines in all precincts. Only about 1% of voters use 
those machines, which also have internal paper reels as back-ups. 
• Independent verification and cross-checking of paper ballots and 
preliminary electronic results.
• Audit of machine-counts of votes by hand-counts in a random sam-
ple of precincts.
• Observers invited to watch both voting and vote-counting procedures.
What makes a system seCure?
Alaska’s system has many strengths, but there is room for improve-
ment. Alaska and other states use electronic systems to count and record 
votes. That technology has a number of advantages—it makes counting 
votes much faster, for example. Federal law also requires all polling places 
to have touch-screen devices for voters who can’t mark paper ballots.
But election-security studies in other states have shown that the 
same voting technology voting used in Alaska could be vulnerable to 
tampering. Alaska also has security issues most other states don’t 
face. It is huge—375 million acres—and the road system covers only 
about 10% of the land area. More than a hundred small communities 
can be reached only by water or air.  Storms and intense cold frequently 
disrupt travel and shipments to remote communities.
So sending ballots and election equipment to and from communities 
around the state, as well as storing equipment in small communities with 
limited facilities, is very expensive and poses many logistical challenges.
To evaluate how Alaska could improve security, we first thought about 
the elements that make a system secure, and grouped them into  three 
categories: defense in depth, fortification of systems, and confidence in 
outcomes. 
• Defense in depth: A secure system should have multiple layers of pro-
tection, so that if one fails others are still in place. This layered approach 
can discourage hackers, because they would have to take several unde-
tected steps to penetrate the system’s security. Also, layers can provide 
early warning of attacks in time for election officials to take action. Equip-
ment, people, and procedures together provide defense in depth.
• Fortification of systems: This means making electronic systems as 
secure as possible and using the latest certified updates, which may 
correct vulnerabilities in earlier systems. Alaska uses optical scanners 
that tally votes cast on paper ballots; touch-screen machines with inter-
nal paper reels that record the votes cast; and servers that integrate 
and tally the electronic and hand-count results. All these system should 
be equipped with the latest updates to minimize the potential for votes 
to be miscounted or tampered with, and they should be protected so 
unauthorized users can’t interfere with their operation before, during, 
or after elections. The systems must also be certified to federal stan-
dards and verified by independent testing centers.
• Confidence in outcomes: Systems and results have to be verifiable and 
shown to be reliable—to increase confidence of both voters and election 
officials in the system. The methods used to select a sample of results for 
hand-counting must also provide a high level of confidence. The election 
process must be open, so anyone can observe what is happening—and 
those who verify results must be objective and bipartisan. 
Alaska’s Election System
Lieutenant Governor
Alaska Division of Elections
Four Regions
(Based on 40 House Districts)
Regional Offices 
(Juneau, Anchorage, Fairbanks, Nome)
439 Precincts
(Large communities have multiple precincts)
• Supervises Division of Elections
• Appoints director of elections
• Director of elections hires election
    supervisors for each region
• Regional election supervisors hire
   bi-partisan election boards and 
   supervisors for each precinct
• Precinct election chair-person hires
   bi-partisan election officials
• Political parties, independent candidates,
    and groups sponsoring or opposing ballot
    initiatives may appoint observers to witness
    voting and vote-counting procedures
 
Source: Alaska Division of Elections
3Alaska’s centralized processes and procedures at the state level 
make it easier to implement consistent security practices. Few states 
have such centralized systems, with standard practices and voting 
equipment statewide. Most states have decentralized systems—
that is, systems in which counties, cities, or townships can set their 
own election procedures. 
Also, Alaska’s system provides a verifiable paper record of  
all the votes cast. Almost all voters mark paper ballots that are 
scanned and counted by an optical-scanner. About one percent of  
voters use touch-screen machines, with no paper ballots, but there 
is voter verifiable paper record .
The Pew Center for the States recently examined how many 
states have verifiable paper back-ups for votes. Keep in mind that 
most states have decentralized election systems—meaning indi-
vidual counties or other local jurisdictions can choose their own 
methods—so the map illustrates the general rather than the exact 
situation in all states.
As the map shows, in 35 states all or most votes are backed 
up by paper records. In some of those states, voters mark paper 
ballots, which are then scanned and counted by optical scanners; 
in other states, voters mostly use touch-screen machines with in-
ternal paper reels.
But as of early 2008, 14 states primarily used touch-screen 
machines without paper reels. The Pew Center reports that two of  
those states—New Jersey and Maryland—have plans to imple-
ment paper-based systems. The remaining state, New York, still 
uses the lever-voting system, but almost all counties plan to begin 
using paper-based systems in 2009.
So overall the movement among states is toward systems with 
paper records—like the system already in place in Alaska.  
Alaska’s Voting System
(Based on 238,307 voters in 2006 statewide election)
81% of  Voters
Go to precinct, present ID, sign registry
19% of Voters
Vote early in person or 
absentee by mail or fax.
1%
Use touch-screen machine
80%
Vote on paper ballot
Voter makes choices on screen.
Machine records electronically
and prints paper copy
that stays in machine
75% of voters put ballot
in optical scanner, which
makes electronic copy,
deposits ballot in locked box
5% of voters put ballot
directly into locked ballot box
Machine tallies votes Machine tallies votes Ballots hand-counted,
with observers present
Precinct workers send results to state office
electronically over phone lines when possible;
otherwise  deliver computer cards by car or 
call in results to regional office
Results phoned in 
to regional office
All precincts prepare two 
packages, separating 
electronic and paper records
for comparison against
each other
Election officials print two copies of results;
all workers sign both copies
One package mailed 
to regional office
One package mailed 
directly to Juneau 
Elections materials sent to Juneau by  
secure carrier. State review board takes 
random sample of precincts, hand-counts 
ballots. If precinct results vary by more 
than 1% from electronic results, 
entire district ballots hand-counted. 
Director of elections certifies results
Unocial results announced. Conrmation process starts.
What if results from a precinct are lost or stolen at some point in the process? Alaska voters can go to 
court. Courts can order the election to be held again, if missing results might have affected the outcome. 
Source: Alaska Division of Elections
Regional results integrated at state level
hoW DiD We iDentify seCurity issues?
• We studied the approaches taken in other states, to determine prac-
tices that could be helpful in Alaska.
• We evaluated the improvements the manufacturer of voting 
equipment has taken to correct security issues identified in 
other election-security studies and summarized in our Phase 
I report.
• We did a detailed, hands-on evaluation of storage, transpor-
tation, and packaging of election equipment and materials.
• We identified issues unique to Alaska, given our geographic 
diversity and transportation logistics.
We found that Alaska is well-positioned, compared with 
many other states. Alaska has in fact put into effect safeguards 
and processes that other states are now adopting to deal with 
election-security issues. But we also want to emphasize that 
every state faces different security and procedural challenges. 
There is no single solution right for every state. 
We did find, however, that two aspects of Alaska’s system 
help its election security, relative to that in other states: its cen-
tralization, and its paper ballot back-ups for virtually all votes. 
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14 states, no paper-back-ups for all or most electronic votes
35 states, some form of  paper back-ups for all or most votes  
1 state, lever-voting system 
Source:  Based on Pew  Center for the States, 2008
Notes: Many states use more than one voting technology.  Not all states that have some paper
back-up have complete paper back-up.  New Jersey plans to have paper back-ups before the
2008 election; New York plans to adopt a paper-based system in 2009; Maryland law requires 
paper back-up by 2010.
4What Do We reCommenD?
The table on the front page summarizes our main recommendations, 
some of which the Division of Elections could put into effect before the 
August primary and the November general election, and some of which 
it can’t. Here we explain more about some of the most important rec-
ommendations, which are discussed in detail in the full report.
• Upgrade to the new, more secure platform after the election. 
We can’t over-emphasize the importance of this upgrade. Alaska, Cali-
fornia, Florida, and other states use the same or similar voting technol-
ogy.  Election-security studies in several states found that the existing 
technology was potentially vulnerable to vote-tampering in a number 
of ways. The new platform,  (Premier Election Systems Assure 1.2), 
which the manufacturer developed in response to those studies, is still 
being tested to insure that it meets standards set by the federal Election 
Assistance Commission. We had hoped the system could be installed 
on Alaska’s voting equipment by the 2008 election, but we now believe 
that’s not feasible. Alaska is now in the run-up to the August primary 
and the November election. The Division of Elections is programming 
its equipment for those elections and doing other work that has to meet 
specific pre-election deadlines. Also, because the state shares voting 
equipment with local governments, the upgrade will have to be coor-
dinated with them as well. To add in a huge, expensive job requiring 
complicated logistics at this point is not feasible. But we recommend 
that it be done as soon as possible after the election.
• Establish security goals and a method for regularly mea-
suring progress toward those goals. The Division of Elections 
is well aware of security issues, and has taken a number of steps to 
improve security. But it currently has no long-range security goals nor 
a plan for measuring progress. We believe it’s very important for the 
division to develop such goals and systematically meet them.
• Consider forming a partnership with some other organi-
zation that could continuously monitor and evaluate any new 
election-security vulnerabilities and ways to improve security. This would 
allow the Division of Elections to quickly make any necessary changes 
or improvements,  before problems developed. Some states are already 
doing this. The Division of Elections itself does not have adequate staff to 
do such monitoring.
• Install new software that allows election officials to cre-
ate a more-secure password authentication system for touch-
screen machines. Election officials are in fact already installing this 
new software, as they do programming for the upcoming election. This 
new software, called Key Card Tool, allows them for the first time to 
create their own authentication password and encryption keys for the 
state’s 439 touch-screen machines. This is a substantial improvement 
in security.  Previously,  the default password and keys were in the public 
domain. They were programmed into all the touch-screen machines 
and couldn’t be changed. Now,  the password and keys can be changed 
regularly, and over time election regions could have their own individual 
passwords and keys.
• Verify the accuracy of voting technology.  Before and after the 
November election, election officials should test all voting machines by com-
paring code in the machines with correct, registered code.  In the longer-
term, the state should develop standard testing processes to insure all vot-
ing technology is functioning properly and recording votes accurately.
• Change system passwords. Before the election, the state should 
change all passwords currently used in election-system technology. After 
the election, the state should develop a plan for routinely tracking and 
changing passwords.
• Use tamper-evident seals on envelopes and shipping containers. 
This precaution can be taken before the upcoming election. Critics argue 
that attackers could in fact open such seals without leaving any evidence 
of tampering. But we believe that especially in Alaska—where ballots and 
equipment can travel long distances under difficult conditions—tamper-
evident seals do help improve security.  
• Recruit more poll workers and improve their election-secu-
rity training. Before the election, the Division of Elections should add a 
section on election-security to the existing training manual, which doesn’t 
currently discuss security. In the longer term, the state needs to recruit 
more poll workers—which in itself would help improve security in poll-
ing places—and to provide better training (possibly online) in election-
security procedures.
• Improve the way voting machines are transported, tracked, 
and stored. Most of these recommended improvements can’t be made 
until after the November election. They include buying better shipping 
containers for optical-scan machines, which have to be shipped to many 
small communities from larger regional centers before and elections and 
returned afterward.  The state also needs a better system for tracking the 
number and location of voting machines, through bar-codes or other meth-
ods of inventory-control. Also, the physical security of machines in storage 
needs improvement. The state should consider reinforced doors, dead-bolt 
locks, ceiling grids, alarms, and other measures as appropriate. 
ConClusions  
We have made a number of recommendations for improving the security 
of Alaska’s election system, but we want to keep those recommendations 
in context:  Alaska’s election system is in good shape. Other states are now 
adopting measures we’ve had in place for years. Personnel of the  Division 
of Elections understand the system and have a good idea of what kinds of  
measures could help make it more secure.
But there’s always room for improvement. Aside from the specific recom-
mendations we’ve listed, Alaska needs to build a foundation for the future—
to make sure Alaska’s election system stays among the best in the country. 
The current election technology is aging, and the state will face new choices 
when it has to upgrade that technology. It needs to start systematically as-
sessing  its future needs and new technologies now.  
 
   
This publication summarizes Phase 2 of the Alaska Election Security 
Report, prepared for Lieutenant Governor Sean Parnell and the 
Alaska Division of Elections. Contributors are LuAnn Piccard, Mark 
Ayers, David B. Hoffman, Stephanie Martin, and Kenrick Mock.
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Introduction 
This report details our work in Phase 2 of the Alaska Election Security study. In this 
phase, we developed recommendations for improving the security of Alaska’s election 
system—not only the technology, but also the election policies and procedures. That’s 
different from most election-security studies done in other states, which mainly assessed 
the security of election technology. It is electronic technology that has received the most 
attention in national debates about election security, but the policies and procedures—and 
the people who carry them out—are critical parts of any secure system. 
 
In September 2007, Alaska’s lieutenant governor, Sean Parnell, and the Alaska Division 
of Elections commissioned the University of Alaska Anchorage to evaluate Alaska’s 
election systems and processes to identify security issues that could jeopardize election 
results. The study is in several phases and will be completed before the November 2008 
presidential election. It also comes at a particularly appropriate time, since this year 
marks the tenth anniversary of Alaska’s adoption of electronic voting technology. 
 
The lieutenant governor—who oversees the election process—and the Division of 
Elections were concerned about election-security issues raised in studies done in several 
states. They wanted an evaluation of Alaska’s election system, to identify potential 
security issues and measures to improve security. The Division of Elections itself first 
identified a number of possible security improvements, and we evaluated their feasibility 
and potential benefits. We also identified additional measures to enhance security.  
 
We want to emphasize at the outset that Alaska’s election system is among the most 
secure in the country. As we reported in Phase 1 of this study, Alaska’s system includes a 
number of safeguards that other states are now adopting. But there is room for 
improvement in the technology Alaska and many other states use to count and record 
votes. Also, Alaska faces security issues most other states don’t have. The state is huge—
375 million acres—and the road system covers only about 10% of the land area. More 
than a hundred small, remote communities can be reached only by water or air. Storms 
and intense cold frequently disrupt travel and shipments to remote places. So sending 
ballots and election equipment to and from communities around the state, as well as 
storing equipment in small communities with limited facilities, is very expensive and 
poses many logistical challenges. 
 
The Phase 1 report, completed in December 2007, included an overview of Alaska’s 
voting system and discussed how our system compares with that in other states. It also 
summarized the findings from detailed election-security studies conducted by other states 
that use voting technology the same or similar to that used in Alaska. Those studies found 
that the current technology was potentially vulnerable to vote-tampering in a number of 
ways. The report concluded with a description of areas that required more detailed 
evaluation in Phase 2. Before we talk about our methods and findings, we first briefly 
discuss why election-security is an issue nationwide and describe Alaska’s election 
system.
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Why Study Election Security? 
Almost all American voters now typically use some type of electronic voting equipment 
when they go to the polls—for instance, optical scanners that scan paper ballots and 
count votes, or touch-screen machines that may or may not provide any paper record of 
the vote. This technology has many advantages, including much faster vote-counting. 
Federal law also requires that all polling places have at least one machine for voters with 
disabilities that make it hard or impossible for them to mark paper ballots. 
 
But many Americans are worried that these machines aren’t secure—that they are 
vulnerable to tampering that could change the outcome of elections. The public must feel 
confident that every vote will be counted, and counted accurately. A number of states 
have examined how vulnerable voting equipment is to tampering—and found that in fact 
it is vulnerable in a number of ways. As we get closer to the 2008 national election, 
several other states and individual Americans have raised additional concerns. As a result 
of election-security studies and widespread publicity about security issues, some states 
are making changes—for example, insuring that there are paper records of votes cast 
electronically. 
 
This Election Security Project has two important objectives:  to help ensure the security 
of votes Alaskans cast and to enhance voters’ confidence in the Alaska election system. 
That second objective is as important as the first. It’s not enough to make the system 
more secure if Alaskans still have doubts about it. Election security should be real, both 
in the protections built into the system and in the minds of Alaskans—who rely on that 
system to count and report their votes accurately and at the same time to preserve the 
secrecy of the individual ballot.  
 
It’s not a simple task to build a system that provides security, accuracy, and privacy. Too 
much or too little focus in any single area can compromise the whole system. For 
example, some people have suggested that voters who use electronic voting machines 
could be given “receipts” that record their votes, as a demonstration of the accuracy of 
the system. But such receipts would not only violate the privacy of voters, they could also 
be used fraudulently in vote-buying schemes, in which voters would be paid for their 
votes after they demonstrated that they voted in a particular way.  
 
What About Alaska? 
Alaska’s voting machines and other technology are manufactured by Premier Election 
Solutions, and are similar to equipment used in many states. The technology includes 
optical-scanners that scan and count votes cast on paper ballots; touch-screen machines 
with internal paper reels that record the votes cast; and computer servers that integrate 
and tally the votes. Almost all Alaska voters (99%) mark their choices on paper ballots; 
about 1% use touch-screen machines with internal paper reels. 
 
Another critical part of the election system is the processes and procedures. We learned 
in Phase 1 that the election system includes a number of procedures that enhance 
security. The Phase 1 report includes a complete description of those security features, 
but below we summarize them briefly. 
• A single voting system, with standardized procedures and identical hardware and 
software, throughout the state. This centralization of Alaska’s system means that it is 
less complex, and it is simpler to evaluate and implement technology and procedures 
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statewide. Few other states have such centralized systems. For many reasons—
including geography, population, history, and other factors—many states have more 
decentralized systems where counties, cities, or townships can make their own 
decisions about equipment, processes, and procedures. There is no single “right” 
system for all states, but Alaska’s centralized approach has many benefits for election 
security. 
 
• Paper records of all votes casts. As we noted above, almost all Alaska voters use 
paper ballots, and for the 1% who use touch-screen machines, there is an internal 
paper record. Many states have become increasingly aware of the importance of 
having paper back-ups. The map below, based on information from the Pew Center 
for the States, shows how many states have paper back-ups for votes as of early 2008. 
Keep in mind, however, that because most states have decentralized systems—that is, 
local jurisdictions can choose their own methods—the map illustrates the general 
rather than the exact situation in various states. In 35 states, all or almost all votes are 
back up by paper records. In some of those states, voters mark paper ballots, which 
are then scanned and counted by optical scanners. In other states, voters mostly use 
touch-screen machines with internal paper reels. But in early 2008, 14 states primarily 
used touch-screen machines without internal paper reels to provide back-ups. The 
Pew Center reports that two of those states—New Jersey and Maryland—have plans 
to implement paper-based systems. One state—New York—still uses the lever-voting 
system, but almost all counties plan to begin using systems that provide paper records 
in 2009. So overall the movement among states is toward systems with paper 
records—like the system Alaska already has in place. 
 
• Hand-counts of votes from a statistical sample of precincts across the state. A state 
review board verifies the machine counts by hand-counting votes from a sample of 
precincts. If the hand-count results vary by more than 1% from the machine-counts in 
any particular precinct, votes from all precincts in the district will be hand-counted. 
 
• Bipartisan oversight of polling places. Bipartisan committees oversee polling places, 
and political parties, independent candidates, and supporters or opponents of ballot 
initiatives can appoint observers to witness voting, vote counting, and vote audit 
procedures. Members of the public are also allowed to witness these activities. 
 
• Independent verification and cross-checking of paper ballots and preliminary 
electronic results. Precincts separate ballots and electronic records and send them to 
both regional election offices and the Alaska Division of Elections for independent 
verification of results. 
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Approach to Phase 2 
In Phase 1, we identified the elements that make for a secure election system, and 
grouped them into three categories: defense in depth, fortification of systems, and 
confidence in outcomes. We used those categories as a framework for assessing the level 
of risk presented by different security issues and for developing a set of high-priority 
recommendations. Some of those recommendations can be implemented during the 2008 
election cycle and others will have to be done after the election. Here’s how we define 
the parts of a secure system. 
 
• Defense in depth. By that we mean a secure system should have multiple layers of 
protection, so that if one layer fails, others will remain in place. For one simple 
example of such depth, Alaska’s electronic tallies of votes are backed up by paper 
ballots, measures are taken to keep the voting systems secure, and the electronic 
counts are verified through hand-counting a random sample of ballots. This 
example represents three layers of security, each of which would have to be 
breached in order to corrupt the election results. One of these elements might be 
subject to an attack or a mistake, but it is extremely likely that errors or problems 
would be caught by one of the other layers. Another example would be adding 
tamper-evident seals on the shipping packages, as well as on several parts on the 
outside and inside of the equipment. One exterior seal might be broken, possibly 
not intentionally but just while some equipment was being transported. However, 
if other internal seals remain in place after a systematic check of the equipment 
has been conducted, the equipment itself may still be secure. This is another 
example of a three-level defense in depth: external shipping container seals, 
external and internal equipment seals, and a systematic check of the equipment 
for evidence of tampering. We can think of defense in depth as a set of inter-
related checks and balances that work together to enhance system security.  
 
• Fortification of systems. Here we mean making electronic systems as secure as 
possible and using the latest updates, which often correct vulnerabilities found in 
earlier versions of the systems. This category also includes safeguards that ensure 
only authorized personnel have access to the system and that this access is 
properly controlled. Also, Alaska’s unique conditions have security 
implications—for instance, voting machines are subject to temperature and 
transportation extremes not found in many other locations. And by law, systems 
used in Alaska must conform to the 2002 Voting System Standards (VSS). This 
equipment certification must come from a recognized Independent Test Authority 
(ITA). 
 
• Confidence in outcomes. This means having systems and results that can be 
verified and shown to be reliable and that therefore earn the public’s trust. Given 
the widespread distrust of electronic voting systems, this is critical. One way of 
building trust is being open about the system—letting voters and interested parties 
observe and participate in the process. Another way is keeping people informed 
about problems that have been identified and solutions being implemented to 
correct them. The intent is to correct as many issues as possible. However, in 
some cases after an evaluation of the costs and benefits, a decision might be made 
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not to correct certain issues that have a low potential for occurrence and that 
wouldn’t have much effect if they did occur.  
 
Multi-Phase Project 
We’re carrying out this project in several phases, each timed to coordinate with critical 
milestones in the 2008 election cycle. In Phase 1, we studied the work conducted by other 
states, determined its applicability to Alaska, and recommended areas for more detailed 
evaluation. In Phase 2, we conducted this more detailed analysis and are making detailed 
recommendations for consideration by the Division of Elections, for implementation in 
this election cycle and later. Phase 3, as determined by the Division of Elections, will 
provide assistance in implementing key recommendations, and Phase 4 could be a real-
time system and procedural audit to verify the results of the recommendations that have 
been implemented. A potential Phase 5 might involve future work with the Division of 
Elections in the off-election cycle.  
 
 
Alaska Voting and Election System
Technologies Existing Systems Policies
Procedures
and 
Processes
Phase 1:  Overview of existing studies and relationship to 
Alaska. High-level vulnerability analysis and preliminary 
recommendations. (October through December 2007)
Phase 2: Detailed analysis, validation and recommendations
to address prioritized vulnerabilities and plan for execution to
meet 2008 election timeline. (January through April 2008)
Phase 3:  Phased implementation.
(April through October)
Phase 4: Real-time system and procedural audit  during 
2008 election process. (November 2008)
 2008)
Post Election Support  (January2009+)Phase 5:
 
Figure 2.0 Multi-Phase Project 
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Scope of Work for Phase 2 
The scope of work listed below summarizes the items that were selected for detailed 
study, grouped into the categories of defense in depth, fortification of systems, and 
confidence in outcomes.  
 
Purpose: Detailed analysis of equipment and procedures and prioritized 
recommendations to improve Alaska election security.  
 
1. Defense in Depth 
 
1.1. Evaluate the cost and process to upgrade existing Premier system software and 
firmware if newer versions are available and certified in time to prepare for the 
2008 election cycle. This analysis will be completed regardless of whether the 
software revisions are certified in time to implement the upgrades during the 
2008 election cycle. Evaluate existing service and maintenance agreements with 
Premier. 
1.2. Evaluate the upgraded Premier system software and firmware changes that have 
been submitted to the EAC for VSS 2002 Certification against potential and 
known security vulnerabilities identified in the Phase 1 report and as they relate 
to the security enhancements proposed by the Division of Elections. Summarize 
the original issue or concern and how the new version of Premier software and 
firmware may address (or may not address) the issues. (See attached document 
provided by Division of Elections for detailed list of items.) 
1.3. Evaluate the existing Premier system software and firmware currently in use in 
Alaska. Determine if the security enhancements proposed by the Division of 
Elections can be implemented if current versions of tabulation software and 
firmware remain in use. 
1.4. Provide recommendations to the Division of Elections on how existing 
procedures can be improved to address any identified security issues. 
1.5. Evaluate password management options, recommend alternatives and propose 
appropriate processes and procedures. 
1.6. Document inter-election chain-of-custody for voting equipment. With the 
knowledge that voting equipment is out of the DOE’s custody during points in 
the election process, assess the risks of tampering, damage, and loss and provide 
recommendations to mitigate those risks. 
1.7. With the knowledge that Alaska, for logistical purposes, stores touch screen and 
optical scan units off site between elections, determine best practices for storage 
and determine whether they would be feasible in Alaska communities. 
Recommend solutions that can meet security requirements and can also be 
practically implemented in the Alaska environment. 
7 
1.8. Identify trusted personnel within the Division of Elections and their points of 
access to equipment. Identify points of equipment access where only one person 
has access or authorization. 
1.9. Determine points in election system where more redundancy in personnel, 
processes and /or joint review processes should be implemented. 
1.10. Assess vulnerability of paper ballots to tampering. Contrast with risks in 
electronic system. 
1.11.  Summarize the security vulnerabilities of the equipment and procedures. To the 
extent possible, demonstrate the level to which proposed enhancements 
(equipment and procedures) mitigate security risks.  
1.12. Develop security training procedures that can be included as an addendum to 
existing training documentation.  
 
2. Fortification of Systems 
 
2.1 Assess the integrity of the hardware and software of the electronic voting systems 
and their ability to accurately tabulate and report results. 
2.2 Evaluate communication protocols and make recommendations regarding data 
transmittal to GEMS to avoid the introduction of viruses and longtime delays in 
election returns. 
2.3. Evaluate the reliability and accuracy of the optical scanning and touch screen 
systems and their ability to function properly in Alaska weather and 
transportation/handling conditions. Study existing Premier reliability testing 
levels and equipment maintenance procedures to identify any concerns.  
 
3. Confidence in Outcome 
 
3.1 Evaluate processes and procedures DOE uses for functionality testing and logic 
and accuracy testing of systems and memory cards. 
3.2 Identify methods DOE can use to increase voter confidence. 
3.3 Establish metrics that the DOE can use to demonstrate continuous improvement 
of election security and predictability of results over time.  
3.4 Provide a weekly review of emails from the public on security issues and 
summarize and publish general responses to them on Division of Elections 
website. Participate in other forums as requested by Division of Elections. 
3.5 Provide a description of the absentee and questioned ballot process. 
3.6 Research other random sampling methodologies that might provide additional 
confidence in election results. These recommendations would be proposed for 
future consideration and evaluation.  
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4. Evaluation and Implementation Plan 
 
4.1 Synchronize Phase 2 work-plan with 2008 election process timeline to ensure that 
completion of critical evaluation deliverables and recommendations are phased 
with implementation deadlines as determined by the Division of Elections.  
4.2 Develop project plan to implement prioritized recommendations (technology, 
systems and procedural) developed during Phase 2 work phased to meet 2008 
election process timeline. If approved, this plan would be the basis of “Phase 3: 
Execution of Phased Deliverables.” 
 
Time Frame:  Mid January 2008-end April 2008.  
(Completion of deliverables will be phased throughout Phase 2 in accordance with 
section 4.1). 
 
Cost (Est.):  $250,000 
 
Exclusions: 
 
1. Detailed hands-on testing of the equipment in operation. 
2. Destructive testing of equipment. 
3. Payment for equipment, hardware, software firmware, tools, personnel, 
packaging, etc. required to upgrade election systems and procedures. 
4. Usability analysis of touch screen systems (e.g. ease of use, language, user 
interface, set-up/tear-down, etc.) 
5. Inventory analysis of existing equipment. 
6. Documentation review and analysis. 
7.  Analysis of voter registration process. 
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Summary of Recommendations 
 
We conducted analyses for each item on the scope of work listed above. Here we 
summarize the evaluation we conducted for each item of the scope of work and the 
relevant recommendations. More detailed information is included in the report 
appendixes, with the appropriate appendix cited in the summary.
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Section Scope of Work Item 
 Current Election Cycle 
Recommendation 
Future Election Cycle 
Recommendation Appendix Reference 
1.0  Defense in Depth 
1.1 Assure 1.2 Upgrade Cost 
Analysis 
Maintain current revision of AccuVote 
software, perform cost benefit analysis 
to determine best resource utilization 
approach. 
Upgrade to Assure 1.2 when 
certified 
Appendix A - Assure 1.2 Upgrade 
Labor Estimate 
1.2 Assure 1.2  Functionality 
Upgrade Analysis 
Maintain current revision of AccuVote 
software. 
Upgrade to Assure 1.2 when 
certified 
Appendix B - Assure 1.2 Upgrade 
Analysis 
Appendix C - Assure 1.2 Upgrade 
Resolution Matrix 
1.3 Division of Elections 
Security Enhancements and 
Features Analysis 
Implement selected recommendations 
from Appendix D - Division of 
Elections Enhancement Analysis. 
2.1-2.5, 2.8, 2.10, 2.13, 2.16, 2.18, 
2.19, 2.23, 2.29 
Implement remaining 
recommendations included in 
Appendix D. 
Appendix D - Division of Elections 
Enhancement Analysis 
1.4 Implement procedures to 
minimize technology risks 
not addressed by existing or 
upgraded systems 
Implement procedures described in 
other sections. Important to maintain 
many of the processes already in place. 
Monitor research on election 
processes and implement changes, 
as appropriate. 
  
1.5 Password Management Change passwords on all affected 
hardware as outlined in password 
management plan (Appendix E). 
Develop password management 
procedures to implement 
password changes and tracking 
for future election cycles to 
ensure password policies are 
followed consistently. 
Appendix E - Physical Password 
Management Recommendations 
1.6 Chain of Custody Begin to use tamper evident seals on 
AV-OS and AV-TSX machines. 
Further implementation of tamper 
evident seals. Implement EPROM 
bar code identification and 
inventory management. 
Appendix G 
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Section Scope of Work Item 
 Current Election Cycle 
Recommendation 
Future Election Cycle 
Recommendation Appendix Reference 
1.0  Defense in Depth (cont.) 
1.7 Best practices for equipment 
storage between elections 
Follow Chain of Custody 
recommendations.  Purchase Division 
of Elections owned equipment for 
North Slope Borough.  Safes are 
recommended for use in Division of 
Elections offices to store keys and 
passwords. 
Improve physical storage security 
such as room security, access 
alarm, etc. 
  
1.8 Trusted Personnel and 
single points of access 
None Require background checks on 
new employees with access to 
election equipment and 
confidential information 
  
1.9 Redundancy Two person inspection and sign off on 
tamper evident seals. 
Add two-person sign-off to 
manual entry of election results 
and tamper seal inspections. 
  
1.10 Paper Ballot tampering 
vulnerability 
None None   
1.11 Master Vulnerability Matrix N/A N/A Appendix R - Master Matrix 
Recommendations, Risk and Value 
Assessment 
Appendix S - 2008 Election Cycle 
Impact Matrix 
Appendix T - Future Election Cycle 
Impact Matrix 
1.12 Security Training Develop materials to train poll worker 
in election security. 
Monitor new procedures and 
expand training as appropriate. 
Appendix H 
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Section Scope of Work Item 
 Current Election Cycle 
Recommendation 
Future Election Cycle 
Recommendation Appendix Reference 
2.0  Fortification of Systems 
2.1 Assess the integrity of the 
hardware and software of 
the electronic voting 
systems and their ability to 
accurately tabulate and 
report results. 
Implement Key Card Tool application.  
Implement GEMS Air Gap Server 
model system.  Implement dedicated 
AV-OS machine for programming 
AV-OS memory cards. 
None Appendix O - Security Key Card 
Enhancement Options 
Appendix P - Security Key Card 
System Description 
Appendix M - AccuVote Functional 
Test Guidelines 
2.2 Preliminary Results Data 
Collection Assessment 
None None Appendix J - AccuVote 
Communications System Description 
Appendix K - AccuVote Network 
Topology 
2.3 Evaluate the reliability and 
accuracy of the optical 
scanning and touch screen 
systems in Alaska weather 
and transportation/handling 
conditions.  
None Implement new shipping 
containers for optical scanning 
systems (PelicanTM. Products 
1600 series or similar) 
Appendix L - AccuVote Reliability 
Assessment 
Appendix I - AV-OS Shipping 
Container Example 
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Section Scope of Work Item 
 Current Election Cycle 
Recommendation 
Future Election Cycle 
Recommendation Appendix Reference 
3.0  Confidence in Outcomes 
3.1 Procedures for functionality, 
logic and accuracy testing 
for systems and memory 
cards. 
Implement increased test scope for 
functional, logic and accuracy testing. 
Implement test results 
documentation and storage 
policies. 
Appendix M - AccuVote Functional 
Test Guidelines 
Appendix N - AccuVote Logic and 
Accuracy Test Guidelines 
3.2 Methods to improve voter 
confidence 
Increase voter use of AV-TSX 
machines to improve voter anonymity. 
Monitor research on election 
processes and implement changes, 
as appropriate. 
  
3.3 Metrics and continuous 
improvement 
Implement a multi-year, multi-phase 
approach to improving election 
procedures and equipment. 
Multi-year, multi-phase approach Appendix F - Chain of Custody Map 
3.4 Weekly email summary Provide on-going summary Provide on-going summary   
3.5 Absentee and questioned 
ballot process 
Implement 2008 election cycle 
security improvements. 
Same as current election 
recommendations. 
Appendix Q - Summary of Absentee 
Voting 
3.6 Random sampling 
methodologies 
None.  Current research is not 
conclusive enough to recommend a 
change to the Division of Elections 
methodology. 
Implement new sampling 
procedure as appropriate and 
approved by statute. 
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Part 1 Defense in Depth 
Section 1.1 – Premier Election Solutions Assure 1.2 Software Upgrade Cost 
Analysis 
 
Description: 
 
Evaluate the cost and process to upgrade existing Premier Election Solutions (Premier) 
(formerly Diebold) system software and firmware if newer versions are available and 
certified in time to prepare for 2008 election cycle. This analysis will be completed 
independently of whether the software revisions are certified in time to implement the 
upgrades during the 2008 election cycle. Evaluate existing service and maintenance 
agreements with Premier.  
 
Summary of Analysis: 
 
The cost to upgrade from the existing AccuVote software and firmware revisions consists 
of contributions from two different upgrade components. 
 
The first component is the cost to purchase the software and firmware components from 
Premier. The Division of Elections has a current maintenance agreement with Premier 
which includes software and firmware upgrades at no additional cost. 
 
Implementation of the Assure 1.2 upgrade requires software and firmware upgrades to be 
performed on all major AccuVote system components. The labor estimate table provided 
in Appendix A – Assure 1.2 Upgrade Labor Estimate provides a list of the tasks required 
to be completed for the Assure 1.2 upgrade as well as an estimate of 995 person-hours to 
implement a system-wide firmware/software upgrade AV-OS, and AV-TSX.  Labor 
associated with each upgrade task is provided as estimated hours.  Actual hours were not 
measured for the purposes of this report.  The comprehensive nature of the Assure 1.2 
upgrade requires that a complete acceptance test be performed following the upgrade to 
ensure system functionality and reliability.  
 
Recommendation: 
 
2008 Election Cycle 
 
We recommend that the Division of Elections do a cost benefit analysis to determine 
whether performing the upgrade using Division of Elections resources, external 
contractors or contracting with Premier is a more cost effective approach for 
implementing Assure 1.2. 
 
Post Election  
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We recommend implementing the Assure 1.2 upgrade upon certification by the Election 
Assurance Commission (EAC) to the Voting Systems Standards (VSS) 2002 using the 
resources deemed most cost effective in the 2008 election cycle. 
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Section 1.2 – Premier Election Solutions Assure 1.2 Software Upgrade 
Enhancement Evaluation 
 
Description: 
 
Evaluate the upgraded Premier system software and firmware changes that have been 
submitted to the federal EAC for VSS 2002 certification against potential and known 
security vulnerabilities identified in the Phase 1 report and as they relate to the security 
enhancements proposed by the Division of Elections. Summarize the original issue or 
concern and how the new version of Premier software and firmware may address (or may 
not address) the issues. 
 
Summary of Analysis: 
 
Phase 1 of the State of Alaska Election Security Project (SOAESP) examined the current 
body of knowledge surrounding the Premier AccuVote voting system platform. This 
examination was focused on identifying areas of vulnerability within the AccuVote 
system currently in use by the Division of Elections. Phase 1 of the SOAESP reported 
that research conducted by the states of California (Calandrino, et al., 2007; Bishop, 
2007), Florida (Gardner, et al., 2007) and others found vulnerabilities in the AccuVote 
platform currently in use by the Division of Elections as well as many other states. 
Premier responded to this research by producing revised versions of the software and 
firmware that operate on various components of the AccuVote system and address a 
number of the identified vulnerabilities. 
 
An examination of the AccuVote software, firmware and hardware components used by 
the Division of Elections as well as an analysis of the vulnerabilities identified by the 
states of California, Florida and Alaska are provided in Appendix B - Assure 1.2 Upgrade 
Analysis. This appendix provides a summary description of each vulnerability or issue 
identified by California, Florida or Alaska. The status of each vulnerability is provided in 
tabular format in Appendix C – Assure 1.2 Upgrade Resolution Matrix.  
 
A total of 38 individual vulnerabilities, issues or risks are identified and itemized for 
evaluation against the Assure 1.2 revision. These items are compared with the Assure 1.2 
functionality to determine whether the vulnerability, issue or risk remains following the 
installation of the Assure 1.2 software or firmware. Installation of the Assure 1.2 revision 
reduces the number of vulnerabilities, issues and risks to 13. 
 
By Alaska statute, the Assure 1.2 AccuVote revision must comply with VSS 2002 before 
it can be used in Alaska. Certification by an approved Independent Test Authority (ITA) 
is required to verify compliance to the VSS 2002 standard. At the time this document was 
written, the Assure 1.2 revision was under test by SysTest, an approved ITA, and 
certification had not yet been granted. 
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Recommendations: 
 
The Assure 1.2 AccuVote revision includes significant improvements in overall system 
security performance. The system revision provides patches to public domain bugs, 
known vulnerabilities and system use issues.  
 
2008 Election Cycle: 
 
We do not recommend implementation of the Assure 1.2 upgrade during the 2008 
election cycle. Since the Assure 1.2 revision has not yet been certified to the VSS 2002 
standard, we cannot recommend that it be implemented prior to the 2008 election year 
primary and general elections. Furthermore, even if the software were to become certified 
prior to the elections there is insufficient time and resources to implement the revision 
before election programming must begin.  
 
Post Election: 
 
We recommend that the Assure 1.2 AccuVote revision be installed following the 2008 
election cycle and once the appropriate VSS 2002 certification has been obtained. 
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Section 1.3 – State of Alaska Division of Elections Proposed Enhancement 
Evaluation 
 
Description: 
 
Evaluate the existing Premier system software and firmware currently in use in Alaska. 
Determine if the security enhancements proposed by the Division of Elections can be 
implemented if current versions of tabulation software remain in use. 
 
Summary of Analysis: 
 
The State of Alaska, Division of Elections has produced an internal document, AccuVote 
Security Enhancements and Features (2007). This document is a list of internally 
recommended security enhancements identified by the Division of Elections. A request 
was made of the project team to evaluate whether any or all of the proposed 
enhancements could be adopted within the structure of the currently operated AccuVote 
software, firmware and hardware platforms. 
 
All of the recommended enhancements can be implemented on the current system with 
little to no impact on system performance. Implementation of the feature and 
enhancement list is limited by Division of Elections resource availability. 
 
A detailed discussion of each feature or enhancement is provided in Appendix D – 
Division of Elections Enhancement Analysis. A cross-reference between the Division of 
Elections AccuVote Security Enhancements and Features and Appendix D – Division of 
Elections Enhancement Analysis is provided below. 
 
Division of Elections Heading Appendix D Section 
GEMS Software and Computers Sections 2.1 to 2.7 
Memory Cards Sections 2.8 to 2.16 
Voting Equipment Sections 2.17 to 2.25 
Testing and Audits Sections 2.26 to 2.28 
Administrator Card Section 2.29 
City/Borough Sections 2.30 to 2.31 
 
 
Recommendations: 
 
2008 Election Cycle: 
 
We recommend that the Division of Elections implement selected recommendations from 
Appendix D - Division of Elections Enhancement Analysis. A subset of the 
recommendations in Appendix D (Sections 2.1-2.5, 2.8, 2.10, 2.13, 2.16, 2.17, 2.18, 2.19, 
2.23, and 2.29) should be adopted during the 2008 election cycle. Highest priority should 
 19 
be placed on hash validation, access control and password management, chain of custody 
assurance, and tamper evident security measures. 
 
Post Election: 
 
The balance of the enhancements not performed during the 2008 election cycle can be 
implemented between the 2008 and 2010 election cycles. This phased implementation 
approach will address the most critical issues first and provide an opportunity for the 
Division of Elections to balance multiple resource demands during this election year.
 20 
Section 1.4 – Procedural Security Enhancements 
 
Description: 
 
Provide recommendations for improving existing procedures to address security issues.  
 
Recommendations: 
 
2008 Election Cycle 
 
Many of the Division of Elections' existing procedures work well and need to be 
maintained. Among these are post election precinct level reconciliation, post election 
audit, election officials as state employees (rather than political appointees), use of chain 
of custody, current ballot printing company, allowing/encouraging observers.  
 
We recommend using tamper evident seals on election equipment (Section 1.7) and 
having poll workers inspect seals (Section 1.12), increasing poll worker awareness of 
tampering risks (Sections 1.6 and 1.12), implementing background checks for employees 
with access to sensitive information and voting equipment (Section 1.8), requiring two 
people to sign off on many procedures (Section 1.9), and ensuring that when voters use 
AV-TSX machines, at least five people vote on them (Section 3.2).  
 
Post Election 
 
Continue to monitor research on election processes and procedures. Make changes to 
Alaska's system as appropriate. 
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Section 1.5 – State of Alaska Division of Elections Password Management 
Options Evaluation 
 
Description: 
 
Evaluate password management options, recommend alternatives and propose 
appropriate processes and procedures. 
 
Summary of Analysis: 
 
The Division of Elections has a desire to improve its handling of passwords. The division 
manages several sets of security controls accessed by password to implement an election. 
These security controls consist of physical security, computer Built-in Operating System 
(BIOS) security, Windows operating system login security and Global Election 
Management System (GEMS) database security. These domains form a hierarchical 
password security system in which multiple levels of security penetration are required to 
gain access. 
 
Physical security and access to servers and voting machines was found to be inconsistent 
across voting regions with some regions executing physical security in a more robust 
manner than other regions. The Division of Elections does not currently implement BIOS 
passwords on any of the GEMS servers in the AccuVote system. Additionally, although 
the Division of Elections currently uses a password management plan for its Windows 
login and GEMS database, room for improvement exists in the management of passwords 
for both of these security domains. 
 
Appendix E – Physical Password Management Recommendations reviews the current 
Division of Elections password management policies and makes a series of 
recommendations regarding each of the security domains. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
2008 Election Cycle: 
 
We recommend changing passwords on all hardware and software platforms as outlined 
in Appendix E – Physical Password Management Recommendations. Development of 
formal policies to accompany the password changes during the 2008 election cycle is not 
recommended due to resource constraints. 
 
Post Election: 
 
We recommend that the Division of Elections make improvements to the consistency and 
fortification of physical security access at equipment storage locations as well as 
implement structured password management policies for each password security domain 
within the AccuVote system. The structured password management policies should 
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include documentation guidelines and formal procedures associated with the 
implementation of the password management plan. A more detailed description of these 
recommendations is provided in Appendix E – Physical Password Management 
Recommendations. 
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Section 1.6 - Chain of Custody 
 
Description:  
 
Document the inter-election chain-of-custody for voting equipment. With the knowledge 
that voting equipment is out of the Division of Election’s custody during points in the 
election process, assess the risks of tampering, damage, and loss and provide 
recommendations to mitigate those risks.  
 
Summary of analysis: 
 
We define "chain of custody" to mean traceability of secure storage and transportation of 
election equipment during all phases of an election cycle and in between election cycles. 
Election equipment includes: ballots, AccuVote optical scan (AV-OS), AccuVote Touch 
Screen (AV-TSX) machines, and memory cards. An overview of Alaska's chain of 
custody procedures for road connected communities and map of Alaska's chain of 
custody is included in Appendix F - Chain of Custody Map.  
 
The chain of custody works well for sending election equipment among Alaska's larger 
and road connected communities. However, 41% of the state's precincts (179 out of 439) 
are off the road system and can only be reached by boat or airplane1. This represents 
about 17% of voters (77,000). As a result, chain of custody documentation is not feasible 
and secure storage space for election equipment may not be available. These conditions 
cause some of the election machines to be vulnerable to tampering during transit and 
storage. Additionally, many of the AV-TSX and AV-OS machines remain in 
communities between the primary election in August and general election in November2. 
Some municipalities and boroughs use the AV-OS machines in municipal elections in 
October. The AV-OS machines are outside of the state's chain of custody when used in 
municipal elections. 
 
Prior to the primary election, OS machines are stored in regional centers, satellite offices 
or hubs. Several weeks before the primary election, the regional offices test AV-OS 
machines with their memory cards inserted. Memory cards are sealed inside the AV-OS 
machines and they are sent out to AccuVote coordinators in communities. Following 
elections, some machines are stored in communities, others are returned for storage in 
hubs or regions. Storage is less centralized between the primary and general election than 
prior to the primary. Memory cards are sent to AccuVote coordinators in communities 
where AV-OS machines have been stored. For the general election machines are again 
tested with their memory cards. 
 
                                                 
1 Some have ice road access in the winter. 
2 Shipping AV-TSX machines back to regional hubs would double the shipping costs, and require more 
election staff. It is a logistical challenge to send AV-TSX machines (weighing 60 pounds), ballots (another 
25 pounds), printers, voting booths, and ballot boxes by small air carrier to hundreds of remote 
communities.  
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Because of time and staffing constraints, AV-TSX memory cards are currently batch 
tested and inserted into machines on election day. The alternative would be to test each 
memory card in its AV-TSX machine, seal the card and ship the machines with cards 
inserted to precincts for primary elections, then ship all machines back to hubs or 
regional centers and repeat the process prior to the general elections. It is not feasible to 
ship all machines back to regional hubs and back out to precincts between elections. It 
would double the current transportation costs and more than double staff time. After the 
primary, Division of Elections staff members are busy preparing for the general election. 
To set up and test each AV-TSX machine with a memory card inside would take 30 
minutes per machine. We estimate that it would take a minimum of 220 hours (about 5.5 
weeks) to test machines one-by-one.  
 
The North Slope Borough owns several AV-OS machines. In past state/federal elections 
the state borrowed AV-OS machines from the borough. The borough's machines are 
outside of the state's chain of custody and security domain. The state has addressed this 
problem by purchasing additional state-owned AV-OS machines to use in North Slope 
communities.  
 
Recommendations:  
 
2008 Election Cycle: 
 
We recommend continuing to use the current system for shipping and testing AV-OS 
machines and their memory cards. 
 
We recommend Division of Elections continues to ship AV-TSX memory cards 
separately from machines. 
 
We recommend using tamper evident seals3 on all AV-OS and AV-TSX machines. In 
collaboration with California counties, Premier developed best practices for use of tamper 
evident seals (Premier Election Solutions 2008). Appendix G - Premier Best Practices for 
Tamper Evident Seal Placement contains the Premier document. Although Premier 
recommends using two seals4 on AV-OS machines and three seals on AV-TSX machines, 
we recommend that the Division of Elections adopt a phased approach to using tamper-
evident seals. Because election equipment is shipped around the state and may be 
subjected to rough handling and harsh weather conditions, we recommend using one seal 
on each AV-OS and each AV-TSX machine in 2008. If there few false alarms and as seal 
inspection and reporting methods are fine tuned, we recommend increasing the number of 
seals per machine in future election cycles.  
 
                                                 
3 We take into consideration the finding in California's top-to-bottom review that tamper evident seals are 
easy to remove and replace (Calandrino et al. 2007). We see implementing tamper-evident seals as a way to 
make attacks more difficult or riskier, but not necessarily impossible (Johnston 2006). 
4 Intab and Seton corporations manufacture seals used successfully in Premier tests  
 25 
For AV-OS machines a serialized tamper evident security seal should cover either the 
front "seam" or the back "seam" and screw hole. Refer to Appendix G for Premier's 
illustrated documentation of security seal placement.  
 
For AV-TSX machines; following Premier's recommendations, the seal should cover the 
"seam" and a screw hole on the back of the machine. (See pictures in Appendix G)  
 
Memory cards: For locations where AV-TSX machines are stored between primary and 
general elections, we recommend mailing AV-TSX memory cards in tamper-evident 
envelopes or bankers bags.  
 
In addition to using tamper-evident seals, we recommend providing poll workers with a 
check list and procedures for seal inspection and instructions for what to do if seals are 
broken. (See Appendix H - Security Training). 
 
The regional office in Fairbanks currently uses a Microsoft Excel based inventory 
management system. We recommend using this system state-wide. 
 
Post Election: 
 
If using one tamper-evident seal on each machine is successful, we recommend 
expanding the use of tamper-evident seals in accordance with Premier's best practices.  
AV-OS machines: in addition to the seal over the front or back seam, the memory card 
slot should be sealed with serialized security seal. Refer to Appendix G for Premier's 
illustrated documentation of security seal placement.  
 
AV-TSX machines: In addition to the seal over the seam, we recommend two additional 
tamper-evident seals on each AV-TSX unit. One of the seals should cover the memory 
card slot. The second seal should seal the privacy panels that cover the touch screen panel 
(See pictures in Appendix G). We also recommend using tamper-evident serialized seals 
on the metal shipping cases.  
 
We recommend implementing a bar code system to keep track of equipment.  
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Section 1.7 - Storage of Election Equipment and Material  
 
Description: 
 
With the knowledge that Alaska, for logistical purposes, stores touch screen and optical 
scan unites off-site between elections, determine best practices for storage and determine 
whether they would be feasible in Alaska communities. Recommend solutions that can 
meet security requirements and can also be practically implemented in the Alaska 
environment.  
 
Summary of analysis: 
 
This refers to the physical storage of election equipment: ballots, memory cards, GEMS 
servers, and peripherals AV-OS and AV-TSX machines. We evaluate storage practices in 
Alaska given the logistical challenges and make recommendations that take them into 
account. 
 
We visited and examined storage sites in Anchorage, Fairbanks, Juneau and Kenai and 
interviewed the regional director in Nome, Juneau and Fairbanks, all borough clerks, 
several municipal clerks. We also reviewed Premier/Diebold recommendations and other 
documents. Uniform practices for storing election machinery would be ideal, but 
differences in building construction and lease arrangements limit the ability of Division 
of Elections to implement a completely uniform storage practice. Storing AV-OS and 
AV-TSX machines in remote communities prior to and between elections complicates 
equipment storage.  
 
Recommendations: 
 
2008 Election Cycle 
 
Regional and state storage areas should have a safe in the director's office for storage of 
keys and password codes.  
 
We recognize that AV-TSX machines are big and take up a lot of storage space. If 
possible, in remote communities, equipment should be stored in a lockable closet within a 
municipal or tribal office. If such a facility is not available, machines should be stored in 
a facility that can be locked when the person responsible for the equipment is not present. 
Poll workers' training needs to emphasize the importance of secure storage.  
 
For equipment in non-secure facilities, additional precautions including inspections, and 
functional tests should be conducted in advance of equipment use to ensure that any 
tampering or reliability issues can be proactively identified. (See Appendix H-Security 
Training.) 
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Post Election 
• A monitored alarm system in all secure storage rooms  
• Deadbolt locks on secure storage room doors  
• Self-closing/locking doors  
• Metal ceiling grids in locations where walls do not extend to the roof or upper 
floor structure. 
• Keyless entry for secure storage rooms with automatic logging of entry and exit.  
• Motion detection security cameras. 
• For the state GEMS storage room in Juneau, we recommend relocating network 
switching equipment outside of the election equipment room. 
 
The Division of Elections officials should consider the ease in securely storing and 
shipping equipment in their decisions about future equipment purchases.  
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Section 1.8 – Trusted Personnel and Single Points of Access 
 
Description:  
 
Identify trusted personnel within the Division of Elections and their points of access to 
the equipment. Identify points of equipment access where only one person has access or 
authorization.  
 
Summary of analysis:  
 
We interviewed Division of Elections staff to identify places in the system where a single 
person has access to software, machines, or election material. We found several instances 
of singular access. The GEMS programmer in Juneau, AccuVote coordinators, poll 
workers who store election equipment, and pilots and air carriers who transport machines 
all represent positions in the election system with singular access to election components. 
The GEMS database is a Jet database file (similar to Microsoft Access). Programming the 
election involves filling in fields in the interface. The GEMS program has built-in checks 
for errors and prompts the user to make changes. Several people besides the programmer 
review ballots before they are sent to the printer5. The Division of Elections has a small 
staff, some of whom have been at their jobs for almost 20 years. The system relies on a 
high degree of implied trust. Tampering with electronic results could be detected by the 
random audit conducted as part of every election.  
 
Recommendations: 
 
2008 Election Cycle: 
 
We recommend continuing to use one person to enter elections information into GEMS. 
Having multiple people programming the elections database is problematic. Alaska's 
boroughs and municipalities that use GEMS and Kennesaw State University Election 
Center (which programs ballots for the state of Georgia) use one person to enter elections 
information into GEMS. The use of a single person is believed to result in fewer errors 
because one person is keeping track of changes to the system. The enhanced logic, 
accuracy, and integrity testing procedures increase the probability of detection of errors 
and issues with election programming prior to deployment for use.  
 
Post Election: 
 
For the positions of election programmer, regional director, and absentee director we 
recommend implementing a program of background checks for new hires, in accordance 
                                                 
5 Boroughs and municipalities in Alaska use a similar system of proof-reading. Georgia loads a test ballot 
into the AV-TSX machine as part of the proof reading (however, over 99% of voters there use touch screen 
devices). 
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with state law and labor union agreements. We recommend that the Division of Elections 
recruit and train more AccuVote coordinators. 
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Section 1.9 – Redundancy 
 
Description: 
 
Determine points in election system where more redundancy in personnel, processes, 
and/or joint review processes should be implemented. 
 
Summary of analysis: 
 
Redundancy can not only protect the election system from tampering, it can also lower 
the chance of errors6. In election systems there is a trade-off between the proprietary 
nature of the election information and having staff redundancy to safeguard the system. 
Division of Elections has several people trained in GEMS programming, in addition, 
several borough level officials are also trained in GEMS programming. Elections could 
proceed if the primary programmer was unavailable due to extenuating circumstances. 
The state has seven people with access to GEMS: one with programming access, six with 
access at regional offices. The state requires two elections officials or poll workers 
present during logic and accuracy testing, and equipment packing for shipment to 
precincts. Joint review for some polling place tasks7 is difficult in practice. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
2008 Election Cycle 
 
Maintain current two-person sign-off on precinct level post-election practices of checking 
vote tallies and registration lists and reporting results. 
 
Add second person or have cross-checking review for the following tasks: 
• Verification of tamper-evident seal integrity. 
• Verification of tamper-evident seal serial numbers.  
• Manual entry of election results into GEMS.  
 
Post Election: 
 
Increase focus on poll worker recruitment. 
                                                 
6 Despite all the attention devoted to potential tampering, researchers found that past problems with 
election results were due to human error or equipment problems, and not malicious intruders (Thompson 
2008, Herrnson et al. 2008).  
7 Alaska's instructions for AV-TSX setting up recommend that one person read instructions, another set up 
the machine. Two people are also required to sign off on zero totals on AV-OS and AV-TSX tallies. People 
are also required to set up tables, post signs, assemble voting booths, and organize registration books and 
other voting materials. Sometimes all task need to be done within 30 minutes, by poll workers whose 
average age is 72. If a polling place is short staffed, its unlikely two people will be available for tasks.  
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Section 1.10 – Paper Ballot Tampering Vulnerability 
 
Description: 
 
Assess vulnerability of paper ballots to tampering. Contrast with risks in electronic 
system. 
 
Summary of analysis: 
 
Paper ballot tampering is easier to detect than electronic tampering because it takes more 
people, better organization, and a higher level of secrecy to tamper. (Norden, et al. 2007). 
Changing election results on a large scale by tampering with paper ballots scale requires 
widespread access.  
 
Ballot stuffing is a one way to tamper with paper ballots. However, Norden et al. (2007) 
write that it would take several election insiders at each polling place to carry out a ballot 
stuffing attack. Insiders need to steal ballots, copy and mark them, insert extra ballots into 
the optical scanner or ballot box, and adjust voter registration books. Despite this 
potential attack scenario, the polling place post-election accounting process (comparing 
number of ballots cast with number of signatures in the registration book) would likely 
detect a ballot stuffing attack. A second process check at during the statewide audit of 
post-election results could also detect ballot stuffing.  
 
Vote buying is another method of tampering with paper ballots. A vote buying scheme 
would involve hundreds of people and would require that hundreds of people keep quiet. 
People would also need to be able to demonstrate that they voted as instructed. Voter 
secrecy helps guard against vote buying schemes by prohibiting issuance of a vote 
receipt. According to Shamos (2004) vote receipts could create an epidemic of vote-
buying.  
 
Paper ballots can be also be damaged or lost during transit. Maintaining electronic vote 
records can mitigate the impact of this risk. Secure ballot provides additional safeguards. 
In Alaska, by law, if ballots are lost, the state can mandate a new election.  
 
Ballot printing mistakes can disrupt an election. Ballots need to be printed and cut 
according to strict equipment vendor specifications so that they can be fed smoothly into 
the AV-OS machines and read accurately without jamming. Ballot printing is a 
specialized process. Mistakes could prevent accurate ballot insertion and vote counting, 
perhaps on a state-wide level. To date, there have been no reported issues relating to the 
physical attributes of the ballots from the current ballot printer. The current ballot printer 
used by the state has proved to be reliable and accurate. For their elections, most 
boroughs and municipalities also contract with the same ballot printer8 that Division of 
Elections uses.  
 
                                                 
8 Boroughs that don't use Print Works send their ballots out-of-state to Premier to print their ballots.  
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Recommendations: 
 
2008 Election Cycle: 
 
Maintain current relationship with Print Works in Homer. There are not a lot of people in 
the country who can consistently and accurately produce ballots that comply with the 
AccuVote system. Ballot printers for ballots used with AV-OS systems must be certified 
to Premier standards. The recent move of many states to paper ballots is pushing the 
capacity of the current printing infrastructure.  
 
Post Election: 
 
This system works very well at present. However, since there is not another qualified in-
state ballot printer alternative, it would be beneficial to identify a qualified back-up.  
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Section 1.11 – Security Vulnerability Matrix 
 
Description:  
 
Summarize the security vulnerabilities of the equipment and procedures. To the extent 
possible, demonstrate the level to which proposed enhancements (equipment and 
procedures) mitigate security risks. 
 
Summary of Analysis: 
 
The intent of the security vulnerability matrix is to convey the major findings of Phase 2 
in a clear, concise manner. The matrix presents the findings in terms of two parameters. 
See Appendix R - Master Matrix: Recommendations, Risk and Value Assessment.  
 
Risk represents a qualitative estimate of the risk level associated with each item in the 
Phase 2 project scope. Risk is shown on a three level scale of high, moderate and low. 
The risk value assigned for each item is not a measureable quantity but rather an 
aggregation of information obtained during research conducted throughout Phase 2. High 
risk items are intended to identify areas where focus should be immediately applied. 
Moderate risk items identify areas requiring attention which should be addressed within a 
reasonable period of time. Low risk items offer little or incremental increase in 
performance.  
 
Value represents the amount of benefit obtained by executing a recommendation. Value 
is rated on a scale of one (lowest) to three (highest). Items with the highest value 
represent good investments of labor and material resources. The benefit obtained by high 
value recommendations result in a reduction in component or overall system risk. Items 
with values of one or two represent investments which may require further research or 
justification. Clearly, low value, low risk items should be carefully studied before 
financial investment is made to ensure that implementation of the recommendation makes 
sense. 
 
The matrix provides a series of columns which describe each scope item (consistent with 
the Phase 2 scope) and a risk associated with the current system implementation. 
Additional columns represent recommendation execution value and residual risk 
remaining following the execution of a recommendation. Resource and time constraints 
do not allow the Division of Elections to execute all of the suggested recommendations 
prior to the 2008 election cycle. As such a further set of columns represents the value and 
residual risk associated with implementing recommendations following the 2008 election 
cycle. Finally, a column is provided which provides constraints, limitations or notes 
associated with an individual scope item. 
 
In addition to the matrix provided, a graphical representation of the current (2008) 
election cycle and the future election cycle scope items is provided. The purpose of these 
figures is to provide a fast, easy method to interpret the results in the matrix. A grid of 9 
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boxes represents the current value of risk for each scope item. Presence of a box with the 
scope items task number in a grid cell indicates its risk and value. The color (black, gray, 
white) represents the residual risk remaining if the recommendations provided are 
implemented   
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Section 1.12 – Security Training 
 
Description: 
 
Develop security training procedures that can be included as an addendum to existent 
training documentation.  
 
Summary of analysis: 
 
Poll workers represent one of several layers of defense in depth to help observe and guard 
against tampering. Currently Alaska poll worker training material does not include any 
security training. Not all of Alaska's poll workers attend training sessions. We reviewed 
and collected training documents from other election jurisdictions including California 
counties, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, 
New York City, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Other research shows that better poll worker 
training is associated with increased voter confidence (Pew Center on the States, 2007). 
Weiser and Goldman (2007) recommend uniform statewide training.  
 
Recommendations: 
 
2008 Election Cycle: 
 
We recommend training and checklists that will increase poll worker awareness of the 
possibility of attacks. Training which reminds poll workers of the importance of vigilance 
and secure equipment storage is part of building a multi-layer defense in depth election 
security system. It is also important to be alert to unusual and suspicious situations. For 
example, one such attack might be an attempt to divert poll workers attention to a false 
emergency. Another might be a disruption that could cause a massive denial of service. 
These kinds of disruptions are most likely in close races, in precincts where a candidate 
expects to lose.  
 
We also recognize that poll workers are temporary employees and have a responsibility 
to not impede elections. Election crimes include causing eligible people to be excluded 
from elections, eligible votes not to be cast or counted, or other interference with election 
results (EAC 2006). It is important for poll workers to maintain the delicate balance 
between security and facilitating voting for all eligible voters.  
 
We recommend training poll workers to inspect tamper evident seals.  
 
We recommend that the Division of Elections provide more specific instructions how to 
"store your ballots, optical scan unit, and touch-screen voting unit in a secure location" in 
training (State of Alaska 2006). Refer to Appendix H - Security Training for more 
information. 
 
Post Election: 
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Suggested changes to poll-worker training include enhanced security procedures as well 
as use of more effective training methods. The Division of Elections should consider 
implementing on-line training programs in addition to in-person training sessions. 
Consider certification and/or increase in poll-worker pay tied to successful completion of 
training. Poll worker wages are currently set by state statute so increases in wages would 
require legislative approval.  
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Part 2 Fortification of Systems 
 
Description: 
 
Section 2.1 Assess the integrity of the hardware and software of the electronic voting 
systems and their ability to accurately tabulate and report results. 
 
Section 2.2 Evaluate communication protocols and make recommendations regarding 
data transmittal to GEMS to avoid the introduction of viruses and longtime delays in 
election returns. 
 
Section 2.3 Evaluate the reliability and accuracy of the optical scanning and touch screen 
systems and their ability to function properly in Alaska weather and 
transportation/handling conditions. Study existing Premier reliability testing levels 
and equipment maintenance procedures to identify any concerns 
 
Summary of Analysis: 
 
The AccuVote election system is made up of voting components which are physically 
distributed across the State of Alaska. The AV-OS and AV-TSX voting machines are 
used to capture and tally votes within individual precincts. Six GEMS servers are also 
used during an election to enter hand-counted paper ballots on election night. The 
AccuVote system allows the election administrators to tabulate preliminary, unofficial 
results rapidly by transmitting the results stored in memory cards from each AV-OS and 
AV-TSX machine to a GEMS server in Juneau where the preliminary results are 
tabulated on a statewide level.  
 
The current election system is implemented using a single director’s office GEMS server 
which is used for both election programming and preliminary vote tabulation on the night 
of the election. AV-OS memory cards are programmed in the Juneau director’s office 
using an AV-OS machine connected to the director’s office GEMS. This machine is 
responsible for programming all of the AV-OS memory cards for the election state-wide.  
 
The transmission of each AV-OS and AV-TSX machine’s results is performed using a 
built-in analog modem. The network of analog modems is connected to the public 
switched telephone network at each precinct using a standard telephone jack. The AV-OS 
and AV-TSX modems dial a bank of 48 analog modems in the Division of Elections 
director’s office in Juneau, Alaska. The modems establish a communications channel 
between the voting machine (AV-OS or AV-TSX) and the GEMS server in Juneau. The 
GEMS software incorporates a communications security feature called secure socket 
layer (SSL) which encrypts the data transmitted over the modem channel. The Division 
of Elections operates the communications channels with this feature enabled reducing the 
likelihood of an eavesdropping attack. At no time is the internet used for communication 
of or transmission of results.  
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Appendix J – AccuVote Communications System Description and Appendix K – 
AccuVote Network Topology provide a system description of the AccuVote 
communications system. The network schematic provides an overview of the 
connectivity between each region and the GEMS server in Juneau. 
 
The State of Alaska requires paper ballot as the ballot of record (AS15.15.030 and 
AS15.15.032). The implementation of this paper ballot in Alaska relies primarily on 
optically scanned ballot cards which are filled out by each voter. This system has an 
inherent redundancy which allows a hand count in the case of a total system failure. 
Although the likelihood of a total system failure is very low, this redundancy ensures that 
no election will be conducted in which a voter would be unable to cast a ballot at any 
precinct. 
 
Premier offers an application - Key Card Tool - which is designed to increase the security 
of AV-TSX memory cards and access cards. The Key Card Tool application allows the 
Division of Elections to change the passwords and encryption keys on the central 
administrator, supervisor, and voter access and memory cards. Current passwords and 
encryption keys are available in the public domain and cannot be considered secure. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
The SOAESP project team did not identify any vulnerabilities requiring remediation in 
the implementation of the AccuVote communications system. The implementation in use 
by the Division of Elections is robust and reasonable. It is important to note that all 
results provided to the public through the transmission of election results are preliminary 
and must be considered unofficial. 
 
2008 Election Cycle 
 
We recommend implementing the Premier Key Card Tool application to improve the 
security of the memory cards used in the AV-TSX machines.  
 
We recommend using a GEMS server system that implements the Air Gap Management 
model (See Appendix M – AccuVote Functional Test Guidelines). 
 
We recommend dedication of a single purpose AV-OS machine for programming AV-OS 
memory cards in the director’s office.  
 
Post Election 
Empirical failure data provided by the Division of Elections point to shipping damage as 
a cause of some hardware failures in the AV-OS machines. It is recommended that 
improved shipping containers be used to reduce machine stress during transportation. We 
recommend using secure transport cases, similar to PelicanTM Products 1600 series cases, 
for transporting AV-OS machines. These cases add a layer of protection against 
tampering as well as guarding against weather and rough handling. Cases should be 
locked or sealed. See Appendix I – AccuVote OS Shipping Container Example. 
 39 
Part 3 Confidence in Outcomes 
Section 3.1 – Functional, Logic and Accuracy Testing 
 
Description: 
 
Evaluate processes and procedures the Division of Elections uses for functionality testing 
and logic and accuracy testing of systems and memory cards. 
 
Summary of Analysis: 
 
The AccuVote election system operated by the Division of Elections requires two 
different types of testing prior to each election to ensure reliable, error free operation. 
Functional testing refers to a suite of tests which validate the functional operation of each 
voting optical scan and touch screen voting machine. Functional testing is required to 
ensure that the machine will operate as designed on election day. The purpose of 
functional testing is to identify component failures or issues prior to deployment of the 
machine for use. Logic and accuracy testing refers to a suite of tests used to validate the 
error-free operation of the voting machines. The purpose of logic and accuracy testing is 
to ensure that the ballot programming is accurate and that voter intent is accurately 
represented in the resulting vote tallies. . 
 
Appendix M is a set of functional test guidelines for the AccuVote system components. 
The appendix first outlines the functional tests currently implemented by the Division of 
Elections for each component. A set of recommendations to enhance the functional test 
suite is then presented. Although the Division of Elections currently performs a subset of 
the recommended tests it was found that improvements could be made in the test 
procedures by adding a number of additional tests and by improving the documentation 
of the test results. 
 
Appendix N is a set of logic and accuracy testing guidelines for the AccuVote system 
components. The Division of Elections current AccuVote tests procedure can be made 
more rigorous by following the procedures provided Premier's State of California: Use 
Procedures document. This document provides a comprehensive list of recommendations 
for secure, error-free use of the AccuVote system. A subset of these recommendations 
which are applicable to the Alaska’s system is outlined in the appendix. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
2008 Election Cycle: 
 
We recommend that the Division of Elections adopt the increased scope of the 
recommended logic and accuracy test guidelines provided in Appendices M and N. Use 
of the enhanced procedures decreases the likelihood of an election day failure and 
reduces the probability of equipment logic or accuracy errors.  
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Post Election: 
 
We recommend that testing technicians document procedures for revised functional test, 
logic and accuracy procedures. 
 
We recommend that the guidelines presented in Appendices M and N be used to develop 
a long-term test documentation system whereby the results of each election cycle’s 
functional, logic and accuracy test results are measured, validated and stored for later 
access and review. 
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Section 3.2 – Methods to Improve Voter Confidence 
 
Description: 
 
Identify methods that the Division of Elections can use to improve voter confidence. 
 
Summary of analysis: 
 
Other researchers determined that numerous factors influence public confidence in 
elections (Celeste, Thornburgh, Lin 2006, Weiser and Goldman 2007). Election 
administration processes and procedures can directly influence many of these9 factors.  
 
• Voters' personal experiences at polling places. Research shows that a voter’s 
personal experience is closely related to the level of poll worker training. 
According to a Pew Trust report (Pew Center on the States 2007), poll worker 
confidence translates to voter confidence.  
• Confidence in election equipment. Closely related to personal experience is voter 
confidence in election equipment. Most of the concern about election security 
involves touch screen systems including the AV-TSX machines used in Alaska. In 
Alaska, each precinct must have a mechanism in place for voters as mandated by 
the federal Help America Vote Act (HAVA). The AV-TSX touch screen voting 
systems meet the HAVA requirements. Each of these systems provides a 
mechanism that allows a voter to verify their individual vote. Additionally votes 
are recorded on a paper reel inside the touch screen unit that is later verified 
during a precinct level validation. This paper reel is considered the official paper 
ballot record. In Alaska, less than 1% of votes are cast on AV-TSX machines. In 
2006, five communities used AV-TSX machines for all or most of their votes 
because these communities would otherwise require a hand-count of paper 
ballots. However, in most communities very few, if any votes are cast on AV-
TSX systems. In Alaska's 2006 general election, in 224 precincts no one used the 
AV-TSX machines. In 112 precincts, fewer than five voters used the machines.  
• Transparency. Alaska has an open process in which observers are encouraged to 
participate in and observe the entire voting and auditing process. Election 
procedures are uniform across the state and are written into state statute.  
• Availability and frequency of recounts. Alaska has had many close races and 
frequent recounts. In Alaska, a vote margin less than or equal to 0.5% fewer than 
20 votes triggers a recount. Otherwise a candidate or group of ten or more voters 
may request a recount. The candidate or proposition with the most votes in a 
                                                 
9 Factors that are beyond the direct influence of election administration procedures are: faith in specific 
public officials, trust in democratic process, lack of public controversy around election administration, 
broad acceptance of election systems by social elites, substance and tone of election and political rhetoric, 
voter technological literacy and knowledge, and election outcome 
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recount is declared the winner. Since Alaska started using AV-OS machines in 
1998, there has never been a case when the recount results changed the election 
outcome.  
• Management of elections by non-partisan elections officials. With the exception 
of the director of the Division of Elections, Alaska's election officials are 
employees hired through the state employment process. Most have been working 
on elections for a long time. We found that several people had tenures of almost 
20 years. Regional directors report that many poll workers have long tenures as 
well. 
• Post election audits. The purpose of post-election audits is to give the public 
confidence that the election machinery is counting votes correctly. The Division 
of Elections conducts a post election audit, with bi-partisan participation and 
observers present.  
• Paper ballot as the official ballot. According to Alaska state statute, the paper 
ballot is the official ballot (AS15.15.30 and AS15.15.32). Alaska is one of 35 
states that require some form of paper back up. Of the 29 states, 13 use the paper 
ballots to audit results from electronic tallies (Pew Center for the States 2008, 
VerifiedVoting.org 2008).  
 
Recommendations: 
 
2008 Election Cycle: 
 
Poll workers need to ensure that if one person uses an AV-TSX machine, at least five 
voters use it. At least 5 voters need to AV-TSX to protect voter confidentiality. Use the 
Division of Elections website to encourage members of the public and people concerned 
about the election system to become observers, encourage people to become poll workers 
and to make results of this evaluation accessible to the public.  
 
Post Election: 
 
We recommend that the Division of Elections expand its efforts to recruit poll workers 
and election observers, use the Division’s website and media to inform the public about 
Alaska’s election system, consider working with high schools to develop a module for 
teaching about Alaska’s election system and recruiting high-school students to work as 
poll workers. 
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Section 3.3 – Metrics and Continuous Improvement 
 
Description:  
 
Establish metrics that the Division of Elections can use as part of a procedure to 
demonstrate continuous improvement effort regarding of election security and 
predictability of results over time. 
 
Summary of Analysis: 
 
Sustaining Division of Elections confidence is more likely if a Continuous Process 
Improvement (CPI) program is instituted. CPI is a structured approach to analyze and 
identify process improvement opportunities and institute improvements on a continual 
basis. In the case of the of the voting process, there will always be a need to have, in 
place, a systematic approach for keeping all levels of the organization involved in 
changes. The objective would be to keep the staff, equipment, software, procedures and 
training up to date. An important aspect of CPI is the requirement for criteria to be 
identified and measured. Measurement becomes the source of metrics on which 
improvement is based. Throughout the voting cycle, there are opportunities for 
procedures to collect metrics that, in turn, can be pursued for improvement. 
 
CPI is commonly referenced throughout management and public administration literature 
and is considered an effective approach for keeping up-to-date and improvements a 
normal part of the organizational culture. CPI was developed first by Dr. W. Edwards 
Deming and initial referred to as the "Shewhart cycles". Continuous improvement is 
accomplished as an iterative cycle that repeats the following steps: Define – Measure – 
Analyze – Improve – Control. CPI was first applied to quality control in the 
manufacturing process. The approach is now adapted by many organizations (private and 
public) for the purpose of involving all organizational levels in improving the quality of 
services and keeping technologies current (Kelly, 2003; Xenakis and Macintosh, 2006). 
 
An example of a possible criterion for consideration is: "Percent of pre-election testing 
errors". This is measurable and can be evaluated using a root-cause methodology and 
subsequent measures indicate improvements. Specific criteria are established as part of 
the improvement process and reflect the goals of Division of Elections. 
 
The four election regions are not identical and there will always be differences regarding 
staff experience and voting challenges. There is a need to adopt a methodology within 
Division of Elections that allows for all of the staff to help in planning and in facilitating 
improvements in all aspects of the voting process. These include updates in software, 
equipment, training and related materials. Regional offices need to be involved both 
because of their contribution to the understanding of unique challenges in the various 
area of the state and the advantage of having the improvements integrated between 
regions. All regions improve because of their collective efforts. 
 
Recommendations: 
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This is to be a change in managerial procedures intended to involve managers at all levels 
of Division of Elections and will take time to initiate and implement. 
 
2008 Election Cycle: 
 
Very little can be accomplished between now and the end of this election cycle however 
preliminary objectives, metrics can be explored. Consider conducting an audit during the 
election to evaluate if these preliminary criteria are the right metrics and use this to 
collect some baseline data.  
 
Post Election: 
 
Instituting a CPI program should be considered starting in 2009 beginning with overall 
training of the topics and process of CPI. Next is setting specific improvement goals and 
measurable criteria. Measurement of results is critical because this becomes the basis for 
measuring improvements. 
 
We recommend that the regional directors play a role in CPI both because they are close 
to the unique challenges within the regions and also this involvement facilitates 
integrating and standardizing the improvements between the regions. 
 45 
Section 3.4 - Public Input and Commentary 
 
Description: 
 
Provide a weekly review of emails from the public on security issues and summarize and 
publish general responses to them on the Division of Elections website. 
 
Summary of Analysis: 
 
From September 2007 through end April 2008, six emails were received from members 
of the public. The suggestions in the emails included: 
 
• Use punch cards that could be fed into an optical scanning system for tallying. 
• Hand-count all ballots in the next election. 
• Use two-part ballot that would provide a receipt showing the votes cast. 
• Eliminate touch screen systems. 
• Provide a tear tab with a serial number. Voter could later visit a website to verify 
correct vote recording using serial number.  
• Post results through a website as votes are tallied. 
• Set optical scanner to read fainter marks to ensure all legitimate votes can be 
counted.  
 
Only systems that have been certified by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) 
Voting Systems Standards can be used in federal elections. These specifications include 
detailed requirements pertaining to functional capabilities, hardware standards, software 
standards, telecommunication standards, security standards, quality assurance standards 
and system configuration management. Each system certified by the VSS must pass a set 
of tests performed by an Independent Test Authority (ITA) that has also been certified by 
the EAC. These standards also include detailed information about ballots and 
accessibility for voters covered by the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) and 
HAVA. Currently, by law, systems used in Alaska must conform to the VSS 2002 
standard. As new capabilities are developed by election equipment vendors, this 
equipment must be certified to this minimum standard as well as any then current 
standard required by law.  
 
At this time, there are no punch card systems that are certified to the VSS standard. 
Random hand-counts and requests for hand counts for close elections help ensure vote 
counting accuracy. Election results have never changed as a result of random hand-counts 
and mandatory or requested recounts. 
 
To protect voter privacy, receipts are not issued. The internet is not considered a secure 
mechanism for transmitting voting results. At this time, memory cards containing the 
votes cast on each machine are manually inserted into centralized vote tabulation 
machines. Real-time information about vote tallies is not provided to ensure that no 
election results are posted prior to the conclusion of the election. For more detailed 
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information on the reliability and accuracy of the optical scanning system please see 
Appendix L – AccuVote Reliability Assessment.  
 
The suggestion to implement a system of tear tabs with serial numbers refers to using 
cryptographic methods to verify votes. The voter receives an encrypted copy of their 
voted ballot with a randomized serial number. Voters can use the serial numbers to get 
internet access to a decrypted version of their voted ballot (Robinson 2004, 2004b). 
Implementing this process would involve a different system than what is in place. It is 
one of several innovations worth considering in the event of an overhaul.  
 
2008 Election Cycle: 
 
Continue to monitor feedback through Division of Elections website and respond to 
frequently asked questions. 
 
Post Election: 
 
Continue to monitor feedback through Division of Elections website. Incorporate 
suggestions into continuous improvement process (CIP). 
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Section 3.5 – Absentee Ballot Process   
 
Description:  
 
Provide a description of the absentee ballot process. 
 
Summary Analysis: 
 
Absentee voting is a major component of the election process because, in the last 
election, 19% of voters voted by absentee. There are two broad categories of absentee 
voting. The first category includes absentee by mail, fax and special advanced requests. 
The second category is called "in-person absentee" It includes special needs voting, early 
voting and absentee in person voting. 
 
In all cases, the process starts with the Division of Elections’ request for ballots to be 
printed. Absentee ballots are produced as part of the same purchase order to the printer 
order for precinct voting ballots. It is placed 48 days before the election. The ballots are 
numbered in sequence with numbers of ballots printed from estimates based on previous 
elections. State of Alaska statute requires that all absentee ballots be reviewed, opened 
and counted by the 15th day after the election. Absentee ballots are not part of the post-
election audit process. 
 
Absentee voting information is detailed on the State of Alaska, Division of Elections web 
site and procedures for the various categories are outlines in: Absentee Voting Station 
Official Procedures (Rev. 5/2006) and Absentee Voting Official’s Handbook (Rev. 
4/25/06). Regarding both categories of absentee voting, the Division of Elections has 
carefully delineated the open period for the respective absentee voting as well as the 
process and procedures for voting absentee. We identified one issue unique to absentee 
voting that requires special attention: time exposure. The ballots are in distribution, 
storage and most importantly, in use, over many more days than the ballots and machines 
used specifically at a polling place on election day. 
 
Appendix Q - Summary of Absentee Voting delineates types of absentee voting and 
respective pre- and post-election dates of the process. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
2008 Election Cycle: 
 
All of the security issues with regard to memory cards, upgrades and ballots used at 
polling places for election day also apply to absentee voting. Ballots stored for use in 
absentee voting need to have tight security to avoid loss, damage or tampering along with 
procedures and staff training emphasizing the risks of unauthorized access. Procedures 
for "end-of-day" documentation, distribution, ballot storage and shipping, and final 
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delivery of ballots and reports to Division of Election in Juneau need special attention to 
assure adequate control and accountability (see Appendix H – Security Training). 
 
Post Election: 
 
The voting equipment used in support of the absentee voting processes should be 
identified in general usage/maintenance records should the need arise to assess unusual 
usage, security concerns and/or maintenance patterns. 
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Section 3.6 – Random Sampling Methodologies 
 
Description:  
 
Research other random sampling methodologies that might provide additional confidence 
in election results. These recommendations would be proposed for further consideration 
and evaluation.  
 
Summary of analysis: 
 
Random sampling methodologies refer to sample size and how ballots are chosen for 
hand counts in Alaska's post election audit.  
 
The main purpose of the post election audit is to increase public confidence in election 
results. Audits do this by verifying that the machine counts were correct and confirming 
that a manual recount would not change the outcome. Audits also detect tampering with 
the system, detect large scale systemic errors, deter fraud, and provide feedback to allow 
jurisdictions to improve voting technology and election administration (Norden 2007). 
The random sample should be large enough to be able to detect discrepancies but small 
enough to be efficient so that hand counts don't take a long time. Alaska is one of only 12 
states with an election audit (Norden 2007) program. Many states are currently evaluating 
and pilot testing audit procedures and sampling methods. But to date, there is little 
agreement about which is the best audit procedure (Norden 2007).  
 
One of the benefits of a uniform statewide system in Alaska is that observers only need to 
go to one place to see the audit. Alaska's random selection process is transparent. Bi-
partisan review board members select the random sample by drawing precinct numbers 
from strips of paper in a box. Precincts are eligible for selection if they include at least 
5% of the voters in that House district. In Alaska, a bi-partisan review board hand counts 
ballots from one precinct in each house district. If the results of the hand count differ 
from the results from electronic counts by more than 1%, all ballots in that House district 
must be hand counted. To date, there has never been a case where counts differed by 
more than 1% in any precinct. 
 
Recommendations:  
 
2008 Election Cycle: 
 
No changes this year.  
 
Post Election:  
 
Wait to consider changes until audit evaluations in other states are finished. Any changes 
to the procedure would require legislative approval since the audit procedure is written 
into Alaska state statutes.  
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Conclusions 
 
The following table summarizes our main recommendations, some of which the Division 
of Elections could put into effect before the August primary and the November general 
election, and some of which it can’t.  
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• Upgrade to the new, more secure platform after the election. We can’t over-
emphasize the importance of this upgrade. Alaska, California, Florida, and other 
states use the same or similar voting technology. Election-security studies in 
several states found that the existing technology was potentially vulnerable to 
vote-tampering in a number of ways. The new platform, Premier Election 
Systems Assure 1.2, which the manufacturer developed in response to those 
studies, is still being tested to insure that it meets standards set by the federal 
Election Assistance Commission. We had hoped the system could be installed on 
Alaska’s voting equipment by the 2008 election, but we now believe that’s not 
feasible. Alaska is now in the run-up to the August primary and the November 
election. The Division of Elections is programming its equipment for those 
elections and doing other work that has to meet specific pre-election deadlines. 
Also, because the state shares voting equipment with local governments, the 
upgrade will have to be coordinated with them as well. To add it is a huge, 
expensive job requiring complicated logistics at this point is not feasible. But we 
recommend that it be done as soon as possible after the election. 
• Establish security goals and a method for regularly measuring progress toward 
those goals. The Division of Elections is well aware of security issues, and has 
taken a number of steps to improve security. But it currently has no long-range 
security goals, nor a plan for measuring progress. We believe it’s very important 
for the division to develop such goals and systematically meet them. 
• Consider forming a partnership with some other organization that could 
continuously monitor and evaluate any new election-security vulnerabilities and 
ways to improve security. This would allow the Division of Elections to quickly 
make any necessary changes or improvements, before problems developed. Some 
states are already doing this. The Division of Elections itself does not have 
adequate staff to do such monitoring. 
• Install new software that allows election officials to create a more-secure 
password authentication system for touch-screen machines. Election officials are 
in fact already installing this new software, as they do programming for the 
upcoming election. This new software, called Key Card Tool, allows them for the 
first time to create their own authentication password and encryption keys for the 
state’s 439 touch-screen machines. This is a substantial improvement in security. 
Previously, the default password and keys were in the public domain. They were 
programmed into all the touch-screen machines and couldn’t be changed. Now, 
the password and keys can be changed regularly, and over time election regions 
could have their own individual passwords and keys. 
• Verify the accuracy of voting technology. Before and after the November 
election, election officials should test all voting machines by comparing code in 
the machines with correct, registered code. In the longer-term, the state should 
develop standard testing processes to insure all voting technology is functioning 
properly and recording votes accurately. 
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• Change system passwords. Before the election, the state should change all 
passwords currently used in election-system technology. After the election, the 
state should develop a plan for routinely tracking and changing passwords. 
• Use tamper-evident seals on envelopes and shipping containers. This precaution 
can be taken before the upcoming election. Critics argue that attackers could in 
fact open such seals without leaving any evidence of tampering. But we believe 
that especially in Alaska—where ballots and equipment can travel long distances 
under difficult conditions—tamper-evident seals do help improve security.  
• Recruit more poll workers and improve their election-security training. Before the 
election, the Division of Elections should add a section on election-security to the 
existing training manual, which doesn’t currently discuss security. In the longer 
term, the state needs to recruit more poll workers—which in itself would help 
improve security in polling places—and to provide better training (possibly 
online) in election-security procedures. 
• Improve the way voting machines are transported, tracked, and stored. Most of 
these recommended improvements can’t be made until after the November 
election. They include buying better shipping containers for optical-scan 
machines, which have to be shipped to many small communities from larger 
regional centers before and elections and returned afterward. The state also needs 
a better system for tracking the number and location of voting machines, through 
bar-codes or other methods of inventory-control. Also, the physical security of 
machines in storage needs improvement. The state should consider reinforced 
doors, dead-bolt locks, ceiling grids, alarms, and other measures as appropriate.  
We have made a number of recommendations for improving the security of Alaska’s 
election system, but we want to keep those recommendations in context: Alaska’s 
election system is in good shape. Other states are now adopting measures we’ve had in 
place for years. Personnel of the Division of Elections understand the system and have a 
good idea of what kinds of measures could help make it more secure. 
 
But there’s always room for improvement. Aside from the specific recommendations 
we’ve listed, Alaska needs to build a foundation for the future—to make sure Alaska’s 
election system stays among the best in the country. The current election technology is 
aging, and the state will face new choices when it has to upgrade that technology. It needs 
to start systematically assessing its future needs and new technologies now.  
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Proposed Statement of Work for Phase 3: Implementation 
 
1. Investigate Institutional Partnership 
2. Develop revised functional, logic and accuracy testing procedures 
3. Continue to monitor poll-worker training and auditing programs going on in other 
states (grant-based work being done) including on-line training capabilities. 
4. Develop Assure 1.2 upgrade procedure. 
5. Perform Assure 1.2 cost benefit analysis for implementation methodology 
6. Design process to audit use of and results from implemented recommendations. 
7. Develop procedures for recommended technical enhancements (e.g. hash code)
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Item 
Number
Assure 1.2 Software or 
Firmware Component Upgrade Procedure Description Machines Affected
Estimated Hours
Per Machine
Total 
Hours
1 AV-OS Firmware Upgrade Existing 1.96.6 firmware EPROM is 
physically replaced with 1.96.10 
firmware EPROM.  New EPROM to 
contain a serial number on bottom 
side of chip.
290 0.25 73
2 AV-TSX Bootloader Upgrade Existing BLR 7.1.2.1 Bootloader 
software is upgraded to BLR 1.3.9
439 0.25 110
3 AV-TSX Windows CE Upgrade Existing Windows CE operating 
system software is upgraded from the 
current version 4 10.2.1 to version 4 
10.3.9
439 0.25 110
4 AV-TSX BallotStation Upgrade Existing BallotStation software is 
upgraded from the current version 
4.6.4 to version 4.7.2
439 0.25 110
5 AV-TSX AccuView Printer 
Module Software Upgrade
Existing AccuView printer modules 
software is upgraded from the current 
version model 3 rev. 3.03 to model A 
rev 3.03
439 0.25 110
7 GEMS Election Management 
Software Upgrade
Existing election management 
software is upgraded from the current 
version 1.18.24.0 to version 1.20.2
8 8 64
8 Key Card Tool Software 
Upgrade
The Key Card Tool software must be 
upgraded to version 4.7.1
2 8 16
9 Voter Card Encoder Upgrade The voter card encoders must be 
upgraded from the existing version 
1.3.2 to the Assure 1.2 version 1.3.3
1198 0.25 300
10 VC Programmer Software 
Upgrade
The VC Programmer software must 
be upgraded from the existing version 
4.6.1 to the Assure 1.2 verion 4.7.1
System-level task lot 4
11 Assure 1.2 Upgrade AV-OS 
Procedure Development
Develop and draft a plan and a 
procedure for upgrade of all AV-OS, 
AV-TSX and GEMS machines to 
include acceptance and functional 
testing following the upgrade 
procedure implementation.
System-level task lot 100
995
Appendix A - Assure 1.2 Upgrade Labor Estimate
Total Hours
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Appendix B - Assure 1.2 Upgrade Analysis 
 
1. System Overview 
 
The Premier Election Solutions AccuVote system used by the State of Alaska Division of 
Elections (DoE) is comprised of several different software and hardware components.  These 
software and hardware components interact at different times during an election in order to 
allow election officials to prepare ballots and races, to allow voters to cast ballots and to allow 
election officials to tabulate the results of the election. 
 
The State of Alaska DoE utilizes the following Premier system components in its 
implementation of the AccuVote election system. 
 
1.1 AccuVote Optical Scan Model B (AV-OS) 
 
The AccuVote Optical Scan (AV-OS) hardware is available in two different firmware 
configurations, precinct count and central count.  The State of Alaska DoE does not use the 
Premier Election Solutions central count firmware.   
 
The precinct count firmware version of the AV-OS is used by individual precincts to conduct 
elections and tally votes.  The firmware in each AV-OS machine is stored on an Electrically 
Programmable Read Only Memory (EPROM) device which is accessed by the AV-OS 
hardware.  The system utilizes a re-writable 40-pin Epson memory card to program individual 
elections.  Tallied votes and ballot definition files are stored on the memory card.  A precinct 
AV-OS machine reads the election mode from the memory card and adopts that functional 
mode for operation. 
 
The firmware revision currently present on the AV-OS platform operated by the State of 
Alaska DoE is precinct count 1.96.6.   
 
1.2 AccuVote Touchscreen Model D (AV-TSX) 
 
The AccuVote Touchscreen (AV-TSX) hardware used by the State of Alaska DoE is a Direct 
Recording Electronic (DRE) machine with an additional module which produces a Voter 
Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT).  The AV-TSX machine allows voters to cast their votes 
from an electronic touchscreen interface.  Once the ballot is cast the touchscreen device 
sends the ballot to a VVPAT printer where the voter validates the results.  Once the voter 
accepts the printed ballot the vote is considered cast and the tallies are updated on the 
electronic memory card. 
 
The AV-TSX machine requires two different applications to run.  The bootloader application is 
used to load the Windows CE operating system image from the system flash memory.  The 
State of Alaska DoE currently uses Bootloader v.BLR 7.1.2.1.  The system also requires the 
BallotStation application which runs under the Windows CE operating system.  This 
application implements the voter interface and administrative functionality within the AV-TSX 
machine.  The State of Alaska DoE currently uses BallotStation v.4.6.4. 
 
An additional security enhancement is available from Premier Election Solutions for use with 
the AV-TSX machines.  The security enhancement is called Key Card Tool.  Key Card Tool is 
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a software application which allows election officials to change encryption keys and access 
passwords within the AV-TSX system.  The State of Alaska DoE is in the process of 
implementing the Key Card Tool application for the 2008 election cycle. 
 
1.3 GEMS (Global Election Management System) 
 
The Division of Elections utilizes a total of eight (8) GEMS servers distributed across the 
State of Alaska.  The GEMS servers implement the ballot definition, vote tabulation and 
system reporting functions for the Premier Election Solutions AccuVote system. 
 
Currently, the Division of Elections is operating identically configured Dell PowerEdge 
Servers which run the Premier Election Solutions GEMS applications. 
 
The GEMS systems are running Election Management System v.1.18.24.0 
 
In addition to running the Election Management System software, the system is operating 
with Dell BIOS A09. 
 
The Division of Elections does not currently calculate hash codes of the certified software 
running on the GEMS servers. 
1.4 Assure 1.2 Components 
 
The Assure 1.2 software / firmware upgrade is a complete system revision.  This system 
revision is comprised of several different software and firmware components which must be 
loaded on to each hardware platform in order to obtain a complete system upgrade. 
 
1.4.1 AV-OS Components 
 
The AV-OS model B machines must be upgraded from the existing 1.96.6 EPROM 
firmware revision to the AV-OS Precinct Count Firmware version 1.96.10 (build date 
10-01-2007). 
 
1.4.2 AV-TSX Components 
 
The AV-TSX model D machines must be upgraded from the existing Bootloader v.BLR 
7.1.2.1 to the Assure 1.2 Bootloader v1.3.9 (build date 11-19-2007). 
 
The AV-TSX model D machines must be upgraded from the existing 
Windows CE version v.4 10.2.1 to the Assure 1.2 v.4 10.3.9 (build date 1-19-2007), 
 
The AV-TSX model D machines must be upgraded from the existing BallotStation v.4.6.4 
to the Assure 1.2 BallotStation v.4.7.2 (build date 01-07-08). 
 
The AV-TSX model D machines must have the AccuView Printer Module software 
updated from AVPM model 3 Rev 3.03 o the Assure 1.2 AVPM model A v.3.03 (build 
date 11-01-07). 
 
1.4.3 GEMS Components 
 
The GEMS Servers must be updated from the existing Election Management Software 
v.1.18.24.0 to the Assure 1.2 v.1.20.2 (build date 11-19-2007). 
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The GEMS Servers must be updated to the Assure 1.2 Security Manager v.1.0.5 (build 
date 01-15-2008). 
 
 
1.4.4 System-wide Components 
 
The AV-OS model B machines and the AV-TSX model D machines must have the 
AccuBasic Report Files version updated to v.2.2.3 (build date 11-19-2007). 
 
The Keycard Tool software must be updated to Assure 1.2 Keycard Tool v.4.7.1 (build 
date 11-01-2007). 
 
The Voter Card Encoder must have the existing software v.1.3.2 updated to the Assure 
1.2 Voter Card Encoder v.1.3.3 (build date 11-01-2007)  
 
The VC Programmer must have the existing software v.4.6.1 updated to the Assure 1.2 
VC Programmer v.4.7.1 (build date 11-01-2007). 
 
1.4.5 Assure 1.2 Release Notes 
 
At the time that this document was drafted the Premier Elections Solutions software had 
not yet been certified to the VSS 2002 standard.  As such the Assure 1.2 release notes 
are not yet available for review. 
 
2. Assure 1.2 Upgrade Cost Estimate 
2.1 Assure 1.2 Software Cost Estimate 
 
The State of Alaska Division of Elections has a current maintenance agreement with 
Premier Election Solutions, Inc.  Software upgrades are provided to the Division of 
Elections at no additional cost while the maintenance agreement is in effect. 
2.2 Installation and Validation Cost Estimate 
 
The installation and acceptance testing of the Assure 1.2 upgrade represents a 
significant dedication of time by the Division of Elections.  Upgrade from the existing 
AccuVote system revision to the Assure 1.2 revision requires the execution of ten 
individual tasks.  A rough estimate of the labor hours associated with the implementation 
of each Assure 1.2 component is provided in “Appendix A – Assure 1.2 Upgrade Labor 
Estimate”. 
 
 
Page 4 of 110
3 Assure 1.2 Software Evaluation 
 
Phase 1 of the SOAESP identified a number of different system issues presented by the 
California Source Code Review of the Diebold Voting System (Calandrino, et al. 2007), the 
California Red Team Review (Bishop, 2007), the Florida Software Review and Security 
Analysis of the Diebold Voting Machine Software (Gardner, et al., 2007) and others.  As a 
result of this analysis, the State of Alaska is interested in evaluating Premier Election 
System’s Assure 1.2 software release.  This new release of software is applicable to the 
State of Alaska’s AccuVote system.   
 
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the Assure 1.2 software platform against the list of 
issues, vulnerabilities and problems identified in Phase 1.  Recommendations are made 
regarding the installation of the Assure 1.2 on Alaska’s AccuVote system. 
3.1 VSS 2002 Compliance 
 
The Premier Election Solutions Assure 1.2 is currently undergoing evaluation by the 
nationally recognized testing laboratory Systest.  Premier Election Solutions, Inc. is 
confident that the Assure 1.2 software release will be compliant with the Voting 
System Standards 2002 certification requirements.  Certification under the VSS 2002 
requirements has not yet been received.  State of Alaska law requires that the 
system be certified prior to installation on the production voting system. 
3.2 California Red Team Review 
 
The California Red Team Review (Bishop, 2007) identified a number of issues which 
are addressed by Premier in the Assure 1.2 platform.  These issues are outlined 
below: 
 
3.2.1 Precinct Count AV-OS Ballot Tampering 
 
The California Red Team was able to verify previous results wherein the 
ballot totals in the AV-OS memory card could be tampered with to affect the 
outcome of an election.   
 
The Assure 1.2 software release corrects this issue. 
 
 
3.2.2 AV-TSX Malware 
 
The California Red Team verified previous findings in which a malicious user 
might overwrite system firmware and / or software.  The potential impact of 
this type of vulnerability was presented in the Red Team Report. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release corrects the bootloader issue.  Premier 
believes that the format string error issue does not present a real 
vulnerability. 
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3.2.3 AV-TSX Escalation of Privileges 
 
The California Red Team identified a vulnerability in which a malicious user 
might gain access to the system at the supervisor or central administrator 
level. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release corrects this issue.  The user can still enter 
the system setup / diagnostics mode when a peripheral device failure occurs.  
Administrative functions are denied. 
 
3.2.4 AV-TSX Default Static Key 
 
The California Red Team commented in their report on the use of the default 
static authentication and data keys within the AV-TSX system. 
 
The Premier Election Solutions Keycard Tool application should be used to 
increase the security surrounding smart card use in the AV-TSX system.  
Premier Election Solutions believes that Indication of the default key on the 
AV-TSX interface is a security feature.  The Assure 1.2 software release 
updates the Keycard Tool application to version 4.7.1. 
 
3.2.5 GEMS Databases 
 
The California Red Team identified an issue with database access within the 
GEMS server where a malicious user could gain access to the GEMS 
databases and corrupt or manipulate the contents of the database. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release corrects the direct database direct read / 
write issue and improves database security. 
 
3.2.6 GEMS Audit Logs 
 
The California Red Team found that the audit logging functionality within the 
GEMS server was insufficient to identify all malicious user activity. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software protects the election database using password 
access. 
 
3.3 Florida Software Review 
 
The Florida review team (Gardner, et al., 2007) identified a number of issues with the 
Premier Election Solutions hardware and software.  The text below describes issues 
which were identified by the Florida team as requiring input and resolution by Premier 
Election Solutions.  
 
3.3.1 RSA Hardware Signature Flaw 
 
The Florida evaluation team found that the AV-OS and AV-TSX RSA 
encryption signatures which validate the AccuBasic scripts in the system 
firmware are implemented in a manner which is susceptible to malicious 
attack. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release corrects the hardware signature flaw. 
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3.3.2 AV-OS Memory Card Integrity Is Not Protected 
 
The Florida evaluation team found that the AV-OS memory card contents are 
not encrypted or authenticated in any manner.  This vulnerability was found 
to expose the AV-OS platform to attack. 
 
Premier Election Solutions believes that a complete memory card 
authentication implementation is beyond the capabilities of the AV-OS 
hardware.  Improvements relating to AccuBasic report scripts have been 
implemented.  Physical memory card protection is recommended as a top 
security priority. 
 
3.3.3 AV-TSX Cryptographic Key Management 
 
Like the California Red Team, the Florida evaluation team found that the 
AV-TSX was vulnerable to smart card attacks when using the default data 
and security keys within the AV-TSX system. 
 
The Premier Election Solutions Keycard Tool application should be used to 
increase the security surrounding smart card use in the AV-TSX system.  
The Assure 1.2 software release updates the Keycard Tool application to 
version 4.7.1. 
 
3.3.4 AV-TSX Memory Card Update File is Unprotected 
 
The Florida evaluation team found that the assure.ini file was not sufficiently 
protected within the AV-TSX system.  This lack of protection was found to 
expose the system to malicious attackers. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release corrects this issue. 
 
3.3.5 AV-TSX Smart Card Authentication Uses Only a Hard Coded Password 
 
The Florida evaluation team found that even with the use of the Keycard Tool 
application the AV-TSX system was vulnerable to smart card attacks by 
skilled attackers. 
 
Not addressed by the Assure 1.2 software release.  Premier Election 
Solutions believes that the vulnerability identified in the Florida analysis can 
be satisfactorily mitigated by training election workers to identify and act on 
suspicious activity in the polling place. 
 
3.3.6 AV-TSX Supervisor PIN is Not Cryptographically Protected 
 
The Florida evaluation team found that even with the use of the Keycard Tool 
application the AV-TSX system was vulnerable to smart card attacks by 
skilled attackers. 
 
Not addressed by the Assure 1.2 software release.  Premier Election 
Solutions believes that the supervisor PIN is sufficient to protect supervisor 
access and that procedural checks should be implemented which restrict 
access to the supervisor cards. 
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3.3.7 AV-TSX Insecure Storage Mount 
 
The Florida evaluation team found that the storage device within the AV-TSX 
platform was not implemented in the most secure manner possible.  This 
vulnerability exposes the system to vote tampering attacks by malicious 
users. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release corrects this issue. 
 
3.3.8 AV-TSX System Configuration Information is Unprotected 
 
The Florida evaluation team found that a large portion of the system 
configuration for the AV-TSX platform is stored in the system registry.  
Alteration was found to be feasible by a malicious user. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release does not address this issue.  Premier 
Election Solutions does not believe that a security risk is posed by this issue. 
 
3.3.9 AV-TSX Ballot Definition File is Unprotected 
 
The Florida evaluation team found that the ballot definition file uses an 
encryption method which is not considered to implement the highest level of 
security. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release addresses this issue by increasing the 
security of the ballot definition file protection using HMAC-SHA-1 (Hash 
Message Authentication Code Secure Hash  Algorithm 1). 
 
3.3.10 AV-TSX No Integrity Protection of Stored Electronic Ballots 
 
The Florida evaluation team found that the encryption method used to secure 
the election database file was not implemented in the most secure manner 
possible.  The Florida team made recommendations to Premier Election 
Solutions regarding security enhancements. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release addresses this issue by increasing the 
security of the stored electronic ballot file protection using HMAC-SHA-1 
(Hash Message Authentication Code Secure Hash  Algorithm 1). 
 
3.3.11 AV-TSX Ballots are Stored Sequentially 
 
The Florida evaluation team found that the ballots are stored within the 
AV-TSX system in the order in which they are cast.  Users with encryption 
key access could potentially correlate voters to ballots and undermine the 
anonymity of the election. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release does not address this issue.  Premier 
believes that in order to exploit this issue the malicious user would require 
access to the encryption keys within the AV-TSX system.  The encryption 
keys are not externally accessible by the user and as such Premier believes 
that this issue does not represent a vulnerability. 
 
3.3.12 AV-TSX Candidate Information is Not Stored in the Results File 
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The Florida evaluation team found that the candidate information on a ballot 
is not stored and a malicious user might use this vulnerability to tamper with 
vote counts. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release does not address this issue.  Premier 
believes that this is not a security vulnerability. 
 
3.3.13 AV-TSX Audit Logs Are Not Cryptographically Protected 
 
The Florida evaluation team found the AV-TSX audit logs are protected in the 
same manner as the electronic ballots.  Improved encryption methods exist 
and are outlined by the Florida team. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release addresses this issue by increasing the 
security of the AV-TSX audit log protection using HMAC-SHA-1 (Hash 
Message Authentication Code Secure Hash  Algorithm 1). 
 
3.3.14 AV-TSX Data is Neither Authenticated Nor Encrypted Over the 
Communication Link 
 
The Florida evaluation team found that although SSL an available protocol 
within the system its use is optional.  Further, the Florida team found issues 
with the Premier Election Solutions implementation of the SSL protocol. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release corrects this issue.  Florida reviewers found 
that the implementation of the SSL protocol was not initialized with sufficient 
entropy to ensure secure communications.  The Assure 1.2 software 
increases the entropy of the SSL protocol seed. 
 
3.3.15 AV-TSX Bootloader Automatically Replaces Itself 
 
The Florida evaluation team found that the bootloader process automatically 
replaced itself if a new copy of the bootloader file was found on the memory 
card.  The Florida team made recommendations to improve the security of 
the bootloader replacement process. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release corrects this issue.  Updating the bootloader 
software now requires both operator and bootloader software authentication. 
 
3.3.16 AV-TSX Bootloader Automatically Replaces Operating System 
 
The Florida evaluation team found that the AV-TSX bootloader could cause 
the operating system to be replaced if certain file types were found on the 
system memory card. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release corrects this issue.  Updating the operating 
system now requires both operator and operating system software 
authentication. 
 
3.3.17 AV-TSX Bootloader Automatically Runs .ins File on the Memory Card 
 
The Florida evaluation team found that the AV-TSX bootloader automatically 
ran files with an extension of .ins.  Although the .ins files on the memory card 
are signed the Florida team found the signatures to have vulnerabilities 
within the AV-TSX system. 
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The Assure 1.2 software release corrects this issue.  The software now 
requires authentication of the user and of the .ins file proper to execution of 
.ins files. 
 
3.3.18 AV-OS Leaks Memory Card Contents 
 
The Florida evaluation team found that the contents of an AV-OS memory 
card could be obtained by interfacing a laptop computer to the AV-OS and 
using built-in Microsoft Operating System tools. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release does not address this issue.  Premier 
Election Solutions believes that this vulnerability can be mitigated by the 
physical security measures of locking the AV-OS onto the ballot box and by 
locking the Yes / No keys on the AV-OS machine. 
 
3.3.19 AV-OS Supervisor PIN Not Cryptographically Protected 
 
The Florida evaluation team found that the supervisor access PIN was 
vulnerable to attack by a malicious user if the user was familiar with the 
method used to secure the supervisor access PIN. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release does not address this issue.  Hardware 
limitations within the AV-OS platform do not allow for secure supervisor PIN 
storage.  Premier Election Solutions recommends that users implement 
procedural security mitigations by strictly controlling supervisor card access. 
 
 
3.3.20 AV-OS No Authentication Between GEMS and the Terminal 
 
The Florida evaluation team found that no authentication exists on the 
communications channel between the AV-OS and the GEMS server. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release does not address this issue.  Premier 
Election Solutions does not believe that this is a security vulnerability 
because the upload of data to the GEMS system is intended for the release 
of unofficial results only. 
 
3.3.21 AV-OS Attacker Can Hide Pre-loaded Votes 
 
The Florida evaluation team found that multiple different attacks existed in 
which the ballot count could be compromised.  The attacks formulated were 
based on the previously identified weaknesses in the security key 
implementation and memory card integrity. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release corrects this issue.  Details about how this 
issue was corrected were not provided by Premier Election Systems. 
 
3.3.22 AV-OS Vote Counters Are Not Directly Checked for Overflow 
 
The Florida evaluation team found that the vote counters associated with 
individual candidates were not checked for overflow and were thus subject to 
potentially insecure conditions.  Not specific attacks were presented. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release corrects this issue.  Details about how this 
issue was corrected were not provided by Premier Election Systems. 
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3.3.23 AccuBasic Interpreter Faults 
 
The Florida evaluation team identified a number of different AccuBasic 
issues in their reports which either compromise or reduce system security.  
These issues are: 
 
3.3.23.1 Error Checking is Inadequate 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release does not address this issue.  
Premier Election Solutions does not believe that this is a 
vulnerability. 
 
3.3.23.2 Error Codes Returned by the AV-OS System are Ignored  
 
The Assure 1.2 software release does not address this issue.  
Premier Election Solutions does not believe that this is a 
vulnerability. 
 
3.3.23.3 Unchecked String Operation:  Allows Overwrite of Stack Memory 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release corrects this issue.  Premier 
Election Solutions did not provide details about how this 
vulnerability was addressed. 
 
3.3.24 GEMS AccuBasic Scripts are Not Authenticated on the GEMS Server 
 
The Florida evaluation team found that the GEMS server does no checks on 
the AccuBasic bytecode.  All bytecode validation is performed from within the 
AV-OS and AV-TSX platforms using the encryption signatures.  The Florida 
team previously found the signatures used to have vulnerabilities.  
 
The Assure 1.2 software release does not address this issue.  Premier 
Election Solutions believes that the authentication of the AccuBasic scripts 
on the AV-OS and AV-TSX platforms is sufficient to ensure security. 
 
3.3.25 GEMS Password Does Not Protect Access to GEMS or Audit Logs 
 
The Florida evaluation team found that using a simple, publicly known attack, 
access to the GEMS database and audit logs could be obtained from within 
the Windows Operating System. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release corrects this issue.  Database access within 
the Assure 1.2 software release is password protected. 
 
 
3.3.26 GEMS Incomplete Implementation of the SSL Protocol 
 
The Florida evaluation team found that the use of the SSL protocol within the 
GEMS server is optional.  The Florida team found then even when the SSL 
protocol was enabled security vulnerabilities still existed. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release does not address this issue.  Premier 
Election Solutions believes that disabling the SSL protocol feature with the 
GEMS system is a security choice and advises customers to use the SSL 
features.  Premier Election Solutions does not believe that their 
implementation of SSL is insufficient. 
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3.4 Other states using the Assure 1.2 platform 
 
The Premier Election Solutions Assure 1.2 software release is currently certified for 
use in the state of Florida.  Actual installation of the Assure 1.2 platform had not yet 
occurred at the time that this report was written.   
 
All other customers of Premier Election Solutions require the same VSS certification 
as the State of Alaska in order to implement Assure 1.2.  As such Assure 1.2 has not 
been installed on any known systems in the United States. 
 
No known AccuVote systems have used the Assure 1.2 revision in a live election. 
 
3.5 Division of Elections AccuVote Security 
Enhancements and Features Evaluation 
 
The State of Alaska Division of Elections provided the UAA project team with a list of 
suggested security improvements during Phase 1.  This list of enhancements and 
features is provided in “Appendix L – State of Alaska, Division of Elections Accu-Vote 
Security Enhancements and Features”. 
 
This section evaluates the DoE enhancements and features against the Assure 1.2 
software revision enhancements.  Cases where the issue identified by the DoE are 
resolved or mitigated by the Assure 1.2 software or firmware are presented in this 
section. 
 
3.6.1 Verify GEMS Certified Software Has Not Been Altered 
 
The Division of Elections desires to compute a hash code of the GEMS software to 
ensure that the currently running version has not been compromised. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release addresses this issue.  Premier Election Solutions 
Premier’s Windows Configuration Guide, Revision 3.0, Section 10 (2007) provides a 
detailed procedure for hash code validation of the GEMS software. 
 
3.6.2 AV-OS / AV-TSX Supervisor Mode Password Changes 
 
The Division of Elections desires to change the supervisor access passwords for the 
AV-OS and AV-TSX devices as regular intervals.  
 
The Assure 1.2 platform in combination with the Keycard Tool application allows 
authorized users to change the supervisor access password for the AV-TSX device.  
The Assure 1.2 platform allows the authorized users to change the supervisor PIN for 
the AV-OS device. 
 
3.6.3 AV-OS / AV-TSX Memory Card Wipe 
 
The Division of Election desires to clear the memory of previous elections from all 
system memory cards prior to conduction of a new election. 
 
The Assure 1.2 software release does not address this issue.  Premier Election 
Solutions recommends using the AV-OS diagnostic menu to erase the contents of 
the AV-OS memory card.  An external PCMCIA reader / writer is recommended for 
re-formatting the AV-TSX memory card units. 
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 3.6.4 AV-TSX VVPAT Bar Code Removal 
 
The Division of Elections desires to remove the time stamp bar code from the VVPAT 
printout. 
 
The current software platform supports this feature. 
 
 
4 Recommendations 
 
It is the recommendation of the SOAESP project team that the State of Alaska, Division of 
Elections install the Assure 1.2 revision.  Installation of this system revision is recommended for 
implementation following the 2008 election cycle.   
 
Although the Assure 1.2 revision represents significant enhancements to system security two 
issues exist which make the installation of the Assure 1.2 revision impossible for the 2008 
election cycle.  Firstly, the Assure 1.2 revision software is not yet certified to the Voting System 
Standards (VSS) 2002 specification.  The Assure 1.2 revision is currently in review with the 
nationally recognized testing agency SysTest.  Formal certification from this agency has not yet 
been received by Premier Election Solutions and is required by Alaska State Law for installation 
on Division of Elections hardware.  Secondly, the Division of Elections resources for the 2008 
election cycle are not sufficient to complete the upgrade prior to the primary election which takes 
place in August, 2008.   
 
It is recommended that the Assure 1.2 revision be implemented by the Division of Elections 
following the general election in 2008 and is contingent upon Premier Election Solutions receiving 
formal certification from SysTest. 
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SOAESP
Issue Number Reference Document
Reference 
Document Section Issue Description Assure 1.2 Status
3.2.1 California Red Team Review Section 3 Precinct Count AV-OS Ballot Tampering
Corrected by adding counter integrity checking with public 
counter
3.2.2 California Red Team Review Section 4b AV-TSX Malware
Corrected bootloader issue, Premier rejects format string error 
vulnerability
3.2.3 California Red Team Review Section 4c AV-TSX Escalation of Privileges
Corrected - can still enter system setup/diagnostics when 
peripheral device fails but cannot access administrative 
functions.
3.2.4 California Red Team Review Section 4d AV-TSX Default Static Key No change, Premier believes default key indication is a feature.
3.2.5 California Red Team Review Section 1b GEMS Databases
Corrected - improved database security, corruption of database  
file (as compared to modification) by system administrator 
cannot be prevented since, by definition, the system 
administrator has full system access.
3.2.6 California Red Team Review Section 1c GEMS Audit Logs
The database is password protected in Assure 1.2.  However, 
standard security practices with the GEMS server are critical.
3.3.1 Florida Analysis Section 3.5
 
 RSA signature flaw. Corrected in Assure 1.2
3.3.2 Florida Analysis Section 3.6 AV-OS Memory Card Integrity Is Not Protected
Complete authentication is beyond the capability of the AVOS 
hardware.  While some improvements have been made, for 
example protecting the Abasic report scripts, physical protection 
of the memory card contains to play a critical role.
3.3.3 Florida Analysis Section 3.7.1.1 AV-TSX Cryptographic Key Management
Premier recommends that all AV-TSX systems utilize the 
Keycard Tool Application
3.3.4 Florida Analysis Section 3.7.1.2 AV-TSX Memory Card Update File is Unprotected Corrected
3.3.5 Florida Analysis Section 3.7.1.3
AV-TSX Smart Card Authentication Uses Only a 
Hard Coded Password
No change. The smart card does not use hard coded 
passwords.  The issue was the authentication method used by 
the smart cards.  This is mitigated procedurally by poll workers' 
monitoring for suspicious activity with smart cards or voters 
spending excessive time at the machine
3.3.6 Florida Analysis Section 3.7.1.4
AV-TSX Supervisor PIN is Not Cryptographically 
Protected
No change.  The issue is that the reviewer did not consider the 
protection robust enough rather than there not being any 
protected. Mitigated procedurally by restricting access to 
supervisor cards.
3.3.7 Florida Analysis Section 3.7.1.5 AV-TSX Insecure Storage Mount Corrected
3.3.8 Florida Analysis Section 3.7.1.6 AV-TSX System Configuration is Unprotected
No Change - this is not a vulnerability since there is no ability to 
externally access this data. 
3.3.9 Florida Analysis Section 3.7.1.8 AV-TSX Ballot Definition File is Unprotected
Corrected - The file was actually protected but the reviewer 
considered the protection to be too weak.  Have changed to 
using a SHA1 HMAC
3.3.10 Florida Analysis Section 3.7.1.10
AV-TSX No Integrity Protection of Stored Electronic 
Ballots
Corrected - The file was  actually protected but the reviewer 
considered the protection to be too weak.  Have changed to 
using a SHA1 HMAC
3.3.11 Florida Analysis Section 3.7.1.11 AV-TSX Ballots are Stored Sequentially
Exploiting this requires access to encryption keys of which there 
is no external ability to access. 
3.3.12 Florida Analysis Section 3.7.1.12
AV-TSX Candidate Information is Not Stored in the 
Results File Premier disagrees that this is a security problem.  No change
3.3.13 Florida Analysis Section 3.7.1.13
AV-TSX Audit Logs Are Not Cryptographically 
Protected
Corrected - The file was  actually protected but the FS review 
considered the protection to be too weak.  Have changed to 
using a SHA1 HMAC
3.3.14 Florida Analysis Section 3.7.1.14
AV-TSX Data is Neither Authenticated Nor 
Encrypted Over the Communication Link
Corrected - The issue was not that the data was not encrypted 
but that the seed used to initialize the encryption system did not 
contain enough entropy. 
3.3.15 Florida Analysis Section 3.7.2.1 AV-TSX Bootloader Automatically Replaces Itself
Corrected - Updating the bootloader now requires authentication 
of the operator and the new bootloader.
3.3.16 Florida Analysis Section 3.7.2.2
AV-TSX Bootloader Automatically Replaces 
Operating System
Corrected - Updating the Operating System now requires 
authentication of the operator and the new Operating System
3.3.17 Florida Analysis Section 3.7.2.3
AV-TSX Bootloader Automatically Runs .ins Files on 
the Memory Card
Corrected - Running an .INS file now requires authentication of 
the operator and the .INS file.
3.3.18 Florida Analysis Section 3.8.1.1 AV-OS Leaks Memory Card Contents
Access to this capability is limited by locking the AVOS onto the 
ballot box and by locking the cover to the yes/no keys.
3.3.19 Florida Analysis Section 3.8.1.2
AV-OS Supervisor PIN Not Cryptographically 
Protected
Due to hardware limitations, there is no secure storage for the 
PIN.  Thus procedural mitigation is required, as it has been in 
the past.
3.3.20 Florida Analysis Section 3.8.1.3
AV-OS No Authentication Between GEMS and the 
Terminal
This upload is for unofficial results only.  The upload at election 
central occurs in a secure environment.
3.3.21 Florida Analysis Section 3.8.1.4 AV-OS Attacker Can Hide Pre-loaded Votes Corrrected 
3.3.22 Florida Analysis Section 3.8.1.5
AV-OS Vote Counters Are Not Directly Checked for 
Overflow Corrected
3.3.23.1 Florida Analysis Section 3.9.1 Error Checking Is Inadequate in AccuBasic
No Change
The report failed to demonstrate any security risk.
3.3.23.2 Florida Analysis Section 3.9.2
Error Codes Returned by the AV-OS System are 
Ignored
No Change
The report failed to demonstrate any security risk.
3.3.23.3 Florida Analysis Section 3.9.5 AccuBasic Unchecked String Operation Corrected
3.3.24 Florida Analysis Section 3.10.1
GEMS AccuBasic Scripts are Not Authenticated On 
the GEMS Server
No change.  The scripts are authenticated on the AV-OS and AV-
TSx, not on the GEMS server
3.3.25 Florida Analysis Section 3.10.2
GEMS Password Does Not Protect Access to GEMS 
or Audit Logs The database is password protected in Assure 1.2
Appendix C - Assure 1.2 Upgrade Issue Resolution Matrix
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3.3.26 Florida Analysis Section 3.10.3
GEMS Incomplete Implementation of the SSL 
Protocol
Disabling this feature is optional.  Policy should be to enable this 
feature.
3.6.1 State of Alaska Division of Elections GEMS Item 1
Verify GEMS Certified Software Has Not Been 
Altered
Hash code validation procedures for software installed on GEMS 
servers are documented in section 10 of Premier’s Windows 
Configuration Guide Rev 3.0 . 
3.6.2 State of Alaska Division of Elections Memory Card Item 6
AV-OS / AV-TSX Supervisor Mode Password 
Changes
Use of the Keycard Tool application allows password changes 
on AV-TSX.  Authorized Users may change the Supervisor PIN 
on the AV-OS platform
3.6.3 State of Alaska Division of Elections Memory Card Item 9 AV-OS / AV-TSX Memory Card Wipe
While Premier does not offer a wipe utility per se , AVOS 
memory cards may be erased in diagnostic mode on the AVOS.  
TSx memory cards may be reformatted in a non-network-
connected, known secure computer with a PCMCIA card reader.
3.6.4 State of Alaska Division of Elections
Voting Equipment 
Item 2 AV-TSX VVPAT Bar Code Removal System is capable of bar code removal
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Appendix D - Division of Elections Enhancement 
Analysis 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This document evaluates the State of Alaska, Division of Elections AccuVote Security 
Enhancements and Features (2007) document to determine whether the proposed changes to 
the system are feasible in the currently implemented system. 
 
Each suggested enhancement or feature listed in this document is presented as shown in the 
State of Alaska, Division of Elections AccuVote Security Enhancements and Features (2007) 
document and is followed by a discussion and recommendation regarding that enhancement or 
feature. 
2. Enhancement / Feature List 
2.1 Software Hash Validation 
 
Description 
 
Verify the certified software installed has not been altered by computing the digital signatures of 
the software and comparing them with the digital signatures of the certified version.  
 
The digital signature comparison should be performed at least: 
a. Immediately after installing a new component or new version of software. 
b. After any unusual or suspicious event. 
c. Before beginning the set-up of a new election. 
d. Immediately after completing an election. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
Calculation of the digital software signature for the components operating on the GEMS server 
and on personal computer based software components or applications (Key Card Tool, VC 
Programmer) is recommended.  The suggested hash validation plan presented by the Division of 
Elections is reasonable.  Although hash validation of the EPROM chips present in the AV-OS 
machines is possible the logistics associated with removal and validation of the EPROM chips 
prior to each election cycle is significant.  As such we recommend validating hash codes on 
AV-OS machines only on an individual case by case basis in circumstances where an unusual or 
suspicious event has occurred.  We also recommend the use of tamper evident markers on the 
EPROM chips as well as marking each EPROM chip with a unique serial number to increase the 
confidence in the AV-OS firmware and lessen the requirement for periodic hash code validation of 
the AV-OS firmware. 
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2.2 GEMS Network Access and Exclusive Use 
 
Description 
 
Ensure that no GEMS computer is connected to a network or the internet and do not allow any 
software on the GEMS computer except for the voting system software itself.  Use only the 
GEMS computer for programming an election. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
It is crucial to the security of the GEMS servers that local network and internet connectivity be 
avoided.  As such careful attention must be paid not only to ensuring that connectivity does not 
exist but also to ensuring that connectivity would be difficult or impossible to achieve by malicious 
users.  The GEMS server should not be housed in close proximity to other network access 
equipment including packet communications switches, routers, etc.  Premier Election Solutions 
Premier’s Windows Configuration Guide (2007) provides detailed configuration information 
regarding the acceptable configuration of GEMS servers to be used in an AccuVote system.  It is 
recommended that the Division of Elections follow these guidelines.  The GEMS server should be 
exclusively used for the purpose of programming elections and for no other purpose (specifically 
it is recommended that any implementation of the Key Card Tool application be performed on a 
separate personal computer platform dedicated to that purpose). 
 
2.3 Authorized GEMS Access Restriction 
 
Description 
 
Restrict access to the voting system to authorized personnel only and maintain an access log to 
record each time a person accesses the GEMS computers. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
Maintaining a secure system by limiting access only to authorized personnel is recommended.  
Authorization to obtain access to the GEMS system should be based on individuals completing 
security training.  This security training should familiarize the user with standard security 
procedures for use with personal computers, the Windows operating system and the GEMS 
software specifically.  The use of access logs is not a recommended enhancement given the 
small number of system users (see “Appendix E – Physical Password Management 
Recommendations”, Section 2 Recommendation 2). 
 
2.4 Election Program Control 
 
Description 
 
Do not allow any changes to the election program once the logic and accuracy testing has 
commenced. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
Knowledge of the election program status at all times in the election process is recommended.  
The Division of Elections current implementation of locking the election program once logic and 
accuracy testing has begun is recommended to ensure consistency and validity of the test 
results. 
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 2.5 Voting System Access Control 
 
Description 
 
Never allow vendor personnel to access the voting system unless an authorized member of 
election staff is present. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
Supervision of all non-staff individuals requiring access to the election system is recommended.  
Vendor supervision is strongly recommended. 
 
2.6 Password Management Policy 
 
Description 
 
Establish policy for password management.  Change passwords on a periodic basis and at least 
once an election cycle or once a year. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
Management of the passwords utilized with the Division of Elections AccuVote system is crucial 
to implementing a secure, reliable election system.  We recommend following the password 
management guidelines presented in the attached “Appendix E - Physical Security and Password 
Management Recommendations”.  This document outlines a password management strategy 
which incorporates the challenges faced by election officials working in the State of Alaska. 
 
2.7 Background Checks  
 
Description 
 
Perform background checks on staff authorized to: 
 
a. Define and configure elections 
b. Maintain voting equipment 
c. Enter election results into GEMS 
d. Gain access to voting system or system components 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
We recommend requiring background checks on new employees (authorized to perform tasks list 
above) in accordance with state and labor union regulations.   
 
2.8 Director’s Office Memory Card Storage 
 
Description 
 
Memory cards stored in the director’s office are to be maintained in a secured environment. 
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 Comments / Recommendation 
 
Secure storage of the AccuVote memory cards is strongly recommended.  Physical access 
security precautions outlined in “Appendix E - Physical Security and Password Management 
Recommendations” are recommended to be used for secure all election components deemed 
vulnerable to malicious attack. 
 
2.9 Memory Card Chain of Custody 
 
Description 
 
Memory cards, once programmed and tested, that are shipped to the regional offices need to be 
shipped using chain-of-custody security measures. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
We recommend using a shipper (such as DHL, FedEx, Alaska Airlines Gold Streak) with chain of 
custody processes to transport memory cards to regional offices prior to elections.  
2.10 Regional Office Memory Card Storage 
 
Description 
 
Once memory cards are received in regional offices they are to be maintained in a secured 
environment. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
Secure storage of the AccuVote memory cards is strongly recommended.  Physical access 
security precautions outlined in “Appendix E - Physical Security and Password Management 
Recommendations” are recommended to be used for secure all election components deemed 
vulnerable to malicious attack. 
2.11 Memory Card Tracking Audit Capability 
 
Description 
 
Have audit / receipt tracking form to compare against sent memory cards and received memory 
cards that is signed off. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
The ability to track and account for all memory cards system-wide is highly recommended.  We 
recommend implementing a bar-code inventory process next year (after elections) and including 
memory cards in the inventory. 
 
2.12 Memory Card Pre-election Tamper Security 
 
 
Description 
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Send memory cards to election board in tamper-sealed envelopes for insertion into the units on 
election morning.  Require election board to verify envelope is sealed prior to opening and sealing 
memory card in voting unit.  Since equipment is in the possession of the election chairperson 
prior to election day, keeping the memory cards sealed until election morning removes the 
possibility of tampering with the memory card by the person with possession. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
We agree that that Division should ship memory cards in tamper evident envelopes and that the 
election board verifies the integrity of the seals and insertion of the cards into machines (if the 
memory card hasn’t already been installed in the voting machine).  
2.13 Supervisor Mode Password Change 
 
 
Description 
 
Consider password changes to access supervisor mode. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
It is highly recommended that the password utilized to access supervisor mode be changed at a 
minimum once per election cycle and that the distribution of the supervisor password be strictly 
limited to election officials requiring supervisor access only. 
2.14 Memory Card Inventory Accounting 
 
 
Description 
 
Maintain inventory log and accountability of all memory cards with election programming to 
ensure all cards are returned after the election. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
It is recommended that the measures recommended in section 2.11 be used to confirm the 
receipt of all returned memory cards used during an election cycle. 
 
2.15 Battery Replacement Schedule 
 
 
Description 
 
Establish a timeline for battery replacement of memory cards. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
Premier Election Systems documentation specifies memory card battery life at 5 years.   It is 
recommended that the Division of Election replace AV-OS memory card batteries every other 
election cycle or when the memory card battery life indicator shows a low battery.  Documentation 
of the battery replacement plan should be developed to ensure that historical battery replacement 
chronology can be produced as need. 
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2.16 Previous Election Memory Card Wipe 
 
 
Description 
 
Establish a timeline of previous elections information to be removed from memory cards. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
It is recommended that the contents of each memory card be cleared prior to each election 
(primary and general).  
 
2.17 AV-TSX VVPAT Flap Removal 
 
Description 
 
Remove the flap from the VVPAT viewing location so voters know they can review the paper 
version of their ballot. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
It is recommended that the VVPAT flap on the AV-TSX machine be modified to include a label 
which instructs the voter to lift the VVPAT flap to review the voted ballot.  This implementation 
retains voter privacy while ensuring that the voter is aware of the ballot review feature. 
 
2.18 AV-TSX Bar Code Removal 
 
Description 
 
Remove the bar code from the VVPAT ballot. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
It is recommended that the bar code printed on the AV-TSX VVPAT ballot be deactivated in the 
BallotStation software to lessen the probability of voter identification after using the AV-TSX 
machine and increase voter anonymity. 
2.19 AV-TSX Use Encouragement 
 
Description 
 
Encourage at least 5 votes cast on the touch screen as a means of protecting voter privacy with 
the use of the reel-to-reel printer. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
It is recommended that precinct officials encourage voters to use the AV-TSX machines as much 
as possible to reduce the risk of voter privacy violations.  A minimum of 5 votes should be 
considered the absolute minimum vote count required for the AV-TSX and more votes should be 
encouraged. 
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2.20 Voting Machine Tracking and Accounting 
 
 
Description 
 
Maintain record of the serial number of each voting unit and which precinct the unit was sent to. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
It is recommended that the serial number, firmware / software versions and functional test results 
from each election cycle along with the destination precinct be recorded and maintained in 
electronic historical archives. 
 
2.21 Physical Security Review 
 
Description 
 
Conduct a physical security review to assess the access and control procedures for areas where 
voting equipment and components are stored and maintained.  Establish policy for access to area 
where equipment is stored, including the restriction of vendor and non-election employees to 
have uncontrolled access. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
We recommend that the physical security recommendations outlined in “Appendix E – Physical 
Password Management Recommendations” be implemented in the 2008 election cycle.  We 
further recommend that the Division of Elections conduct a physical security review using a 
professional security agency at each location where voting equipment is stored. 
2.22 Asset Management Plan 
 
Description 
 
Implement asset management and inventory control system for voting equipment and 
components, including the software and firmware installed on each piece of voting equipment. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
It is recommended that the functional testing, voting machine tracking and accounting (section 
2.20) and the asset management plans be incorporated into a single procedure in which a 
complete documentation package is produced for each voting machine during each election 
cycle.  The contents of the documentation package should be scanned into electronic format for 
long term archival storage. 
 
2.23 Tamper Evident Seals 
 
Description 
 
Implement the use of tamper-evident seals. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
Page 22 of 110
We recommend that the Division of Elections use tamper-evident seals on AV-OS and AV-TSX 
machines. Section 1.6 of the main document includes a detailed description of this 
recommendation 
 
2.24 Vendor Repair Acceptance Testing 
 
Description 
 
Implement testing procedures and sign-off on all equipment returned from vendor after 
maintenance and / or repair to ensure proper versions of the hardware, software and firmware. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
It is recommended that acceptance testing and documentation be performed prior to accepting 
equipment returned from the vendor for repair or maintenance.  The acceptance test procedure 
should follow the tests outlined in “Appendix M - AccuVote Functional Test Guidelines”.  
Documentation confirming that the returned machine passed the required tests should be 
produced and stored electronically in the historical archive. 
2.25 AV-TSX Inter-election Storage 
 
Description 
 
Consider process for the storage of touch screen voting units in remote areas of the state 
between the Primary and General elections. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
We recommend storing touch screen voting units in locked closets or cabinets between elections. 
However, the machines take up a lot of space, and this may not be possible. In which case we 
recommend storing them in a lockable facility. 
2.26 Functional Test Guidelines 
 
Description 
 
Establish functionality testing schedule and procedures for all voting equipment. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
It is recommended that the Division of Elections adopt the functional test guidelines presented in 
“Appendix M - AccuVote Functional Test Guidelines”.  This document outlines a suite of tests and 
provides recommended documentation guidelines for use with the AccuVote system in the State 
of Alaska. 
 
2.27 Logic and Accuracy Test Improvements 
 
Description 
 
Update logic and accuracy testing reports for voting equipment based on where equipment is 
used, polling places, early voting ballot counting at regional offices. 
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 Comments / Recommendation 
 
It is recommended that the Division of Elections adopt the logic and accuracy improvements and 
enhancements outlined in “Appendix N - AccuVote Logic and Accuracy Test Guidelines”.  This 
document details a suite of logic and accuracy tests and documentation guidelines to help ensure 
tabulation accuracy and election programming validity. 
 
2.28 Post Election Audit Validation 
 
Description 
 
In post-election audit, compare all election results transmitted via modem from the polling place 
against the actual results printed by the election board prior to transmission. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
It is recommended that the transmitted results be compared with the printed results to confirm 
accuracy.  Inconsistencies between the transmitted results and the printed results must be 
documented and resolved prior to official results being released by the Division of Elections. 
 
2.29 Central Administrator Card Controls 
 
Description 
 
Establish inventory controls and procedures for the security of the Central Administrator Cards for 
touch screen voting system. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
It is recommended that the AV-TSX Central Administrator cards be secured in the highest 
security area and passwords associated with the Central Administrator card be given only to 
authorized individuals requiring Central Administrator access. 
 
2.30 Security Standards for Loaned Voting Machines 
 
Description 
 
Establish basic security standards of voting equipment that is used or stored by city / borough 
entities. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
It is recommended that entities utilizing State of Alaska owned voting machines should be trained 
regarding election system security and the policies adopted by the State of Alaska.  Complete 
functional testing of loaned voting machines should be performed upon return of the voting 
machines to the Division of Elections.  Documentation of these tests should be produced and 
archived. 
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2.31 Municipal Owned Machine Use Policy Review 
 
Description 
 
Consider policy on the use of municipal owned voting equipment being used in state and federal 
elections.  There is a location in the state where the municipality owns the optical scan and the 
state uses it during elections. 
 
Comments / Recommendation 
 
It is recommended that the State of Alaska procure enough machines to service all precincts 
required and that the State of Alaska not utilize machines owned and stored by other government 
entities. 
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Appendix E - Physical Security and Password 
Management Recommendations for GEMS Servers 
 
1. System Overview 
 
 
This document describes the existing safeguards employed by the State of Alaska, 
Division of Elections to protect the Global Election Management System (GEMS) hub and 
regional servers.  The discussion is limited to the physical security and the password 
mechanisms in place that relate to the GEMS servers.  Related topics, such as 
recommended Windows configurations, disaster planning, or malware prevention are not 
discussed here.   
 
 The security mechanisms consist of the physical building security and three layers of 
password-protected systems: BIOS (Built-In Operating System) password, Windows 
authentication, and GEMS Database server authentication.  These mechanisms are 
depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Layers of protection afforded by passwords and physical security 
 
 1.1 Existing Physical Security 
 
The Division of Elections maintains eight GEMS servers, two host servers for  Director’s 
Office use (one is a backup), one for Region I (handcount use), one for Region II 
(handcount use), two for Region III (multiple servers for handcount efficiency), two in 
Region IV (multiple servers for handcount efficiency).  The host server is used to program 
the databases for dissemination to the regional GEMS server prior to an election and for 
aggregating results from the regional GEMS servers after an election.  Several regional 
supervisors reported that the regional GEMS servers are not frequently used – they are 
primarily used to hand-enter election results from hand-count precincts and for 
hand-count results entry in precincts where the AV-OS upload has failed. 
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The host server is administered by the GEMS programmer.  The GEMS programmer also 
sets accounts and passwords for the regional servers that are operated by the regional 
Election Supervisors.  The physical security varies by location, but it is the Division of 
Election’s policy to keep all GEMS servers, voting equipment, and components of the 
voting systems (e.g. memory cards) in a locked and/or alarmed room. 
 
• Host server: Juneau 
 
The host server is located in a locked, alarmed room.  Three employees have 
access to the room.  The door is unlocked by a key that is stored in a private 
desk drawer. 
 
• Region I: Southeast 
 
The GEMS server is located in a locked, alarmed room.  The election equipment 
is located in a separate locked room that can be alarmed.  Two employees have 
access to the rooms. 
 
• Region II: Anchorage and Matanuska Valley 
 
The GEMS server is located in a locked, alarmed room together with the touch 
screen units.  The optical scan units are stored in an outer room, also locked and 
alarmed.   Three employees have access to the GEMS server room.  An 
additional key is available to staff, but only the three employees know the alarm 
access code. 
 
• Region III: Fairbanks and Interior 
 
The GEMS server is located in a locked room.  Three employees have access to 
the server room.  Unlike the other regions, activity in this room is high since a 
staff member has a desk located in the room. 
 
• Region IV: Nome, Barrow and West Coast 
 
The GEMS server is located in a locked back conference room.  Two employees 
have access to the room which also stores other election equipment. 
 
 
Access to the rooms is limited to authorized Division of Elections employees. All 
non-employees entering the room must be accompanied by an authorized Division of 
Elections employee.   Division employees go in and out of the rooms frequently and do 
not maintain an entry or exit log.   
 
 1.2 Existing Password Management Policies 
 
Systems that may be secured by password include alarm access codes, BIOS 
passwords, Windows login passwords, and GEMS database passwords.  
 
Alarm access codes consist of a numeric PIN and are used to enable or disable the 
alarm system, if one exists. 
 
A BIOS password requires the user to enter a password to boot the system.  This may be 
enabled in the BIOS for the GEMS servers.  Only a single password is stored; i.e. there is 
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no per-user authentication.  The password is stored in flash memory or refreshed by an 
internal battery. None of the Division of Elections supervisors reported that a BIOS 
password was enabled on their server. 
 
Windows login passwords are used to log into the GEMS servers, which are currently 
running a version of Windows 2000.  There is only one account for each server and users 
share accounts.  For example, there is a generic user account used by two different 
users to log in for a given GEMS server.  The number of users sharing an account is 
never more than three and is typically a single user.  Regional supervisors were unsure 
about details of account policies, including password aging (a mandatory change to a 
new password after some time period has elapsed), number of re-tries if an invalid 
password is entered, and password generation details.  The regional supervisors 
indicated that the account policies should be identical to the host server, which reportedly 
locks out users after three failed attempts and implements password changes every 
election cycle.  However, one regional administrator reported that the Windows password 
had not been changed, indicating that mandatory password aging has not been 
implemented in all cases. 
 
The GEMS database stored on each GEMS server is further protected by a 
database-level password.  Prior to every election the GEMS host programmer sends the 
election database to the regional supervisors.  The database is sent physically on a CD 
and shipped via a tracked shipping method.  Access to the database requires a 
username and password which is set in the master database at the time of creation.  The 
username and password are changed once every election cycle.  The usernames and 
passwords are selected and discussed during the senior manager’s conference call and 
typically consists of a phrase with mixed case letters and numeric characters.  The 
usernames and passwords are shared with the regional supervisors via telephone call.  
The process is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Distribution mechanism for GEMS database usernames and passwords 
 
At the time of this report, there are seven usernames and passwords.  The database 
username and password is always different from the Windows login username and 
Page 28 of 110
  
password, although in most cases when a user logs in on the same regional GEMS 
server they will use the same Windows login and the same database login. 
 
2. Physical Security Recommendations 
 
In the GEMS system, physical security arguably presents the greatest opportunity to 
deter malicious attack.  Given unfettered access and sufficient time a determined attacker 
will likely be able to circumvent the BIOS, Windows, and database passwords.   
Removing physical (and remote) access eliminates many avenues of attack.   
 
Our recommendations for physical security are similar to many of Premier’s 
recommendations described in the Client Security Policy documentation (Diebold 
Election Systems, 2007) but have been adjusted for the Division of Elections work 
environment.   
 
Our recommendations are to: 
 
1. Fortify the structure enclosing the GEMS server and associated infrastructure so 
it may not easily be entered by force. 
 
2. Do not maintain entry and exit logs to the GEMS server rooms.  This is not 
practical given the high volume of access in several locations, primarily by the 
same employees.  We recommend continuing the practice of requiring an 
authorized Division employee to be in the room at all times to supervise any non-
authorized persons are in the room.   
 
3. At a minimum, continue to secure the GEMS server and associated infrastructure 
in a locked room.  We also strongly recommend a monitored alarm system.  
Other considerations include a video surveillance system, fireproof door, 
temperature controls to maintain the temperature between 50-80 degrees 
Fahrenheit, and a two-factor entry system.   Two-factor authentication requires 
two methods to enter the room (e.g. key and biometric fingerprint scanner, key 
and alarm passcode, etc.) 
 
4. Where feasible the GEMS server and associated infrastructure should NOT be 
stored in the same room as other election equipment (e.g. touch screen or optical 
scan units) to physically separate those personnel authorized to access the other 
election equipment but not the GEMS server. 
 
In instances where it is not feasible to physically separate the GEMS server from 
other election equipment the equipment storage area should be used exclusively 
for storage.  All testing, tabulation, validation and other process related activities 
should be performed in a workspace separate from the GEMS storage area.  
Access to the GEMS servers should be carefully monitoring and limited to 
authorized personnel only. 
 
5. All doors should be locked when the equipment is not in use. 
 
6. Practice the principle of least access.  Access to the GEMS server room should 
be kept to the minimum number of privileged personnel. 
 
7. Establish a procedure to regularly inspect and maintain physical locks and test 
alarm systems. 
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8. Keys to the GEMS server room should not be left in a location accessible to non-
authorized personnel (such as cabinets or drawers).  Authorized personnel 
should carry a key on their person or store it in a securely locked location, such 
as a safe.  Any non-authorized personnel wishing to enter the room must have 
an authorized employee open the door and monitor the non-authorized 
personnel’s activity while in the room. 
 
9. The server should have a locked bezel to deter disk bays from being accessed or 
the cover from being opened. 
 
10. Establish a written, formal physical security policy that addresses the above 
considerations and includes policies to change access codes or keys when 
employees leave, backup and recovery procedures, backup power, fire 
emergency plan, and procedures to periodically review existing or new physical 
security controls.  These procedures should assess known risks and identify 
vulnerabilities associated with the physical environment.  This periodic review is 
necessary because appropriate policies and procedures may need revision as 
technology changes over time, or vice versa. 
 
3. Password Management Recommendations 
 
Passwords provide a secondary line of defense if physical security is compromised.  We 
recommend employing BIOS passwords as an additional security control on top of the 
Windows and GEMS database passwords.  All passwords should be “strong” in the 
sense that they are not easily guessed or determined through systematic means. 
 
An example of a weak password is any word found in a dictionary.  An attacker could 
determine the password by brute force, trying every word in the dictionary (automated by 
a program) until the password is found.  Another weak password is one that is too short 
or selected from a small set of characters.   Consider a 4-character password comprised 
of lowercase letters.  This allows (26)4 or 456,976 possible passwords.  A brute force 
program could easily enumerate all possibilities and quickly determine the password.  
However, if the set of characters is expanded to include uppercase letters and digits, and 
the length is increased to 8, then the number of passwords becomes (62)8 or 2.2×1014, a 
much larger number that makes the password more difficult to guess or determine 
through brute force. 
 
However, we must recognize that strong passwords alone do not guarantee protection.  
For example, an attacker could bypass the Windows login password by physically 
removing the hard drive and mounting it on a separate system to examine its contents. 
Similarly, the strongest passwords are useless if an unauthorized observer “shoulder 
surfs” by watching the keys pressed by an authorized user as she enters her password, 
or if the passwords are discovered by an attacker on a written piece of paper.  Moreover, 
in the case of the GEMS servers, the security of the underlying operating system is much 
easier to break than the password security.  As one example, the RABA report (RABA 
Technologies LLC, January 20, 2004) describes how to exploit a Windows bug on an 
unpatched GEMS server to gain administrator access by merely dialing into the system’s 
modem with a software product called Canvas.  Additional defensive controls must be in 
place to secure the system and the passwords themselves to mitigate potential attack. 
 3.1 Tradeoffs between usability and password strength 
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While longer and more complex passwords increase the cryptographic strength, a 
tradeoff must be made with usability, i.e. the ease of which users are able to work with 
the system.  For example:   
 
• Long and complex passwords are hard to remember. 
 
• If a password is hard to remember then it is more likely to be written down, 
providing an attacker easy access if the written password is discovered. 
 
• If a user has to remember many passwords then it is more likely they will be 
written down, providing an attacker easy access if the written passwords are 
discovered. 
 
A balance must be made between password length, number, and memorability.  We 
recommend the following criteria for password selection and storage: 
 
1. Passwords should be at least 8 characters and include mixed-case, at least one 
digit, and at least one non-alphanumeric character. 
 
2. Ideally, passwords should not be written down or the risk of disclosure will 
increase.  If they must be written down then the password must be stored in a 
secure, non-obvious location that is not in the same room as the server.  For 
example, we do not recommend storing the password in a desk (even if locked) 
in the server room or in the desk of the employee that commonly frequents or 
manages the server room.  A safe would constitute a secure location. 
 
3. Optionally, to increase the memorability of passwords, several techniques are 
possible, such as concatenating the first few letters of words in a phrase while 
inserting digits or non-alphanumeric characters.  For example, if the phrase is 
“secure elections every time” then the password could be sec4ele+eve&Tim.  
Recent research indicates that using such mnemonic passwords schemes still 
leaves the system vulnerable to smart-dictionary types of attacks (Kuo, 
Romanosky, & Cranor, 2006), although the vulnerability is likely to be exploited 
only in the more distant future 
 
4. The same password should never be used in a different system.  For example, 
the BIOS password should not match the GEMS password.  Similarly, the 
Windows password should not match an employee’s personal Google password. 
 
A related and sometimes contentious issue is password aging, or the practice of forcing 
users to change their passwords after a certain number of days has elapsed. A password 
history can also be kept so users cannot revert to a previous password. 
 
The major benefit of password aging is to safeguard against guessing and unknown 
disclosure. For example, if a password has not been changed for years but has been 
leaked unbeknownst to the owner, perhaps through accidental disclosure, then regular 
password changes will prevent an unauthorized user from logging in.  We include 
“unbeknownst to the owner” because if the leak is known then the password should be 
changed immediately and the machine examined for tampering. 
 
Conventional wisdom and the Diebold Client Security Policy  (Diebold Election Systems, 
January 11, 2007) suggest a password age no more than 45 days and a history of 10 
passwords.  However, the benefits of password aging are fairly modest and can actually 
be destructive (Spafford, 2006): 
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• Password changes offer no protection against password snooping and operating 
system level attacks. 
 
• Frequent password changes make the password harder to remember and 
becomes more likely to be written down, increasing the potential for disclosure. 
 
• To generate a new and memorable password that is not in the history list, many 
users use an algorithm that can be easily guessed, such as appending a different 
digit onto the end of the password.  This practice also increases the potential for 
guessing if old passwords are disclosed. 
 
• If a password has been obtained by an attacker then the mandatory password 
change is likely weeks away, giving the attacker many days to authenticate and 
attack the system.  This scenario can be mitigated by incorporating additional 
security controls that the attacker must also confront.  For example, if an attacker 
discovers the password but doesn’t yet have a way to get into the room then 
password aging will thwart the attacker if the password is changed before the 
attacker finds a way to gain physical access. 
 
Due to the relatively modest gains of password aging and the negative impact on 
memorability we suggest a less aggressive aging schedule than the Diebold 
recommendations.  Specific recommendations relating to password aging are given in the 
following sections.  Our recommendations regarding password management have also 
been targeted specifically for the Alaska Division of Elections GEMS environment.  For 
example, with less than 10 users and infrequently used servers, the same policies are not 
always appropriate that would be used in the common IT scenario involved in 
authenticating hundreds of users on an enterprise network.  
 
 3.2 BIOS Password 
 
A BIOS password prevents the system from booting if an incorrect password is entered.  
This prevents several trivial attacks, such as booting up from a floppy disk to run a 
program that extracts the Windows administrator password, to booting from an external 
hard drive to run a program that examines the internal hard drive.  However, with enough 
time and access an attacker can easily bypass a BIOS password.  The BIOS password 
can typically be reset by removing the internal battery or reconfiguring jumpers on the 
motherboard.  This is one reason why the computer’s case should be physically locked 
(recommendation 2.9).  Some BIOS’s also have known, hard-coded passwords. 
 
We recommend: 
 
1. All GEMS servers should incorporate a BIOS password conforming to the 
password selection and storage criteria described in section 3.1. 
 
2. The BIOS should be configured to boot from the hard drive only. 
 
3. The BIOS password should be changed anytime an authorized employee leaves 
the organization or disclosure is suspected. 
 
4. Since there is only one BIOS password it must be shared among all authorized 
personnel that use the system.  The password should not be shared with anyone 
else. 
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 3.3 Windows Passwords 
 
The next line of defense is the Windows logon password.  As previously discussed, there 
are many weaknesses in the Windows OS that a knowledgeable attacker may exploit to 
gain administrator access to the machine.  Consequently, the Windows OS should not be 
considered secure, especially if it has not been patched.  Nevertheless, Windows 
passwords do afford some level of protection, particularly against less technical malicious 
insiders. 
 
We recommend the following policies and controls for the Windows login account of the 
GEMS server: 
 
1. All GEMS servers should incorporate a Windows password conforming to the 
password selection and storage criteria described in section 3.1. 
 
2. Lock out the user account after three consecutive failed login attempts.  This can 
be configured as a security policy in Windows. 
 
3. All users should have their own login account.  Users should never share 
accounts.  Passwords must never be shared with anyone, not even a system 
administrator.  These same recommendations are made by Diebold  (Diebold 
Election Systems, January 11, 2007). 
 
4. All users should change their password at least once every election cycle.  This 
could be implemented with a yearly aging policy with a password history of 5.   
 
5. An authorized user should never leave the server unattended after logging in. If 
possible, the machine should be powered off when all authorized employees 
leave the room. 
 
6. Consider two-factor authentication (e.g. biometric fingerprint scanner in addition 
to a typed password). 
 
 3.4 GEMS Passwords 
 
The GEMS database requires authentication with a username and password before the 
database may be accessed.  Similar to the situation with Windows passwords, the GEMS 
database should not be considered secure even if an attacker does not have a valid 
GEMS username and password.   The GEMS server is based on Microsoft Access, and 
many techniques exist in the public domain to exploit and manipulate the contents of an 
Access database.  Nevertheless, GEMS database passwords do afford some level of 
protection, particularly against less technical malicious insiders. 
 
We recommend the following policies and controls for the GEMS database passwords: 
 
1. The database passwords should conform to the password selection and storage 
criteria described in section 3.1. 
 
2. All users should have their own database account.  Users should never share 
accounts.  Passwords must never be shared with anyone, except when 
disseminated by the GEMS programmer to the GEMS regional supervisor that 
will use that account.   
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3. The practice of changing passwords every election cycle is adequate, given the 
relatively low frequency of use.  However, care should be taken in the way that 
the GEMS databases are disseminated via CD-ROM.  If an attacker intercepts 
the CD-ROM during transit it may be possible to incorporate malicious software 
with the contents of the database onto a new CD-ROM and then forward the 
compromised CD-ROM to the regional supervisor.  If the compromised CD-ROM 
is inserted into the GEMS server then the server may be compromised. 
 
To mitigate this possibility we recommend that either: 
 
1. The databases be hand-delivered to the recipients. 
 
or 
  
2. A hash/checksum tool be run on the CD containing the database to be 
transmitted.  The checksum would be communicated to the recipient by 
phone.  When the recipient receives the CD-ROM it would be tested on a 
third machine to verify that the checksums match before inserting the 
CD-ROM on the GEMS server. 
 3.5 Other Recommendations 
 
We also recommend the following practices and procedures that are related to password 
security: 
 
1. If the physical security of a GEMS server has been compromised, password 
management is only a secondary concern.  The Windows operating system is the 
weakest link due to the numerous security flaws that have been well documented 
and publicized.  Many tools are readily available that allow attackers to quickly 
gain administrator privileges using known security flaws.  To protect against 
many of these attacks, the GEMS servers should be patched with the latest 
Microsoft security updates.  Use the procedure described in the Diebold Client 
Security document (Diebold Election Systems, January 11, 2007), section 4.1.1.  
This involves downloading the updates to a third computer, verifying their 
contents and checksums, then burning them onto a CD for installation to the 
GEMS server. 
 
2. Disable any unnecessary services with the assistance of qualified IT personnel 
as described in the Diebold Client Security document (Diebold Election Systems, 
January 11, 2007), section 4.5. 
 
3. Install and regularly update a malware detection program such as McAfee anti-
virus software.   
 
4. Evaluate the use a drive encryption program such as TrueCrypt or BitLocker 
(Windows Vista only) on the GEMS servers.  This type of software 
encrypts/decrypts data stored on the hard disk in real-time.  If an attacker 
removes the hard disk and attempts to mount it on a different machine, the data 
will be unreadable without the encryption keys.   
 
5. Regularly inspect both Windows event logs and database logs for suspicious 
activity. The frequency of inspection should be on a fixed schedule and at a 
minimum include an inspection before, during, and after an election. 
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 Appendix F:  Ballot and Election Equipment Distribution and 
Chain of Possession 
1 Ballot and Election Equipment Distribution and Chain of 
Possession 
The process of holding a statewide election begins long before Election Day.  The 
following section is a general description of the locations and movements of election 
ballots and voting machines through one election.  Because Alaska communities are so 
diverse in their size and accessibility, there are exceptions to the processes not 
represented here. The state uses standard procedures to keep the process as consistent 
as possible, as we illustrate in several diagrams.  Section 1.1 shows the icons used in 
those diagrams. We describe the creation and distribution of ballots both for hand counting 
precincts and for use in the optical scan voting machine (Sec 1.2); the general dispersion 
and return of the optical scan voting machines (Sec. 1.3) and touch screen voting 
machines (Sec. 1.4) from storage to the respective precincts and back to storage.  The 
movements of the machines include the merging of memory cards with the voting 
machines and their removal and return to Juneau after the election.   
 
With the large number of polling locations throughout Alaska, the distribution and storage 
requirements have always been a logistical challenge.  For the majority of the life of any 
voting machine and memory cards, they reside in secure storage.  From the beginning of 
an election cycle, there is the need to remove the machines from storage, test as 
appropriate, prepare, and distribute. 
 
When ballots and voting machines are stored and when they are in transit there are 
challenges in protecting them from damage and the potential for unauthorized access. 
Accessibility, accountability, training, and documentation with regard to the chain of 
custody should be monitored and reviewed. 
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 Icons Used in the Voting Process Diagrams 
Optical Scan voting machine (w/o memory card)
TSX
Mem.
Ballots
OS
Mem.
Optical Scan voting machine (memory card inserted)
Touch Screen voting machine (w/o memory card)
Touch Screen voting machine (memory card inserted)
Memory Card for a Optical Scan voting machines 
Memory Card for a Touch Screen voting machines
Paper Ballots for Optical Scan voting machines
Paper roll of voting results from a Touch Screen machines
GEMS computers for ballot development, memory card loading, testing and results tabulation
B allots
Voting machines
Memory cards
Data transfer
TR ANS F E R
TS
Printed
Votes
OS
OS
TSX
TSX
Ballot 
Info
Ballot Information for printed ballots
 
Figure 1 - Voting Process Diagram Icons 
 
 Optical Scan Ballots and Hand-Count Ballots 
 
The following diagram and legend describe the movement between locations and over 
time for the optical scan ballots and the hand counted ballots between ballot design in 
Juneau (based on the candidates’ applications filed with the Division of Elections) and 
other ballot issues. The regional election offices provide precinct-by-precinct official 
counts of registered voters and quantities of ballots needed for each voting location. 
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Figure 2 - Optical Scan Ballots and Hand-count Ballots – Chain of Possession 
1. Regional offices submit the quantity of ballots needed for each voting location to the 
Director of Elections office in Juneau. 
2. GEMS programmed with candidate information and layout.   
3. Ballot information and precinct quantities are sent electronically to the ballot printer.  
4. Ballots are sequentially numbered, printed and shrink-wrapped in quantities of 25. 
5. Ballots are shipped by the printer to the Division of Elections offices in Anchorage, 
Fairbanks, Juneau, Mat Su and Nome. 
6. Ballots for locations in rural Alaska are mailed by delivery confirmation to local 
election officials  
7. Some locations ballots are shipped to hubs prior to distribution to election officials, 
while those locations within driving distance to a regional office picks up the ballots 
directly from the election supervisor. 
8. Ballots are brought to polling places the morning of the election by an election official 
9. After polls have closed all ballots are secured. 
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10. The OS voting machine transmits the results to Juneau.  If hand counted, the results 
by the Regional offices to are called into Juneau. The unused ballots are destroyed. 
11. The ballots are secured by the local election officials. 
12. All ballots, along with signatures, memory cards and ballot statement are combined, 
sealed and returned to the Division of Elections. The route back is same as 
respective route ballots took to the polling places from a Regional Office. 
13. All voted ballots are retained in Juneau for recounts and final archiving. 
1.2.1 Optical Scan Machines (OS) and Memory Cards 
Optical Scan machines are stored at Regional Election Offices or at selected hubs 
between elections.  The memory cards for the Optical Scan machines are stored in 
Juneau between elections. After an election, OS machines are returned to their 
respective storage locations and the memory cards are all returned to Juneau for any 
necessary review and to be stored.  Optical Scan machines, when in use, are locked in 
place on top of a black poly-carbon ballot box.  These boxes are distributed separately 
and can be positioned at polling places before the morning of the election.  They are 
designed to hold the scanned ballots and contain a side slot and separate chamber to 
hold any ballots voted but not scanned.   
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Figure 3 - Optical Scan Machine (OS) & Memory Card – Chain of Possession 
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 1. Optical Scan Voting Machines (OS) are stored and tested at the Regional Offices or 
stored and tested at selected hub locations. 
2. GEMS programs the memory card in Juneau.  They are tested by the State Review 
Board there before being sent to the Regional Offices. 
3. The memory cards and the OS machines are tested at the regional offices by the 
Regional Accu-Vote Board or in hub communities by Accu-vote coordinators.. The 
memory cards are inserted into the machines and sealed. 
4. The OS voting machines are distributed to the precinct officials for placement on 
Election Day either from the Regional office or a hub. 
5. The voting machines are placed at the precinct the morning of the election and are 
tested before the polls are open. 
6. After the polls are closed, the ballot results are printed and signed-off by the election 
board and then are sent by the OS machine to GEMS in Juneau. 
7. The memory card is removed and ballots, memory card, printed results and ballot 
statement are sent to Juneau either directly or through the Regional Office. 
8. The memory cards are returned to Regional Offices when the cards can be delivered 
directly.  Off the road system, cards are sent to Juneau directly. 
9. The OS memory cards and printed results are received by the Juneau office for any 
needed review and final storage. At the Director's office, in Juneau the cards and 
printed results are used to resolve unexplained discrepancies. 
10. The OS machines are returned to their originating Regional Office or hub for storage. 
1.2.2 Touch Screen (TSX) Voting Machines and Memory 
Touch Screen (TSX) voting machines must be available at each voting location to assist 
disabled voters who need special assistance.  Electronically these are more 
sophisticated machines and are programmed with the ballot information both as a visual 
ballot and as an audible ballot for the blind. The TSX machine can be used by any voter, 
but are intended for use by disabled voters.  As seen in the following flow diagram, as 
each voter votes, the machine produces a printed version of the voter’s choices, which 
the voter can see and confirm before casting a ballot. Once the ballot is cast on the TSX, 
the printed ballot is wound into a storage canister in the machine, which is removed after 
the polls close and returned along with the results stored in the memory card.  The 
machines are returned to the locations where they are kept between elections.  Because 
of the size and weight (60 lbs.) of the TSX machines, some are stored at communities 
between the primary election and the subsequent general election. 
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The printed records from TSX machines are treated as “official” ballots for their return to 
regional offices and to Juneau.  Likewise, the TSX memory cards are treated like the 
memory cards from the OS machines. 
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Figure 4 - Touch Screen (TSX) Voting Machine & Memory Card – Chain of 
Possession 
1. Touch Screen Voting Machines (TSX) are stored and tested at the Regional 
Offices and at selected hub locations. 
2. GEMS programs the TSX memory card in Juneau.  They are tested there by the 
State Review Board before being sent to the regional offices. 
3. The memory cards and the TSX machines are tested at the regional offices by 
the Regional Accu-Vote Board. For those machines stored in hub locations, the 
memory card is sent to the hub location.  The memory cards are inserted, either 
at the regional office or hub location, into the machines and sealed before being 
distributed.  
4. The TSX voting machines are distributed to the to precinct election officials for 
placement on Election Day. 
5. One TSX voting machine is positioned at each of the polling places for use while 
the polls are open. 
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6. As voters use TSX voting machines, their choices are printed onto an enclosed 
printed roll. The voter can review and confirm their choices on the printed version 
of the ballot. Upon approval, the results are reeled into a container within the 
machine and stored.  The individuals’ results are also stored on the memory card 
in the AV-TSX machine. 
7. After the polls are closed, the final results are both printed from the AV-TSX 
machine and the results are transmitted electronically to GEMS in Juneau with t 
he exception of results in hand-counted precincts and those that are called in to 
Regional offices and up-loaded to Juneau. 
8. The memory card, printed ballots, printed results summary are removed after the 
polls are closed and the AV-TSX machine’s results are transmitted. 
9. The AV-TSX memory cards are returned to the Regional offices or hub for 
delivery to Juneau or in some cases sent directly to Juneau.. 
10. The memory cards and the printed AV-TSX ballots rolls are returned to Juneau 
for review and, in the case of the ballot rolls, archiving. 
11. The AV-TSX machines are returned to the Regional Office or hub where they 
originated for storage. 
 
The information regarding movements is general. Actual movements between the 
beginning and end of an election cycle can be quite complex. 
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Premier Election Solution 
Tamper Evident Security Seal Document 
 
The following document illustrates the recommended placement of tamper evident 
security seals on Premier Election Solution (Premier) equipment.  The applicable 
equipment includes the AccuVote-OS (optical scan) and the AccuVote-TSX (touch 
screen).  Premier is using best practices on the placement of security seals based on 
discussions and interviews with several California counties.  The placements of those 
seals are recommendations to mitigate any potential tampering of the AccuVote-OS and 
AccuVote-TSX units.   
 
Counties are recommended to use this placement of seals, along with augmenting the 
security seal placements with additional placement of seals on the voting equipment, 
depending on the county’s security seal policies and procedures.  The recommended 
placement of seals on the unit should not preclude a county from continuing to utilize 
their best practices regarding seal placements on the AccuVote-OS and AccuVote-TSX 
units.   
 
Premier is illustrating where the placement of the security seals could be placed on 
those units.  As far as the actual security seals, Premier does not recommend a specific 
vendor.  However, tamper evident security seals from vendors such as Intab and Seton 
have been used on the equipment with success.  There are illustrations of those seals 
within this document. 
 
All seals used on Premier equipment should be serialized and tamper evident.  
Additionally, the security seals must be logged and tracked by the authorized election 
officials and verified by the poll workers prior to using the voting equipment.  This 
verification process ensures the equipment has been thoroughly checked and verified 
against any potential tampering of those units 
 
In some seal application areas, a choice of different seal types is available.  In other 
instances, the choice to apply multiple seals is possible. The following outline pictures 
will demonstrate the use and location of wire anti-tamper evident labels, wire seals, 
plastic (rat tail) seals, and spring lock seals on the AccuVote-OS and AccuVote-TSX. 
 
The following is a list of the seal application areas by the equipment type.  The 
equipment type also includes the AccuView Printer Module (AVPM) which contains a 
security canister used for housing the voter-verifiable paper audit trail.  The AVPM 
security canister is secured using a spring lock security seal or a tamper evident security 
seal. 
Seal Application Areas by Equipment Type 
 
· AVOS 
Ø  Memory Card seal  
§ Wire Security Seal 
 
· AVTSX 
Ø Memory Card Slot seal  
§ Anti-Tamper Evident Security Seal Label 
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Ø AVTSX Front Panel Door seal 
§ Wire Security Seal 
§ Plastic (rat tail) Security Seal 
 
· AVPM 
Ø Printed Receipt Security Canister Seal 
§ Spring Lock Security Seal 
§ Anti-Tamper Evident Security Seal Label 
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There are several types of tamper-evident seals and labels used on the AccuVote-OS 
and AccuVote-TSX units.  The following seals have been used on the AccuVote-OS and 
AccuVote-TSX security seals.  The wired and spring lock seals have been used for the 
memory card slot on the AccuVote-OS unit.  The tamper evident security seals and 
spring lock seals have been utilized on the AccuVote-TSX units.   
 
 
 
Wire Security Seal (Passive RFID Tool less Roto Tag) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spring Lock Plastic Security Seals (Heat Stamped and Consecutive Numbering) 
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Tamper Evident Security Seals Label (1 by 3 inches, serialized) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tamper Evident Security Seal Label (1 by 3 inches, bar-coded and sequential 
numbered) 
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Tamper Evident Security Seal (10 inch pull tight seal, Heat stamped and serialized) 
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AccuVote-OS Security Seal Locations 
 
The following are recommended locations for the placement of security seals on the 
AccuVote-OS unit.  Counties are recommended to use this placement of seals, along 
with augmenting the security seal placements with additional seal placements, 
depending on the county’s security seal policies and procedures.  The recommended 
placement of seals on the unit should not preclude a county from continuing to utilize 
their best practices regarding seal placements on the AccuVote-OS.  At a minimum, a 
jurisdiction should seal the following locations on the AccuVote-OS unit when used in the 
precincts: 
 
· Memory Card Slot 
· Sealed over the front of the AccuVote-OS unit over the “seam” on the 
AccuVote-OS unit, and / or in the rear of the AccuVote-OS unit over a screw 
hole as well as over the “seam” on the back of the AccuVote-OS unit 
 
All of the security seals must be logged, serialized and verified by the poll worker prior to 
using the equipment on Election Day.  The jurisdictions could deploy a seal verification 
log which the poll worker could verify the security seal with the seal verification log 
document.   
 
 
See the photos below for an illustration of the security seals on the AccuVote-OS. 
 
 
 
AccuVote-OS Memory Card Slot Sealed with a Security Seal 
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AccuVote-TSX Security Seal Locations 
 
The following are recommended locations for the placement of security seals on the 
AccuVote-TSX unit.  Counties are recommended to use this placement of seals, along 
with augmenting the security seal placements with additional seal placements, 
depending on the county’s security seal placement policies and procedures.  The 
recommended placement of seals on the unit should not preclude a county from 
continuing to utilize their best practices regarding seal placements on the AccuVote-
TSX.  At a minimum, a jurisdiction should seal the following locations: 
 
· AVTSX Memory Card Slot and /or On/Off Slot 
· On the AccuVote-TSX over a screw hole, which would also cover the “seam” 
on the AVTSX unit 
 
Additionally, a security seal should be placed sealing the AccuVote-TSX “doors”.   
 
All of the security seals must be logged, serialized and verified by the poll worker prior to 
using the equipment on Election Day.  The jurisdictions could deploy a seal verification 
log which the poll worker could verify the security seal with the seal verification log 
document.   
 
See the photos below for an illustration of the security seals on the AccuVote-TSX. 
 
 
     
 
     
 
 
. 
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Illustration of AccuVote-TSX Security Seal Placements 
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AccuView Printer Module (AVPM) Security Seal Locations 
 
The following are recommended locations for the placement of security seals on the 
AVPM.  At a minimum, a jurisdiction should seal the following locations: 
 
· On the AVPM security canister with a tamper evident security seal sealed 
over the opening of the AVPM security canister; or 
· With a springlock seal on the security canister 
 
The security seal needs to be placed on the security canister when the security canister 
has been fed with paper, and the security canister has been closed.  See the photos 
below for an illustration of the security seals on the AVPM. 
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General instructions to poll workers 
 
To ensure 5 votes on AV-TSX poll workers vote at the end of the day. Poll workers should vote at the 
end of the day. If there are more than 1 but fewer than 5 votes cast on AV-TSX, then they should cast 
their votes on AV-TSX machines. 
 
Tampering doesn't need to be sophisticated. Attempts at election fraud can look more like vandalism 
that high tech computer hacking. If someone is worried about losing an election in specific precinct, 
that person might try to prevent people from voting for opponent by causing a disruption.  
 
Election results would also be destroyed if someone spilled liquid on to the AV-TSX printer. The printer 
paper absorbs liquids, so a spill could leak though plastic cover and absorb into the paper on the 
spool.  
 
Don't allow loitering in the area around voting booths. 
 
Don't allow people to bring food or beverages into voting booths.  
 
Equipment used in absentee voting locations is exposed to tampering for several days. People in 
charge of elections in absentee locations need to exercise vigilance and ensure that voting equipment 
is locked in secure storage areas when a voting official is not present.  
Tamper evident seal inspection on AV-TSX and AV-OS machines 
Regional Offices 
Prior to election 
 
1. Prior to opening polls. Keep list of all machines/precincts where poll workers have reported 
that tamper-evident seals have been broken. 
2. After election. Test and inspect memory cards from machines where seals have been broken. 
Votes cast on these machines may be subject to 100% manual tally. 
Precincts 
Prior to opening polls 
 
1. Prior to opening polls. Inspect tamper evident seal on the AV-TSX machine. DO NOT 
REMOVE SEAL. 
2. If seal is not broken, check "no" on checklist.  
3. If the seal is broken, check "yes" on the checklist and notify Regional Director.  
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Appendix I – AV-OS Shipping Container Example 
 
1 Description  
 
The AccuVote optical scan (AV-OS) machines currently use cardboard boxes with hard cell 
foam inserts.  These cardboard boxes are prone to deterioration over time, especially when 
considering the frequency use they receive.  An assessment of the reliability of the AV-OS 
machines found a measurable number of AV-OS repairs required resulting from physical 
damage incurred during shipment or transport. 
 
An improved shipping container would reduce the number of failures due to physical damage 
during shipment and transport.  Initial procurement of new shipping containers requires the 
purchase of a new case for each AV-OS machine.  The cases purchased for use in the 
shipment of AV-OS machines would make suitable, robust storage containers as well, further 
protecting the devices from damage.  The selected shipment and storage container should 
allow the Division of Elections to lock the case with a tamper seal. 
 
2 Example Case and Cost Estimate 
 
The dimensions of the AV-OS machine are 16 inches X 14 inches X 3 inches.  These 
dimensions can be accommodated by a PelicanTM Products 1600 series case.  The 1600 
series case has interior dimensions of 21.43 inches X 16.50 inches X 7.87 inches.  PelicanTM 
1600 cases are watertight, crushproof and dust proof making them ideal for transport and 
storage of sensitive electronic equipment.  Custom configurable foam interior lining allows the 
case to be fitted to the AV-OS machine.  PelicanTM cases also include openings for case 
security (lock or tamper seal insertion). 
 
It is recommended that the PelicanTM 1600 case or a similar product is purchased for the 
storage and transport of all AV-OS machines owned by the Division of Elections. 
 
The PelicanTM 1600 case is available at an average street price of $160.  The Division of 
Elections has a total of 290 AV-OS machines in its possession.  This results in a total cost of 
approximately $46,400.00 to procure new cases.  In addition to the procurement cost there is 
labor associated with configuring each case for the AV-OS machines.  An estimate of 30 
minutes per case to configure the foam lining results in a labor estimate of 145 man hours. 
 
A manufacturer cut sheet taken from the PelicanTM Products website is included on the 
following page. 
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Pelican™ Products 1600 Case http://www.pelican.com/cases_detail_print.php?Case=1600
1 of 2 4/27/2008 6:07 PM
 Print | Close Window 
Uncontrolled document as of April 28, 2008. Refer to website for up to date specifications.
 
 
1600 Case
Watertight, crushproof, and dust proof
Open cell core with solid wall design - strong, light weight
Automatic Pressure Equalization Valve
O-ring seal
Comfortable rubber over-molded handle
Stainless steel hardware and padlock protectors
2 level Pick 'N' Pluck™ with convoluted lid foam
Personalized nameplate service available
Unconditional Lifetime Guarantee of Excellence
1600 Case Configurations
Cat. #  Description   
1600
 
1600 Case
  
1600NF
 
1600 Case (No foam)
  
1604
 
1600 Case with Padded Dividers
  
Black Silver Orange Yellow OD Green* Desert Tan
*OD Green available upon request
1600 Case Specifications
Exterior Dimensions (L x W x D)  Interior Dimensions (L x W x D)
24.25" x 19.43" x 8.68" (61.6 x 49.3 x 22 cm)  21.43" x 16.50" x 7.87" (54.4 x 41.9 x 20 cm)
Lid Depth  Bottom Depth Total Depth
1.75" (4.4 cm)  6.12" (15.5 cm) 7.87" (20 cm) 
    
Weight with Foam  Weight without Foam Buoyancy Max. 
14.11 lbs. (6.4 kg)  13 lbs. (5.9 kg) 74.96 lbs. 
(34 kg)
    
Range Temperature  
-10 / 210° F
(-23 / 99° C)
 
Personalized Nameplate Available
    
1600 Case Certificates
• IP67 (1 meter submersion for 30 minutes)
• MIL C-4150J • Def Stan 81-41/STANAG 4280 • ATA 300
1600 Case Accessories 
Cat. #  Description  Sug. Retail
1600IP
 
Instapak Quick® RT
 US$47.95
1601
 
4 pc. Replacement Foam Set
 US$99.95
1602
 
Pick ‘N’ Pluck™ Sections Only (set of 2)
 US$81.95
1603
 
Replacement O-ring
 US$5.25
1605
 
Padded Divider Set Only
 US$158.95
1609
 
Lid Organizer
 US$45.95
Pelican™ Products, Inc.Page 56 of 110
Appendix J - AccuVote Communications System 
Description 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this document is to analyze and document the configuration and topology of the 
State of Alaska Division of Elections AccuVote communications network.  The goal of this 
analysis is to identify any potential vulnerabilities and to recommend enhancements to the 
Division of Elections. 
 
2. Network Topology 
 
The Division of Elections (DoE) AccuVote communications network is utilized to transmit 
preliminary, unofficial election results to the DoE director’s office host GEMS upon the close of 
polls at each precinct.  These results are tabulated by the director’s office GEMS and are 
provided as preliminary, unofficial results to the public. 
 
The Division of Elections AccuVote communications network is comprised of the following 
network transmission types. 
 
1. AccuVote Optical Scan (AV-OS) and AccuVote Touchscreen (AV-TSX) Precinct 
Reporting  
 
Each voting precinct utilizing AV-OS and AV-TSX machines reports preliminary results 
using an internal modem which is fully tested prior to each election.  The internal modem 
is connected to a local Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) jack at the precinct.  
Using the public telephone network a communications channel is established between 
the DoE director’s office GEMS server and the local precinct equipment.  A total of 48 
analog modems in the director’s office are configured to handle the incoming requests as 
precincts are closed across the State of Alaska. 
 
The AV-OS and AV-TSX machines are configured to utilize the Secure Socket Layer 
(SSL) protocol to ensure that the communications channel is secure.  Use of this protocol 
minimizes eavesdropping vulnerabilities over the communications channel. 
 
 
2. GEMS Handcount Reporting  
 
The regional office GEMS servers are used following an election to enter handcount 
ballots into the AccuVote system.  The handcount ballots are collected and a data entry 
technician enters the ballots into the region’s GEMS software.  When all of the ballots 
have been captured in the GEMS server the ballots results are transmitted to the GEMS 
in the DoE director’s office in Juneau using an analog modem.   
 
Ballot results transmitted in this manner are connected to PSTN in the same manner as 
the precinct AV-OS and AV-TSX machines.  In the case of Region 3 the PBX is 
interconnected using a dedicated T-1 circuit provided by the telecommunications carrier 
General Communication Inc.  An option 81 Nortel PBX located in the Juneau, Alaska 
director’s office terminates all transmissions into the DoE director’s office. 
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A total of 6 regional GEMS servers are used in each election to enter handcount ballots.  
The GEMS servers are allocated based on the number of handcount precincts present in 
a region.  A regional breakdown of the number of handcount precinct as well as the 
number of regional GEMS servers is provided below. 
 
Region Handcount Precincts GEMS Servers 
Southeast – Region 1 18 1 
Anchorage and Matsu – Region 2 1 1 
Fairbanks and Interior – Region 3 45 2 
Nome, Barrow, West Coast – Region 4 85 2 
 
Each regional GEMS server is configured to utilize the Secure Socket Layer protocol 
when transmitting data between itself and the DoE director’s office GEMS. 
 
 
3. Recommendations 
 
The current Division of Elections communications network appears to be implemented in a 
reasonable, robust manner.  Built-in safeguards such as implementation of the SSL protocol are 
in use as suggested by Premier Election Solutions.   
 
The State of Alaska Election Security Project was made aware that the State of Alaska will be 
transitioning its current analog phone system to a full voice over IP (VoIP) system in the future.  It 
is recommended that a subsequent analysis of this network be performed once the details of the 
new voice network are finalized.  Implementation of a VoIP network presents a different set of 
security risks to data transmission and these risks and vulnerabilities should be assessed before 
the network is used for a subsequent election. 
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Appendix L - AccuVote Reliability Assessment 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This document assesses the reliability of the AccuVote system components operated by the State 
of Alaska Division of Elections.  The Division of Elections maintains records of AccuVote Optical 
Scan equipment that is returned to Premier Elections Systems for repair with varying detail by 
region.  These records provide information regarding the failure mode and the repairs required to 
return the machine to “as new” condition.  Records regarding the AccuVote Touch Screen and 
GEMS systems are not maintained in sufficient detail to evaluate reliability trends. 
 
This document describes the reliability requirements as stated in the Voting System Standards 
(VSS) 2002 (2002) specification and describes the concept of reliability as it relates to the 
Division of Elections’ system.  A brief discussion of the VVSG Recommendations to the EAC 
(2007) is provided as this document provides a significant improvement in the specification of 
reliability performance regarding electronic voting systems over the 2002 VSS.  An evaluation of 
the limited data set provided by the Division of Elections offers some insight regarding the failure 
trends and observations.  Recommendations are made regarding ways to improve the reliability 
and performance of the AccuVote Optical Scan hardware. 
 
2. Reliability Performance Specifications 
 
The reliability performance required from the AccuVote hardware and software is defined in the 
Federal Election Commission’s 2002 Voting Systems Standards.  Conformance with these 
specifications is required by state aw.  Conformance with these specifications is established 
through the Independent Testing Authority (ITA) certification process.  The 2002 VSS uses the 
term “system” in several instances when discussing both reliability and availability.   
 
Taken in the context of the 2002 VSS, the term “system” can be taken to imply a single voting 
machine under test.  This is consistent with the ITA test report results.  It is our opinion that this 
interpretation is inconsistent with commonly accepted reliability theory and that the values 
specified by the 2002 VSS result in reliability certifications which are of little value to the Division 
of Elections.  Reliability and availability are statistical quantities and must be taken in the context 
of a statistically significant volume of machines or units.  In the case of the State of Alaska this 
would mean considering a system which is sized at least as large as one of Alaska’s four regions.  
Further discussions in this section which use the term “system” will clarify whether the intent is to 
indicate a single voting machine (hardware and software) or a set of voting machines. 
 
The minimum reliability and availability required for certification in the State of Alaska are 
specified in the 2002 VSS.   
 
Reliability is defined in the 2002 VSS in terms of the statistical parameter mean time between 
failures (MTBF).  This parameter defines the average interval between which failures occur.  A 
failure is defined as any event where the system (an individual machine or set of machines) fails 
to perform one or more functions or exhibits behavior where performance is degraded to an 
unusable condition for a period of greater than 10 seconds.  The MTBF is defined in the 2002 
VSS as having a minimum value of 163 hours. 
 
System availability is the probability that the system performs the desired functions at any instant 
in time under stated conditions.  The VSS 2002 standard provides guidelines for both the 
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calculation and evaluation of the system availability.  Specific system components are required to 
meet availability specifications within the VSS 2002 guidelines.  In the case of the AccuVote 
optical scan (AV-OS) machines the functions of voter selection recording and paper ballot 
encoding must meet the availability requirement.  The AccuVote touch screen (AV-TSX) 
availability requirement applies to the recording and storage of voter ballot selections.  In both the 
AV-OS and AV-TSX cases the consolidation of the vote data requires that the Global Election 
Management System (GEMS) also meet the availability requirement.  The VSS 2002 standard 
specifies a minimum system availability of 99%. 
 
Upon reviewing the ITA certifications documents the evaluation of reliability and availability are 
subject to interpretation and do not seem to provide useful performance measures.  Review of the 
Voluntary Voting System Guidelines Recommendations to the Election Assistance Commission  
(2007) specification provides a significant change in the performance specifications associated 
with voting system reliability.  This specification has not yet been ratified and is not in force for the 
State of Alaska.  A review of its contents is valuable for the assessment of future voting system 
performance specifications and evaluation of those changes against the system currently in 
operation. 
 
3. Division of Elections System Performance  
 
Evaluation of the Division of Elections system using empirical data is problematic.  
Comprehensive records regarding failures of the AV-OS, AV-TSX and GEMS system 
components do not exist.  As such the statistical data here is based on records kept by Region III 
(Fairbanks) and Region IV (Nome, Barrow, West Coast of Alaska).  Qualitative information can be 
gleaned from these records regarding AV-OS and AV-TSX performance weaknesses and areas 
in which improvements might be made. 
3.1 System Description 
 
The State of Alaska Division of Elections operates a Premier Election Solutions AccuVote system 
with the following AccuVote component counts.  The counts presented in Table 1 refer to precinct 
counts.  The Division of Elections maintains additional AV-OS and AV-TSX machines as spare 
units in the case of a failure. 
    
 
Region AV-OS AV-TSX GEMS 
I - Southeast Alaska 71 89 1 
II - Anchorage / Mat-su 151 152 1 
III - Fairbanks / Interior 56 101 2 
IV - Nome / Barrow / West Coast 12 97 2 
Juneau Director’s Office 0 0 2 
Total 290 439 8 
 
Table 1.  AccuVote System Component Count by Region 
 
 
The GEMS servers in the Juneau Director’s office operate in a redundant configuration where a 
backup server available in the case that a failure of the primary server occurs.  This backup 
server is configured prior to each election to exactly mirror the configuration of the primary GEMS 
server.  In the case that the primary GEMS server fails the backup server would quickly be 
brought into service.  A minimal service outage would result in the case of a primary GEMS 
server failure.  Redundancy for the backup server is not provided. 
 
Page 61 of 110
Precinct level machines are operated in a non-redundant configuration.  Two different 
deployments of AV-OS and AV-TSX machine are used depending on the population of each 
community.  In larger communities a single AV-OS and AV-TSX is allocated to each voting 
precinct.  Smaller communities utilize hand-counted paper ballots or optional use of the AV-TSX 
machines. 
 
A non-repairable failure of the AV-TSX voting machine results in voters being directed to use the 
AV-OS machine in that precinct (where available).  Failure of the AV-OS machine results in a 
precinct hand count.  The paper ballot reliance built into the Division of Elections system results in 
a system in which no failure can occur which would cause a voter to be turned away during an 
election.  
 
During live elections the Division of Elections employs “rovers”.  Rovers are trained on-call 
helpers responsible for assisting with trouble calls during an election.  They are trained to replace 
malfunctioning equipment and to assist election workers in ensuring that the election hardware 
works properly on election day.  Rovers serve to increase the availability of AV-OS and AV-TSX 
machines by reducing the equipment outage duration associated with a failed component in 
urban areas.  Rovers are employed by the Division of Elections in Anchorage, Fairbanks, Juneau, 
Kenai Borough, Sitka, Kodiak, Valdez, Nome and the Matanuska Valley.  In all other communities 
the failure of an AV-OS or AV-TSX results in it being removed from service and the ballots hand 
counted. 
 
Although a rigorous academic reliability analysis of the Division of Elections AccuVote system 
does not exist for public review the historical performance of the system is very good.  The 
Division of Elections reliance on paper ballots as the final ballot of record ensures that in no 
circumstance will a voter be turned away because of equipment malfunctions.  Failures of system 
components result in an increase in election worker resource requirements but do not affect the 
outcome of an election. 
 
3.2 Premier Election Solutions Reliability Models 
 
The VSS 2002 standards set specific requirements regarding the reliability and availability of 
election systems (as defined in the 2002 VSS).  Certification of the AccuVote system used by the 
Division of Elections against the VSS 2002 standard ensures compliance with the reliability 
requirements.  Section 3.4.5 of the VSS 2002 requires vendors to specify the configuration of 
systems to the ITA for evaluation.  This configuration specification includes sparing 
recommendations, maintenance / repair staffing recommendation and system configurations 
required to ensure that the required availability is met. 
 
Unfortunately, the content of these technical details remains closed to public disclosure and these 
documents were not reviewed as part of this analysis. 
 
3.3 Division of Elections Failure Data 
 
The State of Alaska Division of Elections has maintained repair and maintenance records for the 
AV-OS machines in Region III (Fairbanks and Interior) and Region IV (Nome, Barrow and West 
Coast of Alaska) of the voting system.  These records were reviewed and the primary failure 
modes were determined. 
 
Repair records for Region III and Region IV are not in the same format and as such the resultant 
analysis is qualitative in nature. 
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Region III maintenance and repair data provided to the SOAESP team records repair activities for 
the AV-OS machines dating back to 1998.  A total of 37 failures are recorded in the Region III AV-
OS repair records between 1998 and 2006.  It was recorded that four (4) of the failures were 
coincident with physical damage to the machine.  In many cases the machines housing was 
cracked or damaged and had to be replaced.   
 
Failure Mode Number of Failures 
Ballot Reader 21 
Modem 7 
Liquid Crystal Display 4 
Power Supply 2 
No Trouble Found by Premier 5 
Printer 0 
 
Table 2.  Region III AV-OS Failure Modes 
 
Review of this data shows that the AV-OS ballot reader is the primary component failure mode.  
The percentage of failure column in Table 2 does not sum to 100% because in several instances 
a multiple failure was discovered during the repair of the AV-OS machine.  During the period 
between 1998 to 2006 a total of 28 unique machines failed in a manner requiring repair by 
Premier Election Solutions.  Table 1 indicates that in Region III 56 AV-OS machines are in use 
which results in the unique failure of exactly 50% of AV-OS machines in the 1998 to 2006 time 
period. 
 
Region IV maintenance and repair data provided records of the maintenance activity for both the 
AV-OS and AV-TSX machines over the time period from 2000 to 2007.  Failure  data for the 17 
AV-OS machines in Region IV are provided in Table 3. 
. 
Failure Mode Number  of Failures 
Ballot Reader 7 
Modem 1 
Liquid Crystal Display 0 
Power Supply 2 
Printer 1 
 
Table 3.  Region IV AV-TSX Failure Modes 
 
Failure data from Region IV confirms that results seen in the Region III data indicating that the 
ballot reader is the least reliable component in the AV-OS machine. 
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Failure data for the 102 Region IV AV-TSX machines is provided in Table 4. 
 
 
Failure Mode Number  of Failures 
Printer 7 
Modem 4 
Screen 2 
Enclosure 4 
Memory Card Slot 1 
 
Table 4.  Region IV AV-OS Failure Modes 
 
The data in Table 4 shows that printer failure is the primary mode of failure for the AV-TSX 
machines.   
4 Recommendations 
 
Review of the Division of Elections empirical data log with the 2002 VSS and 2007 VVSG indicate 
a high operational reliability and availability for the AccuVote system in the State of Alaska.  The 
specifications provided by the 2002 VSS certification provide little insight or value regarding an 
AccuVote system consisting of hundreds of machines which operate simultaneously during an 
election.  In spite of an apparent lack of publicly available academic rigor regarding reliability and 
availability of the system operated by the Division of Elections the practical reliability and 
availability are extremely high. 
 
The reliance on the paper ballot as the final ballot of record provides an inherent improvement in 
system reliability which could never be achieved in a system which exclusively uses Direct 
Recording Electronic (DRE) voting terminals.  Failure of electronic components in the current 
Division of Elections increases the resource dependence by initiating the hand count process but 
no time jeopardizes a precinct’s ability to serve voters. 
 
Although the current system is very robust and effective, we are making recommendations which 
should prove to incrementally reduce machine maintenance and improve reliability.  More robust 
functional and logic and accuracy testing as detailed in Appendices M and N are recommended.  
Increased functional testing scope would serve to better detect hardware failures prior to 
equipment shipment and will reduce day of election field failures.   
 
Better storage and transport containers for AV-OS are also recommended.  Empirical 
maintenance data review indicates a measurable number of AV-OS machines experiencing 
physical damage during shipment and transport.  The correlation between the transportation of 
the AV-OS machines and their failure rate was not reviewed as part of this analysis but it also 
recommended if improved transportation packaging for the AV-OS machines does not result in a 
reduction of machine failures.  Vibration, environmental effects and contamination are all likely to 
contribute to an increased machine failure rate. 
 
 
 
 
Page 64 of 110
Appendix M - AccuVote Functional Test Guidelines 
1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this document is to outline a set of recommended functional tests to be performed 
as part of pre-election and precinct testing for each AccuVote Optical Scan (AV-OS), AccuVote 
Touchscreen (AV-TSX) machine, Voter Card Encoder and GEMS server in preparation for 
deployment during an election cycle.   
 
This document is organized into two sections.  The first, “Current Functional Tests” outlines the 
current functional tests performed by the Division of Elections prior to deployment of the AV-OS, 
AV-TSX, and Voter Card Encoder devices in each precinct for an election cycle.  The second 
section “SOAESP Recommended Functional Tests” details an expanded set of functional tests 
recommended for implementation.  This expanded set of functional tests provides a more 
comprehensive functional check prior to each election cycle potentially reducing the number of 
election system failures in the field on election day. 
 
2. Current Functional Tests 
 
Currently the Division of Elections performs functional testing on the AV-OS platform prior to 
deployment for each election cycle.  The AV-TSX platform is subjected to Logic and Accuracy 
testing but documentation received by the SOAESP project team does not indicate functionality 
testing before each election cycle.  In addition, no documentation indicates functional testing on 
the Voter Card Encoder or GEMS server election system components.  Section 3 of this 
document outlines recommended functional tests for these components. 
2.1 AV-OS Physical Test 
 
2.1.1 Physical damage to unit check. 
The AV-OS machine is physically inspected for damage prior to use.  Specific damage to 
identify is not called out in the test procedure. 
 
2.1.2 Printer door lock test 
The door lock to the AV-OS printer compartment is checked to ensure that the lock is 
functional and that the key works in the lock. 
 
2.1.3 Serial number or State of Alaska tag number recording 
The serial number or State of Alaska tag number is recorded at the top of the functional 
test document. 
 
2.1.4 LCD readability test 
The AV-OS is tested to qualitatively confirm that the LCD is readable and that the entire 
LCD component has not failed. 
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2.2 AV-OS Vote / Modem Testing (Regional Offices) 
 
In addition to the physical test set specified by the Division of Elections an additional set of 
tests focused on verifying modem connectivity between the AV-OS and the GEMS is also 
conducted. 
 
Upon startup of the AV-OS in pre-election mode the AV-OS supervisor or central 
administrator follows a set of prompts within the system to perform a series of tests on the 
AV-OS machine. 
 
Test Ballots 
 
The AV-OS vote test verifies that the ballot counting functionality is working properly.  This 
test does not include the validation of un-voted or fully voted ballots.  Upon completion of the 
ballot count test the user instructs the AV-OS system to print the test results in short form. 
 
Modem Transmission Test 
 
The user follows the LCD prompts, validates the phone number in the AV-OS and transmits 
the results by telephone to the modem bank connected to the GEMS server in the Juneau 
Division of Elections director’s office.  The AV-OS transmits the dummy data and the modem 
transmission test is completed. 
 
Comments 
 
The Vote / Modem Testing procedure currently in use by the Division of Elections provides a 
very basic functional check of two portions of the AV-OS system.  These checks confirm 
ballot counting (not tabulation) and modem functionality.   
 
The AV-OS system provides a suite of tests that should be considered by the Division of 
Elections to decrease the probability of discovering a failed component or system on the 
AV-OS machine on election day.  We recommend a test suite for consideration by the 
Division of Elections detailed in Section 3 of this document. 
 
3. SOAESP Recommended Functional Test Procedure 
 
3.1 Election Functional Test Lifecycle 
 
The recommended functional tests are broken into two different groups.  A set of functional 
tests is recommended to be performed at the Regional Center prior to precinct shipment.  
Upon arrival at the precinct it is recommended that a subset of these test be re-performed to 
ensure reliable functionality on voting day.   
 
Precinct tests are intended to be performed at the precinct immediately prior to the election 
and their purpose is to validate the hardware for use on election day.  The Regional Office 
tests are more comprehensive and are intended to identify any issues with a machine before 
it is distributed to the precinct for use in the election. 
 
A checklist should be provided to each Regional Center.  This checklist (similar to the one 
currently in use by the Division of Elections) would be filled out and returned with the AV-OS 
machine at the end of the election.  Anomalies or comments should be included on the 
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checklist sheet to identify any issues arising from the tests.  Each checklist should be 
scanned at the end of the election and logged electronically to a common location for each 
machine to create a functional checkout history of the machine. 
 
A sample functional test lifecycle for AV-OS and AV-TSX machines is provided below. 
 
1. Election cycle checklist is generated for each voting machine (AV-OS and AV-TSX). 
2. Functional testing is performed for each AV-OS and AV-TSX machine at the 
Regional Center level.  (This does not necessarily imply that the test itself must be 
performed physically at the Regional Center). 
3. The functional test checklist document is filled out by the Regional Center level 
technician. 
4. The AV-OS or AV-TSX machine is boxed and readied for shipment with the 
functional test checklist included in the box. 
5. Functional testing is performed for each AV-OS or AV-TSX machine at the Precinct 
level prior to election administration for each election (Primary and General).  The 
functional test checklist document is further updated with the results of the precinct 
level test for the Primary and General elections. 
6. The election is conducted. 
7. The functional test checklist document and AV-OS or AV-TSX machines are 
re-packaged and returned to Division of Elections officials. 
8. The functional test checklist documents are collected and scanned for historical 
purposes.  Backed up electronic storage should be used to maintain the integrity of 
the functional checklist documentation. 
 
A functional check of the Voter Card Encoder devices is recommended prior to each election.  
A complete history of the Voter Card Encoder functional testing is not recommended at this 
time. 
 
GEMS functional testing is recommended on a per election basis and it is further 
recommended that the test documentation be archived in manner similar to that suggested 
for the AV-OS and AV-TSX machines.  A sample GEMS functional test lifecycle is presented 
below. 
 
1. Election cycle checklist is generated for each election system GEMS. 
2. Functional testing is performed on each GEMS machine prior to the administration of 
the election. 
3. The functional test checklist is completed by the test technician and is returned to the 
appropriate individual for historical archiving.  Any anomalies or inconsistencies are 
noted in the functional test checklist form and are thus permanently recorded. 
 
3.2 AccuVote Formatting and Clearing Procedure 
 
The AccuVote system stores election ballots and vote tabulation data on a variety of different 
media during the process of an election.  It is desirable from a security standpoint to clear 
and re-format the electronic storage media prior to use during each election cycle.  Two 
different Election Management models were developed by Premier Election Solutions in 
response to the State of California de-certifying the Diebold equipment for use in California.  
It is recommended that the Division of Elections implement the Air Gap Election Management 
model as presented in Premier Elections Solutions document Plan on Formatting and 
Clearing Program Storage on Voting System, Revision 1.0 (2007). 
 
 
3.2.2 GEMS Server Configuration 
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 The Air Gap election management model requires the use of three separate host 
computers and maintains integrity and security by limiting the operations performed on 
each computer platform.  The purpose of each computer is summarized below.  
 
GEMS Server 1:  GEMS server 1 is used to create election definitions, ballot templates 
and to download data to the voting machine memory cards. 
 
GEMS Server 2:  GEMS server 2 is used to capture uploaded election results from the 
AV-TSX and AV-OS precinct machines.   
 
Workstation Computer:  The workstation computer (more than one is possible) is used to 
clear the contents of AV-TSX memory cards prior to re-use in the AccuVote election 
system.  The workstations used for this purpose should be dedicated to memory card 
storage clearing and should be minimally configured.   
 
See Section 3.2 of Plan on Formatting and Clearing Program Storage on Voting System, 
Revision 1.0 (2007) for more information 
 
3.2.3 AV-TSX PCMCIA Memory Card Storage Clearing 
 
The contents of the AV-TSX memory cards should be cleared prior to each election 
cycle.  The workstation computer(s) should be used to reformat the contents of each 
PCMCIA memory card.  See Section 4.4 of Plan on Formatting and Clearing Program 
Storage on Voting System, Revision 1.0 (2007) 
 
3.2.4 AV-OS Memory Card Storage Clearing 
 
The contents of the AV-OS memory cards should be cleared using an AV-OS machine 
prior to each election cycle. See Section 4.5 of Plan on Formatting and Clearing Program 
Storage on Voting System, Revision 1.0 (2007) for details on the AV-OS memory card 
clearing procedure.  
 
 
3.3 AV-OS Regional Center Tests 
 
In addition to the existing functional tests specified by the Division of Elections (see Sections 
1.1 and 1.2), the following additional tests and / or actions are recommended for each 
election cycle. 
 
The majority of the tests or actions listed below require Diagnostics Mode access to the 
AV-OS machine. 
 
3.3.1 Key Functionality Check 
 
Locate all AV-OS keys.  The AV-OS system utilizes a key for printer access and a key for 
ballot box access. Verify that AV-OS printer key opens printer door.  Verify that ballot box 
key opens security plate and all other ballot box access points to ensure key functionality. 
  
3.3.2 Serial Number Recording 
 
Record the hardware serial number of the AV-OS machine in the functional checklist 
document. This procedure ensures that the documentation associated with the test is 
associated with a specific AV-OS machine and traceability of the machine’s life can be 
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maintained.  The State of Alaska asset tag should also be recorded if it is present.  The 
asset tag should not be used in lieu of the serial number but in addition to it. 
 
3.3.3 Firmware Version Validation and Recording 
 
Record the firmware version of the AV-OS machine.  Validate the reported firmware 
version against the known correct version.  Do not use AV-OS if reported firmware 
version does not match expected value. 
 
3.3.4 System Clock Setting 
 
Verify that the system clock is set.  If the clock is not set properly follow the procedure in 
the AccuVote-OS user’s guide to set the clock.  The clock maintains the date and time in 
the AV-OS machine and is backed up by the system battery (Diebold Election Systems 
AccuVote-OS Precinct Count 1.96 User’s Guide Revision 4.0, Section 17.2, 2005). 
 
3.3.5 LCD Test 
 
This test confirms that the AV-OS machine’s LCD display can properly reproduce all of 
the required text characters (AccuVote-OS Precinct Count 1.96 User’s Guide Revision 
4.0, Section 17.4, 2005).  
 
3.3.6 System Memory Test 
 
This test writes a set of test data to the AV-OS system memory and reads it back from 
the system memory.  This test is successful if the data read is identical to the data written 
to system memory (AccuVote-OS Precinct Count 1.96 User’s Guide Revision 4.0, 
Section 17.5, 2005). 
 
3.3.7 Memory Card Test – REQUIRES A BLANK AV-OS MEMORY CARD 
 
This test writes a set of test data to the AV-OS memory card and reads it back from the 
memory card.  This test is successful if the data read is identical to the data written to the 
memory card (AccuVote-OS Precinct Count 1.96 User’s Guide Revision 4.0, Section 
17.6, 2005). 
 
3.3.8 Printer Test 
 
This test is executed during the Memory Card Test and validates the printer functionality 
by printing a subset of the standard character set on the printer tape (AccuVote-OS 
Precinct Count 1.96 User’s Guide Revision 4.0, Section 17.6, 2005). 
 
3.3.9 Auxiliary Serial Port Test 
 
This test confirms that the modem interface is functional to ensure that election results 
can be properly transmitted upon election close.  This is an internal test and does not 
require a connection to the Public Switched Telephone Network (AccuVote-OS Precinct 
Count 1.96 User’s Guide Revision 4.0, Section 17.8, 2005). 
 
3.3.10 Card Reader Test 
 
This test confirms that the optical scanning read sensor channels (34 total on each ballot 
side) are functioning properly.  It is not recommended to perform the card reader test 
using the “RECIRCULATE BALLOTS?” mode. 
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3.4 AV-OS Precinct Tests 
 
The precinct testing involves a subset of the Regional Center level testing.  The purpose of 
the precinct level testing is to confirm that the machine is not physically damaged and to 
detect high level problems with the AV-OS machine. 
 
1. Physical Damage Inspection (see Section 2.1.1) 
2. Serial Number Recording (see Section 3.2.2) 
3. Firmware Version Validation and Recording. (see Section 3.2.3) 
4. Key Functionality Check (see Section 3.2.1) 
3.5 AV-TSX Regional Center Tests 
 
The following tests are recommended to be performed at the regional center before an 
AV-TSX voting machine is distributed to a precinct for use in an election. 
 
3.5.1 Physical Damage Inspection 
 
The AV-TSX machine is inspected for physical damage during shipment or setup.  All 
tamper-evident seals are checked to confirm that the AV-TSX machine has not been 
compromised.  The security hologram is inspected during the physical damage 
inspection. 
 
3.5.2 Machine Serial Number Validation 
 
The AV-TSX hardware serial number is recorded on the checklist functional test sheet.  
Once the machine has booted, access the software reported serial number from the 
settings menu and confirm that the physical serial number and the software serial number 
match (Ballot Station 4.6 Users Guide Revision 2.0 Section 8.3.1.1, 2005) 
 
3.5.3 Hardware and Firmware Version Validation 
 
The AV-TSX Bootloader version, Windows CE version and BallotStation versions are 
checked and recorded during AV-TSX system boot after power is applied to the machine. 
 
3.5.4 Card Reader Port Validation 
This test confirms that the smart card reader can perform the required read / write 
operations without error (Ballot Station 4.6 Users Guide Revision 2.0 Section 8.3.1.2, 
2005). 
 
3.5.5 Date and Time Programming 
 
This procedure sets the date and time in the AV-TSX machine (Ballot Station 4.6 Users 
Guide Revision 2.0 Section 8.3.2, 2005). 
 
3.5.6 Screen Display Calibration 
 
This procedure calibrates the touchscreen and ensures that voter selections match with 
the software display presented to the user (Ballot Station 4.6 Users Guide Revision 2.0 
Section 8.3.3.2, 2005). 
 
3.5.7 Printer Test 
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This test ensures that the AV-TSX VVPAT printer can printer the required paper ballot 
without error (Ballot Station 4.6 Users Guide Revision 2.0 Section 8.3.4.1, 2005). 
 
3.5.8 Audio Test   
 
This test ensures that the audio output subsystem of the AV-TSX machine is operational 
(Ballot Station 4.6 Users Guide Revision 2.0 Section 8.3.7, 2005). 
 
3.5.9 Modem Test 
 
This test validates the AV-TSX internal modem functionality and confirms the AV-TSX’s 
ability to send data to the internal modem (Ballot Station 4.6 Users Guide Revision 2.0 
Section 8.3.9, 2005). 
 
3.5.10 Security Setting Validation 
 
This procedure validates the security settings of the AV-TSX for use in the election.  The 
security setting validation procedure should include certificate validation and key 
signature validation.  It may be desirable to implement the Key Card Tool key update 
procedure during this functional test step (Ballot Station 4.6 Users Guide Revision 2.0 
Section 8.3.10, 2005) 
 
3.5.11 Central Administrator / Supervisor Access Test 
 
A valid central administrator card and a valid supervisor card should be inserted into the 
AV-TSX machine following the Key Card update to ensure that central administrator 
access is available.  An invalid central administrator and an invalid supervisor card 
should be inserted into the AV-TSX machine following the Key Card update to ensure 
that the security keys are properly transferred and the AV-TSX machine has been 
secured. 
 
3.6 AV-TSX Precinct Tests 
 
The precinct level tests for use with the AV-TSX are a subset of the regional center tests.  
The recommended suite of precinct tests is given below. 
 
3.6.1 Physical Damage Inspection  (see Section 3.4.1) 
3.6.2 Machine Serial Number Validation (see Section 3.4.2) 
3.6.3 Hardware and Firmware Version Validation (see Section 3.4.3) 
3.6.4 Printer Test (see Section 3.4.7) 
3.6.5 Supervisor Access Test (see Section 3.4.11) 
3.7 Voter Card Encoder Tests 
 
The Voter Card Encoder is used to create valid voter cards for use in the AV-TSX machines.  
Each Voter Card Encoder device should be tested prior to use in a precinct for voting during 
an election. 
 
3.7.1 Voter Card Encoder Physical Damage Check 
 
Inspect the Voter Card Encoder for visible physical damage. 
 
3.7.2 Voter Card Encoder Display Check 
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 The Voter Card Encoder should be powered on and the display should be checked to 
ensure that it is visible and all characters are visible.  Fading should not be evident on the  
LCD display. 
 
3.7.3 Voter Card Encoder Firmware Check 
 
This procedure checks the Voter Card Encoder firmware level and ensures that the 
proper revision of firmware is present on the Voter Card Encoder. 
 
3.7.4 Voter Card Encoder Supervisor Access Check 
 
Supervisor access to the Voter Card Encoder should be verified. 
 
3.8 GEMS Server / Workstation Tests 
 
The AccuVote GEMS server is used to create election definitions, ballot templates and to 
download data to the voting machine memory cards as well as to receive uploaded precinct 
results from AV-TSX and AV-OS machines.  Use of the Air Gap Election Management model 
(see Section 3.2)  requires implementing two GEMS servers for each election.  Both GEMS 
servers should have functional tests performed prior to use during an election cycle.  A third 
workstation is used to wipe AV-TSX memory cards prior to election programming. 
 
3.8.1 GEMS BIOS (Built-in Operating System) Password Validation 
 
The GEMS server should implement a BIOS password policy compliant with the 
password management plan (Appendix E – Physical Password Management 
Recommendations, 2008). 
 
3.8.2 Verify System, Service Pack, Server Model, Processor, Disk Size and RAM 
Parameters 
 
The GEMS server should have the system parameters listed above checked prior to use 
to ensure that tampering has not occurred on the system. 
 
3.8.3 GEMS Software Hash Verification 
 
The GEMS.exe application should be validated by calculating both MD5 (Message-Digest 
5) and SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) hash functions.  These hash codes should be 
compared with those registered with the National Software Reference Library 
(http://www.nrsl.nist.gov/votedata.html).  Known vulnerabilities exist with the MD5 hash 
function and as a result both the MD5 and SHA hash functions should be calculated 
(Premier’s Windows Configuration Guide, Revision 3.0, Section 10, 2007). 
 
3.8.4 Loaded Software Confirmation 
 
The GEMS server should be checked to ensure that only Winzip v11, Adobe Acrobat 8, 
Adobe Audition 2.0 or Sony SoundForge 8 and Nero Burning ROM 8 are the only 
applications loaded on the server. 
 
 
3.8.4.1 GEMS Operating System Update Packages Validation 
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The GEMS server should have the recommended operating system update packages 
installed (Premier’s Windows Configuration Guide, Revision 3.0 Section 4, 2007).  
 
3.8.4.2 GEMS Operating System Services Validation 
 
The GEMS server should have the recommended services running (Premier’s 
Windows Configuration Guide, Revision 3.0 Section 5, 2007).  All other system 
services should be disabled. 
 
3.8.4.3 GEMS Operating System Data Execution Protection Module Validation 
 
The GEMS server should have the Data Execution Protection (DEP) modules turned 
on as indicated in Premier’s Windows Configuration Guide, Revision 3.0, Section 6 
(2007). 
 
3.8.4.4 GEMS Operating System Security Policy Validation 
 
The GEMS server should have security policies validated which are in compliance 
with the SOAESP recommended password policy and which are compliant with 
Premier’s Windows Configuration Guide, Revision 3.0, Section 7 (2007). 
 
 
3.8.4.5 GEMS Server File Permission Validation 
 
The GEMS server file permissions should be assigned as indicated in Premier’s 
Windows Configuration Guide, Revision 3.0, Section 8 (2007). 
 
3.8.4.6 GEMS Operating System Registry Permission Validation 
 
The GEMS server registry permission should be assigned as indicated in Premier’s 
Windows Configuration Guide, Revision 3.0, Section 9 (2007). 
 
 
 
3.8.5 GEMS Server Date and Time Adjustment 
 
The date and time on the GEMS server should be set to the current values prior to use 
during an election. 
 
3.8.6 Network Address Validation 
 
The network address reported by the GEMS server should be checked prior to use to 
ensure that it is NOT connected to a network. 
 
3.8.7 GEMS Acceptance Test Database Test 
 
The GEMS acceptance test database should be loaded and the contents of the test 
database validated using the GEMS software. 
 
3.8.8 GEMS Database Backup 
 
The GEMS database backup functionality should be confirmed prior to use of the GEMS 
software for election management.  Ensure that a backed up database file can be 
properly read into the GEMS software. 
 
3.8.9 GEMS Print Test 
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 The GEMS printing functionality should be validated by initiating an “Administrative 
Report” from within the GEMS software.  Both the hardware printer driver and the pdf 
printer driver should be tested. 
 
3.8.10 Key Card Tool Test 
 
A dedicated Key Card Tool workstation should be used to perform the Key Card Tool 
test.  This workstation should be used to generate new security keys on a smart key card.  
The keys loaded on the smart key card should be confirmed by removing the card and 
then reading the keys back into the Key Card Tool software. 
 
4 Recommendations 
 
It is recommended that the Division of Elections implement all of the recommended tests 
presented in this document in addition to the tests already being used.  The addition of the tests 
detailed in this document provides a more comprehensive functional check out of the system and 
reduces the potential problems encountered on election day.  Adoption of the historical logging of 
checklist documentation ensures that the lifecycle of each voting machine is documented and 
available for review at a later time. 
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Appendix N - AccuVote Logic and Accuracy Guidelines 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The logic and accuracy guidelines presented here establish a minimum set of 
requirements to confirm that each electronic voting machine is producing reliable, 
accurate results. 
 
This document is organized by first presenting the currently implemented logic and 
accuracy procedures in use by the Division of Elections.  Following the currently 
implemented procedures a set of additional recommendations is presented which is 
intended to enhance the output of the logic and accuracy testing.  
 
2 Current Logic and Accuracy Procedures 
2.1 AccuVote Optical Scan (AV-OS) 
 
The AV-OS machines are tested for logic and accuracy using a test deck of ballots with 
known results.  The logic and accuracy test is implemented by shuffling the test ballot 
deck to create a randomly oriented set of ballots.  The user then verifies that the number 
of ballots fed into the AV-OS machine matches that reported on the AV-OS public LCD.    
The results of the test deck are printed in short form.  The results printed on the AV-OS 
results tape are compared with the known outcome. 
 
The AV-OS machine’s memory card is then prepared for the election and the machine is 
powered off until the actual election is conducted.   
2.2 AV-TSX 
 
The AV-TSX are tested for logic and accuracy by following a procedure designed to 
identify election programming errors.  This procedure first clears results that are already 
present on the memory card.  The technician then prints a zero totals report to ensure 
that the results memory register of the memory card was cleared. 
 
Once the memory card results register is cleared the technician then creates a voter 
access card for each ballot type being tested.  Manual test mode is used (requiring voter 
access cards) to perform the logic and accuracy testing for each ballot type in the 
election.  Once all of the ballot types have been voted the results are printed and 
reviewed to ensure that the voted values match the expected results.  Once the logic and 
accuracy of the printed results is review the memory card is set to election mode and is 
physically removed from the AV-TSX machine. 
2.3 GEMS 
 
Currently no explicit logic and accuracy testing is performed by the Division of Elections. 
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3 Recommended Logic and Accuracy Procedures 
3.1 AV-OS 
 
The AV-OS logic and accuracy testing procedure presented here ensures that the logic of 
the ballot programming is correct and that votes cast in each oval position are accurately 
tabulated. 
 
In order to perform the AV-OS logic and accuracy tests several sets of test ballots must 
be prepared corresponding to each ballot type to be used in the election.  The following 
sections describe the three different test decks to be used for AV-OS logic and accuracy 
testing. 
 
3.1.1 LAn Test Deck Test 
 
The LAn (Logic and Accuracy for n candidates) test deck test validates that all 
candidates in all races and on all ballots are counted correctly.  In the LAn test a 
test ballot is created for each possible contest where the voting outcome is 
produced as shown below (where n = 5): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The race tabulations above show the number of tabulated votes for 
Races 1 and 2.  The sample ballots shown are the first four ballots in the test 
deck for race 1.  A total of 15 ballots would be required for each race shown. 
 
A test ballot deck should be produced for all races for each ballot style. 
Candidate Vote Candidate Vote
A1 X A1
B1 B1 X
C1 C1
D1 D1
E1 E1
Candidate Vote Candidate Vote
A1 A1
B1 X B1
C1 C1 X
D1 D1
E1 E1
Ballot 1 Ballot 2
Ballot 3 Ballot 4
Candidate Vote Count
A1 1
B1 2
C1 3
D1 4
E1 5
Candidate Vote Count
A2 1
B2 2
C2 3
D2 4
E2 5
Race 1 Test Deck
Race 2 Test Deck
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3.1.3   Multi-vote Test Deck 
 
The multi-vote test deck is used for ballots where “vote for more than one” races 
are programmed.  In these races the ballots should be filled out as follows. 
 
3.1.3.1 Overvote Ballot 
 
The overvote ballot contains one more oval on each “vote for more than 
one” race than is allowed by the election program.  The sample ballot 
shown is for a “Vote for Three” race where 4 ovals were selected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.3.2 Test Ballots 
 
The test ballot deck for the multi-vote case consists of ballot as shown 
below (Vote for 3 ballot with 5 candidates): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Candidate Vote
A X
B X
C X
D X
E
Overvote Ballot
Candidate Vote Count
A 1
B 2
C 3
D 2
E 1
Multi-vote Test Deck
Candidate Vote Candidate Vote
A X A
B X B X
C X C X
D D X
E E
Candidate Vote
A
B
C X
D X
E X
Multi-vote Ballot 1 Multi-vote Ballot 2
Multi-vote Ballot 3
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3.1.4 Logic and Accuracy Test Procedure 
 
The logic and accuracy test should be performed on all AV-OS machines that will 
be used in the election.  Following each test a precinct results tape should be 
printed and the results compared with the expected outcome.  The results of the 
test should be uploaded to the GEMS and reports on the GEMS server should be 
generated which confirm the expected outcome. 
 
Logic and accuracy testing for the AV-OS system should be conducted by 
following the procedure below. 
 
1. Run a LAn test deck through the AV-OS machine for every ballot style that 
will be used in the AV-OS machine. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LAn test ballots are run through every AV-OS in each voting district.  
 
AV-OS AV-OS AV-OS AV-OS
Precinct 1 Precinct 2 Precinct 3 Precinct n
Voting District
Lan
Test
Deck
All precincts in 
each district
AV-OS Logic and Accuracy Test Ballots
Page 78 of 110
2. Print the results tape and confirm that the results match the expected value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each AV-OS machine prints a results tape and these results tape outcomes are 
compared with the known expected outcome to ensure that tabulation is 
occurring accurately. 
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3. Transmit the results to the GEMS server. 
4. Following the transmission of all results to the GEMS server a report is 
generated and the contents are compared with the expected value for the 
test ballot results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. The paper ballot decks generated for the use in the logic and accuracy tests 
as well as the logic and accuracy printed results should be archived together 
for historical purposes.  Scanning of the results and electronic storage of 
these logic and accuracy test results is recommended. 
 
 
3.2 AV-TSX 
 
The AccuVote Touchscreen Ballot Station software offers the user two different 
approaches for logic and accuracy testing.  These approaches are labeled Manual and 
Automated within the Ballot Station software. 
 
3.2.1 Manual Logic and Accuracy Testing 
 
In Manual Logic and Accuracy testing the user manually casts a series of test 
ballots to validate that the AV-TSX is properly counting ballots.  The Premier 
recommended AV-TSX manual logic and accuracy test is performed by selecting 
the manual logic and accuracy test option within the Ballot Station software.  The 
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manual test automatically casts a successively increasing number of ballots until 
the number of ballots is equal to the number of candidates in the largest race. 
 
3.2.2 Automated Logic and Accuracy Testing 
 
The AV-TSX Ballot Station software includes an option for automated logic and 
accuracy testing.  In the automated test environment the tester selects a pre-
determined combination of ballots to be voted.  The system automatically casts 
the ballots and tabulates the results.  The number of ballots cast is increased on 
each iteration until the number of ballots equals the number of candidates in the 
largest race on the ballot (as in the manual test mode).  Additionally, a blank 
ballot is cast for each ballot set.   
 
The tester can select from 5 different ballot testing options within the automated 
test mode.  It is recommended that the test technician perform the Full Test by 
Ballot and the Full Test by Precinct automated tests. 
 
The Ballot Station software offers two options while performing the automated 
test procedures.  The Use Ballot Rotation option allows the user to rotate the 
candidate position.  The Provisional Ballots option allows the user to specify the 
use of provisional ballots during the test. 
 
3.2.2.1 Full Test by Ballot 
 
The full test by ballot test votes a full set of ballots for every ballot on the 
memory card.  Each unique ballot on the memory card is voted by 
casting votes as shown below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This procedure is iterated until all unique ballots on the memory card 
have been voted.  
 
3.2.2.2 Full Test by Precinct 
 
The full test by precinct test casts a full set of ballots for every base 
precinct present on the memory card.  Ballots are cast in the same 
manner as shown in section 3.2.2.1 where the number of ballots cast is 
increased on each iteration until the number of ballots cast is equal to the 
largest number of candidates in that race. 
 
3.2.3 Results Validation 
 
 
3.2.3.1 Print Results 
 
Candidate Vote Count
A 1
B 2
C 3
D 4
E 5
Total Ballots 15
AV-TSX Full Test by Ballot
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Once the logic and accuracy tests are completed it is recommended that 
the results be printed and the results on the printed tape be validated 
against the expected results. 
 
 
3.2.3.2 Upload Results 
 
The results of the logic and accuracy test should be uploaded to the 
GEMS server using the internal modem.  Once the results have been 
uploaded an election report should be printed and validated against the 
expected results. 
3.3 GEMS 
 
3.3.1 Tabulation Accuracy Validation  
 
The GEMS host computer in the Director’s office in Juneau is used to tabulate 
logic and accuracy results transmitted during the logic and accuracy testing of 
each machine.  The GEMS Summary, Statement of Votes Cast and the Cards 
Cast report results must be reconciled with the results obtained in the AV-OS and 
AV-TSX machines (GEMS 1.18 Election Administrator’s Guide, 2006).  
 
4. Recommendations 
 
We recommend that the Division of Elections implement all of the tests presented in this 
document in addition to the tests already in use.  The increased scope of the tests detailed here 
provides a more comprehensive validation of the logic and accuracy of the programmed election.  
Detailed documentation of the test results for each AV-OS and AV-TSX machine is 
recommended for each election cycle.  Historical logging of these results is also recommended in 
electronic format. 
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Appendix O - AccuVote Touchscreen  
Smart Key Card Enhancement Options 
 
1. System Description 
 
 
The AccutVote Touchscreen voting system is comprised of several different components.  
System security is maintained by utilizing a suite of smart cards to secure the election 
ballot, vote tallies, the touchscreen voting machine operating system, and other sensitive 
system data.  The smart card system is comprised of four different smart cards, the Key 
Card Tool application and a smart card programmer.  
 
This section describes each system component in the context of the key card tool 
application.  Each component is described along with its interaction with the key card 
security implementation. 
 
 Key Card Tool Software 
 
Key Card Tool is a software application created by Premier Election Systems for use with 
the AccuVote Touchscreen (AV-TSX) system.  The Key Card Tool application allows 
users to create authentication keys and passwords on a personal computer platform and 
to write those authentication keys to smart cards for use in the touchscreen voting 
system. 
 
Key Card Tool requires a personal computer workstation on which the Key Card Tool 
application runs as well as a smart card reader which interfaces to the personal computer 
communications port.  The smart card reader is used to read and write authentication 
keys and passwords to individual smart cards. 
 
 Smart Key Card 
 
The smart key card is the basis of the touchscreen system access security.  The smart 
key card stores two authentication keys and two passwords.   The smart card key is used 
to authenticate user access at the central administrator, supervisor and voter levels.  The 
smart card key validates the user’s authentication key against the key present in the 
hardware device being accessed.   The data key is used to encrypt individual data files 
within the ballot station (firmware that operates on the touchscreen terminal).  A 
password is stored to secure central administrator access and another is stored to secure 
supervisor access to the touchscreen machine. 
 
The smart key card is programmed by Premier with default values for the security and 
data keys as well as the central administrator and supervisor passwords.  These 
passwords are well known in the public domain and are considered insecure.  
Replacement of the key and password values is accomplished through the use of the Key 
Card Tool application. 
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The Key Card Tool application allows the user to select new values for the security key, 
data key, central administrator password, and supervisor password and to write these 
values onto a blank smart card.  
 
Once the central administrator and supervisor smart cards have been updated with new 
keys and passwords these cards cannot be further updated without the use of the Key 
Card Tool application and the original security keys. 
 
After the smart key card has been programmed with the values selected by the election 
officials, the card is removed from the programming device and must be used to update 
the authentication keys on the touchscreen devices and the voter card encoder devices. 
  
 Central Administrator and Supervisor Cards 
 
The central administrator and supervisor cards are used to secure central administrator 
and supervisor access to the AccuVote Touchscreen machine.  Central administrator 
access allows users an expanded set of system options within the AccuVote 
Touchscreen system not available to users with supervisor or voter access.  Supervisor 
access allows election administrators to open and close elections, print paper records 
and to transmit election results to the GEMS.    
 
Central administrator and supervisor cards must be updated using the Key Card Tool 
application at any time the keys and passwords are changed.  The cards are updated by 
inserting the smart card into the card encoding device and following the software 
procedure after the smart key card has been created. 
 
Central administrator and supervisor touchscreen device access is obtained by inserting 
the central administrator or supervisor card into the touchscreen device and entering the 
appropriate password.  Upon insertion of the smart card the card security key is 
authenticated against the terminal key and the user is granted the appropriate level of 
access.  A central administrator or supervisor card that does not have valid security and 
data keys will be rejected by the system.  After 7 unsuccessful attempts at system access 
using a smart card with invalid keys the smart card will be permanently disabled. 
 
 Voter Access Card  
 
The voter access card is used to allow voters to cast their votes on the electronically 
defined ballot.  The voter access card is programmed by a voter card encoder that is 
under the authority of election administrators.  The voter card encoder must be updated 
with the security and data keys when the key and password values are updated.  Voter 
cards are not required to be programmed by the Key Card Tool application.  
 
During an election after election officials determine that a voter is allowed to cast a ballot 
the vote card encoder is used to enable a voter card.   The voting process of an individual 
voter proceeds as follows: 
 
1. An election official creates a valid voter access card by inserting a default voter 
access card into the voter card encoder. 
2. The voter takes the valid voter access card to a touchscreen terminal and inserts 
it into the smart card slot.  The system authenticates the voter access card 
against the authentication keys present in the AccuVote system software. 
3. The voter casts a ballot and completes the voting process. 
Page 84 of 110
4. The AccuVote system software overwrites the voter access card authentication 
keys with default values defined by Premier. 
5. The voter removes the voter access card and returns it to an election official. 
6. The process is restarted using the voter access card with default security key 
values. 
 
Voter access cards with previously assigned or invalid authentication keys cannot be 
used to cast a ballot on a terminal containing authentication keys which do not match the 
smart card keys. 
 
2. Logistical Impact 
 
Implementing the security enhancements available through the Premier Election Systems 
Key Card Tool product requires the State of Alaska Division of Elections to modify the 
manner in which it transports and stores the AccuVote Touchscreen devices. 
 
Every authentication key and password change requires a system-wide AccuVote 
Touchscreen firmware authentication key update.  This update includes: 
 
1. Smart Key Card 
2. Central Administrator Cards 
3. Supervisor Cards 
4. Voter Card Encoder 
5. AccuVote Touchscreen Terminal 
 
The system functions only when all hardware and software have the same authentication 
keys loaded.   
 
Currently the Division of Elections will ship AccuVote Touchscreen devices to remote 
communities for Primary elections.  Upon completion of the Primary election the 
touchscreen terminals will remain in many remote communities until the general election 
some time later.  This makes authentication key / password changes impossible during 
the “sleepover” period. 
 
Implementing the highest level of security improvement in which the authentication keys / 
passwords are changed following each and every election requires the field equipment 
(touchscreen terminals and voter card encoders) to be returned to a central location for 
programming after the close of each election. 
 
3. Recommendations 
 
We recommend that the Division of Elections procure and implement the Key Card Tool 
application for use in the 2008 election cycle.  We do not recommend returning the 
AV-TSX machines to have the encryption keys and passwords changed between the 
primary and general elections because of the significant logistical impact this would have 
on the Division of Elections.  The use of the Key Card Tool application for each election 
cycle increases the security of the AccuVote Touch Screen system significantly. 
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Appendix Q – Summary of Absentee Voting 
 
Absentee Voting is a major component of the election process because, in the last election, 18% 
of the voters voted by absentee.   
 
There are two broad categories of absentee voting. The first category includes absentee by (1.) 
mail, (2.) fax and (3.) special advanced requests.  The second category is called in person 
absentee which includes (1.) special needs voting, (2.) early voting, and (3.) absentee in person. 
 
The description of requirements is listed in the Division of Election web site.  In all cases, the 
process starts with the request for ballots to be printed. This is done as part of the same order for 
ballots to the printer for the precinct voting 48 days before the election.  The ballots are numbered 
in sequence with numbers of ballots printed from estimates based on previous elections. 
 
Law requires that all absentee ballots be reviewed, opened and counted by the 15th day after the 
election. Absentee ballots are not part of the post-election audit process. 
 
There is an Absentee Voting Station Official Procedures (Rev 5/2006) and a Absentee 
Voting Official’s Handbook (Rev 4/25/06) 
 
1. Absentee Ballots 
Category 1 ballots are sent to the Division of Elections Absentee and Petition office in 
Anchorage by the printer.    
 
1.1 Absentee by Mail 
Deadline for by mail requests must be received 10 days before the election.  Individuals can 
request either to vote for a single election or all elections in the calendar year. Voters receive 
their ballot by mail, complete it, and place the completed ballot into an included security 
sleeve. That is place that inside a return envelope, the envelope is signed and witnessed.  
The ballot envelope must be postmarked no later than Election Day.  If mailed from within the 
United States, the envelope must be received within 10 days after Election Day. If mailed 
from outside the United States, it must be received within 15 days of Election Day.   
 
The by mail absentee ballots are addressed to the respective Regional office.  These 
envelopes are reviewed by the review board, opened and processed through an OS 
machines at the Regional office election evening.  Either a separate machine is used or a OS 
machines that was used at the election, but with a separate memory card. Eligibility of 
absentee voters is accomplished with the Voter Registration Election Management System 
(VREMS).  This system is completely separate from the GEMS system. 
1.2 Absentee by Fax 
GEMS generates the ballots by fax document as a PDF template that is distributed (faxed by 
computer) to those who requested the ballot by fax.  Voters requesting this format can do so 
between 15 days before the election but no later that 5PM AST the day before Election Day.  
Voters have two options when receiving the ballot by fax. One is to return it by fax (to the 
Absentee and Petition Office) and the other is to mail it back to the respective Region Office.  
If faxed back, it must be received no later than 8 PM AST the day of the election. If mailed 
back, the ballot must be postmarked no later than the Election Day and received; within 10 
days, if U.S postmarked or within 15 days if via international mail.  Absentee voters are 
reminded that by returning their ballot by fax, means that they are voluntarily waiving their 
right to a secret ballot.  Faxed ballots are sent from the Absentee and Petition office to the 
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respective Regional Office.  The Region review board reviews each ballot for eligibility and 
determined if a full or partial count ballot.  Ballots are placed in piles and two individuals 
together make a facsimile of the ballot for processing as an OS ballot.    
 
1.3 Special Advance 
This form of voting is available for individuals in remote Alaska or overseas who want an 
official ballot 60 – 32 days before the election.  These requests result in the individual being 
sent both a special advance ballot and an official ballot to be voted absentee.  If only the 
advanced ballot is returned to the Absentee office, it is entered into VREMS, and secured 
until 15 days after the election. The special advanced ballots are hand counted and the 
results manually loaded into GEMS.  If the OS ballot is returned, it is entered into VREMS 
and forwarded to the respective Regional official.  VREMS verifies if only the advanced ballot 
was received or if both the advanced ballot and the OS ballot were received.  If both were 
received, the OS ballot is the only one that is counted. The Advanced ballots are 
accumulated to 15 days, then logged, reviewed by a review board and shipped to Juneau 
and entered officially in Juneau into GEMS. 
 
2. In Person Absentee Voting 
2.1 In person  
Individuals may vote in person or through a representative up to 15 days prior to Election Day.  
Ballots are printed and delivered to the Regional offices. Each region has appointed absentee 
voting locations and distributes ballots to these locations. Some have house seat ballots for 
all 40 house seats and other absentee sites have only the ballots for the respective Regions’ 
House Districts for that voting location.  The Regional Offices (and Wasilla satellite are also 
absentee voting locations with ballots of all 40 representative districts and available for all 15 
days. 
 
 Region  Number of Locations  
   I  30 
   II  11 
   III  20 
   IV  15 
Some of the absentee voting locations are only available for Election Day or Election Day and 
the day before.  The Official Election Pamphlets outline the locations and time that these 
locations are open for absentee voting. 
2.2 Special Needs Voting 
A qualified voter who is disabled may apply for an absentee ballot through a personal 
representative who can bring the ballot to the voter.  
(following bullets taken from Division of Elections web site:  
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/abinfo.php) 
• A personal representative can be anyone over 18, except a candidate for office in the 
election, the voter's employer, an agent of the voter's employer, or an officer or agent 
of the voter's union.  
• Ballots are available 15 days before the Primary, General or Statewide Special 
Election at any Regional Elections Office: 
 
- Anchorage: 2525 Gambell St, Ste 100 , 522-8683 
- Fairbanks: State Office Building, 675 7th Ave., 451-2835 
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- Juneau: Mendenhall Mall, 9109 Mendenhall Mall Road, Suite 3, 465-3021 
- Nome : 103 E Front Street, 2nd Floor - State Office Building, 443-5285 
- Matanuska-Susitna : 1700 E. Bogard Road, Building B, Suite 102 - North fork 
Professional Building, 373-8952 
• Ballots are available 15 days before the Primary, General or Statewide Special 
Election from any Absentee Voting Official. 
•  Ballots are also available on Election Day from the voter's polling place, unless there 
is an Absentee Official in the area.  
• The Personal Representative brings the completed application to an Election Official 
for a ballot and takes the ballot to the voter.  
• The voter completes a certificate authorizing the Personal Representative to carry 
their ballot, votes the ballot privately, places it in a secrecy sleeve and seals it inside 
the envelope provided.  
• The Personal Representative brings the voted ballot back to the Election Official by 
8:00 p.m. on Election Day.  
2.3 Early Voting In Person 
These early vote in person ballots are only issued at the Regional offices (and Wasilla 
office). They are voted in the office and then sealed, placed in a separate ballot box. These 
ballots are opened and OS scanned election night with the ballots retuned to Juneau with the 
Regions election documents.   
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Document 
Section Scope of Work Item
Current
Risk Level
(H, M, L)  Current Election Cycle Recommendation
Value / Benefit of 
implementing 
recommendation in 
the 2008 election 
cycle
(3, 2, 1)
Residual Risk  Level 
after implementation 
of 2008 election cycle 
recommendations
(H, M, L) Future Election Cycle Recommendation
Residual 
Risk 
remaining 
from 2008 
election 
cycle
(H, M, L)
Value / Benefit of 
implementing 
recommendation in 
the current election 
cycle
(3, 2, 1)
Residual
Risk Level after 
implementation of 
future election cycle 
recommendations
(H, M, L) Constraints / Notes
1.1 Assure 1.2 Upgrade Cost Analysis M Maintain current revision of AccuVote software, 
perform cost benefit analysis to determine best 
resource utilization approach.
N/A M Upgrade to Assure 1.2 when certified M 3 L Funding and logistical planning of the upgrade represents a significant dedication of 
resources.
1.2 Assure 1.2  Functionality Upgrade 
Analysis
M Maintain current revision of AccuVote software. N/A M Upgrade to Assure 1.2 when certified M 3 L Certification of the Assure 1.2 software is required prior to installation.
1.3 Division of Elections Security 
Enhancements and Features 
Analysis
H Implement selected recommendations from 
Appendix D - Division of Elections Enhancement 
Analysis.
2.1-2.5, 2.8, 2.10, 2.13, 2.16, 2.17, 2.18, 2.19, 
2.23, 2.29
3 M Implement remaining recommendations 
included in Appendix D.
M 3 L Determination of which selected enhancements are implemented in the current 
election cycle requires input from the Division of Elections.
1.4 Implement procedures to minimize 
technology risks not addressed by 
existing or upgraded systems
M Implement procedures described in other sections. 
Important to  maintain many of  the processes 
already  in place. 
3 L Monitor research on election processes and 
implement changes, as appropriate.
L 2 L Implementation of technology updates and changes is crucial to maintaining election 
system security and performance.
1.5 Password Management M Change passwords on all affected hardware as 
outlined in password management plan (Appendix 
E).
3 L Develop password management procedures to 
implement password changes and tracking for 
future election cycles to ensure password 
policies are followed consistently.
L 2 L Resources to develop password management procedures will likely not be available 
until after the 2008 election cycle.
1.6 Chain of Custody M Use tamper evident seals on AV-OS and AV-TSX 
machines.
3 L Implement EPROM bar code identification and 
inventory management.
L 2 L Bypass mail, rural home storage, poll worker training and uncertainty about tampering 
false alarms present challenges to implementing a robust tamper seal security plan.
1.7 Best practices for equipment 
storage between elections
M Follow Chain of Custody recommendations.  
Purchase Division of Elections owned equipment 
for North Slope Borough.  Safes are recommended 
for use in DoE offices to store keys and 
passwords.
1 L Improve physical storage security such as room 
security, access alarm, etc.
L 3 L Equipment storage outside of regional centers and hubs is not addressed by the 
recommendation.  Security during transportation is a concern.
1.8 Trusted Personnel and single 
points of access
M None N/A M Require background checks on new employees 
with access to election equipment and 
confidential information
M 2 L State and union regulations may limit the implementation of background checks.  
Access to proprietary information should be limited.
1.9 Redundancy L Two person inspection and sign off on tamper 
evident seals.
1 L Add two-person sign-off to manual entry of 
election results and tamper seal inspections.
L 2 L Poll worker resource constraints could make tamper seal inspections difficult on 
election day.
1.10 Paper Ballot tampering 
vulnerability
L None N/A L None L N/A L Maintain current paper ballot system.
1.11 Master Vulnerability Matrix N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1.12 Security Training M Develop materials to train poll worker in election 
security.
1 L Monitor new procedures and implement as 
appropriate.
L 1 L Poll workers are temporary employees, usually retirees, many don't complete training, 
a lot of information to cover in training session, limits to poll worker authority. 
2.1 Assess the integrity of the 
hardware and software of the 
electronic voting systems and 
their ability to accurately tabulate 
and report results.
L Implement Key Card Tool application.  Implement 
GEMS Air Gap Server model system.  Implement 
dedicated AV-OS machine for programming AV-
OS memory cards.
N/A L None L N/A L None
2.2 Preliminary Results Data 
Collection Assessment
L None N/A L None L N/A L None
2.3 Evaluate the reliability and 
accuracy of the optical scanning 
and touch screen systems in 
Alaska weather and 
transportation/handling conditions. 
L Implement new shipping containers for optical 
scanning systems (PelicanTM. Products 1600 
series or similar)
2 L None L 1 L None
3.1 Procedures for functionality, logic 
and accuracy testing for systems 
and memory cards.
M Implement increased test scope for functional, 
logic and accuracy testing.
2 L Implement test results documentation and 
storage policies.
L 2 L Storage of machine test results may require implementation of an electronic data 
storage system.
3.2 Methods to improve voter 
confidence
L Increase voter use of AV-TSX machines to 
improve voter anonymity.
1 L Monitor research on election processes and 
implement changes, as appropriate.
L N/A L Changes to Alaska's audit procedure require legislative approval. DoE staff size limits 
is ability to develop new poll worker training and recruitment programs.
3.3 Metrics and continuous 
improvement
L Implement a multi-year, multi-phase approach to 
improving election procedures and equipment.
1 L Multi-year, multi-phase approach L 2 L A multi-year, multi-phase approach requires staff training and coordination between 
DOE departments.
3.4 Weekly email summary N/A Provide on-going summary N/A N/A Provide on-going summary N/A N/A N/A
3.5 Absentee and questioned ballot 
process
M Implement 2008 election cycle security 
improvements.
2 L Same as current election recommendations. L 2 L The absentee ballot system is subject to the same vulnerabilities as the standard 
election system but the AV-OS machines are exposed for a 2 week period of time.
3.6 Random sampling methodologies L None.  Current research is not conclusive enough 
to recommend a change to the DoE methodology.
N/A L Implement new sampling procedure as 
appropriate and approved by statute.
Unknown Unknown Unknown Changes must be approved by statute
3.0  Confidence in Outcomes
Appendix R – Master Matrix:  Recommendations, Risk and Value Assessment
1.0  Defense in Depth
2.0  Fortification of Systems
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1 2 3
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
1.10
1.11
1.12
2.1
2.2
2.3
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
Assure 1.2 Upgrade Cost Analysis
Assure 1.2  Functionality Upgrade Analysis
Division of Elections Security Enhancements and 
Features Analysis
Implement procedures to minimize technology 
risks not addressed by existing or upgraded 
systems
Password Management
Chain of Custody
Best practices for equipment storage between 
elections
Trusted Personnel and single points of access
Redundancy
Paper Ballot tampering vulnerability
Master Vulnerabilty Matrix
Security Training
Communications Protocols, Integrity of hardware 
and software, perceived usability issues.
Preliminary Results Data Collection Assessment
Evaluate the reliability and accuracy of the optical 
scanning and touch screen systems in Alaska 
weather and transportation/handling conditions. 
Procedures for functionaity, logic and accuracy 
testing for systems and memory cards.
Methods to improve voter confidence
Metrics and continuous improvement
Weekly email summary
Absentee and questioned ballot process
Random sampling methodologies
1.3
1.5
1.4
1.6
1.7
1.9
1.12
Fix not available or 
required
1.1
1.2
1.8
1.10
2.1
2.2
2.3
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.5
3.6
Appendix S – 2008 Election Cycle Impact Matrix
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3.4
3.5
3.6
Assure 1.2 Upgrade Cost Analysis
Assure 1.2  Functionality Upgrade Analysis
Division of Elections Security Enhancements and 
Features Analysis
Implement procedures to minimize technology 
risks not addressed by existing or upgraded 
systems
Password Management
Chain of Custody
Best practices for equipment storage between 
elections
Trusted Personnel and single points of access
Redundancy
Paper Ballot tampering vulnerability
Master Vulnerabilty Matrix
Security Training
Communications Protocols, Integrity of hardware 
and software, perceived usability issues.
Preliminary Results Data Collection Assessment
Evaluate the reliability and accuracy of the optical 
scanning and touch screen systems in Alaska 
weather and transportation/handling conditions. 
Procedures for functionaity, logic and accuracy 
testing for systems and memory cards.
Methods to improve voter confidence
Metrics and continuous improvement
Weekly email summary
Absentee and questioned ballot process
Random sampling methodologies
1.3
1.5
1.4
1.6
1.71.9
1.12
Fix not available or 
required
1.1
1.21.8
1.10
2.1
2.2
2.3
3.1 3.2
3.3
3.5
3.6
Appendix T – Future Election Cycle Impact Matrix
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Appendix U:  Photographs of System Components and 
Division of Elections Facilities 
 
 
1.0  Alaska Division of Election Voting Equipment  
AccuVote-OS (Optical Scan Terminal) 
 
 
AccuVote-OS  memory card port, memory card and panel to secure memory card in terminal. 
 
 
 
 
Accuvote-OS Memory Card port secured with tamper evident, numbered  tab.  Tamper evident tab after 
removal. 
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AccuVote-OS Terminal vote recording tape chamber and tape.  Tape is Secured beneath locked panel 
during election. 
 
 
 
 
AccuVote-OS Terminal positioned over ballot container.  Note lockable panel on ballot box is opened 
(lower left) .  During election, locked front  and rear panels of the ballot box coverthe secured memory 
card port and the rear of AccuVote OS unit (lower right).  
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Dual chamber, secure ballot container 
 
 
 
 
 
Global Election Management System (GEMS) Server 
GEMS Server (Fairbanks and Anchorage) 
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AccuVote-TXS (Touch Screen Voting Terminal) 
AccuVote-TXS voting terminal, vote viewing panel and vote recording paper tape reel beneath lockable 
panel.  
 
 
 
 
AccuVote-TXS voting terminal lockable memory card port and voter access card port.  
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2.  Alaska Division of Elections Statewide, Regional and Borough Office’s 
Equipment Storage  
2.1 Juneau State-wide Office 
Election Programming Office keyed alarm panel and dead-bolt lock on door. 
 
Election Programming Office          Memory Card Storage Cabinet          Memory Card Storage 
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Inside election programming office, GEMS Server and AV OS used for Memory Card programming prior 
to elections. 
 
 
Inside AV-OS Unit:  EPROM.  Create barcode an place on underside of EPROM for security and 
inventory control 
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Switching Equipment in Election Programming Office  and Equipment Action Log 
 
Ballot Room 
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2.2  Region 1:  Juneau  
Alarm panel and memory card storage cabinet 
  
GEMS Server                                                          Walls and Ceiling 
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AV-OS Unit Storage 
 
Inventory tags on shelves matched with individual AV-OS units. 
 
AV-TSX Storage 
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2.3  Region 2:  Anchorage 
AccuVote-OS and AccuVote-TSX Storage areas.   
 
AccuVote-TSX Voter Access Card programming units used at precincts.  Numeric touch-pad alarm unit 
inside equipment storage room  
 
 
2.4  Region 3:  Fairbanks 
 
(At the time of this photo the optical scanning equipment was on loan to the Fairbanks North Star 
Borough for their municipal election.) 
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2.5  Kenai Borough Office (Representative Hub) 
Storage Vault                                                      Equipment Storage inside Vault 
  
 Excess Election Material Storage 
(Note:  This material does not require secure storage (e.g. ballot boxes, tables, mailing envelopes, etc).  
No “secure” material is stored here (electronic equipment, ballots, etc.) 
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3.0  AV TSX and AV OS  Shipping and Transportation 
AV-OS foam padding and shipping boxes 
 
AV-TSX Shipping Containers with locking capabilities 
The AV-TSX shipping container plus the AV-TSX unit together weigh in excess of 50 pounds.   The 
exterior latches on the AV-TSX shipping cases can be secured with serial-numbered tamper evident seals 
similar to the ones shown below.  
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AV-TSX Shipping Labels:  US Mail Priority, Return Receipt 
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